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“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times,
it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness...”
Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities.
The title of this thesis is about choices of direction; looking back at the three
years I have spent in Tilburg, I realize that this is far from accidental. Coming
to the Netherlands to undertake my PhD studies represented a clear change of
direction, away from my previous life (not only professionally) and towards a
different future. It wasn’t an easy choice to make then, but I now know that it
was the best choice I could make.
Writing a dissertation is a challenging process. There are times (the best
ones) when the enthusiasm about a topic, a new idea or simply talking to
people who share the same interests and the same passion makes it seem an
easy task. But of course it is not. Research can be frustrating business, trying
to prove the same result for the n-th time (n → ∞ sometimes, eh Piotr?!) when
nothing seems to work, naturally spawns a very strong desire to quit it all -
these are the worst of times... I am writing these lines because I know that it
is only thanks to the people I am about to mention that the good times out-
weighted the bad ones.
Even before coming to Tilburg I knew that, from the professional point of
view, the Environmental Economics Group was a first class team. What I
could not anticipate is that the Environmental Economics Corridor in Tilburg
is among one of the finest places in the world to spend three years studying,
working, playing, running, laughing and sometimes eating and drinking. I
would like to thank all the people who made that corridor so special over the
years, thank you Aart, Cees, Daan, Edwin, Erwin, Frans, Jaan, Jetske, Kathi,
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Martin, Paco, Philippe, Rossella, and Sjak.
To Aart de Zeeuw and Sjak Smulders, my promotores, I owe much more than
academic guidance. Aart has always being there for me with his kindness,
his precise comments, and his many suggestions. Most of all I benefited from
his unique ability to show me the broader picture. I find no words to thank
Sjak for his infinite patience and his willingness to share with me his knowl-
edge and his incredible humanity. Over the three years we worked together
he was for me an invaluable example as a teacher, an economist, and a co-
author. The things I most cherish of our time together, however, are of a more
personal nature, his respect and humility, his tactful kindness, his quiet con-
fidence and gentleness will always have a prominent place among my most
precious memories.
I would also like to thank Reyer Gerlagh, André Grimaud, Peter Kort, and
Cees Withagen for their willingness to be a part of the PhD committee and for
their many comments and suggestions.
This thesis is the fruit of my work with some very special people. Besides
Sjak, I have to thank Edwin, Piotr and Simone. Working with you guys was
the best – and sometimes the funniest – part of the process from which this
thesis emerged. Thank you very much, to all of you. Edwin, went with me
through so many things during the last three years that it would be impossible
for me to think of the defense ceremony without him, I am very happy that he
accepted to be one of my paranymphs. Piotr, I will never forgive you for not
letting me taste your home-brewed beer, but otherwise thanks for all the work
and the insights you put into our paper. As for Simone, it has been a pleasure
to work with someone as brilliant and funny as you are. To put it differently,
despite the Tilburg-Zurich distance working with you non è mai stato un dito.
Beside the great working environment, Tilburg also gave me the possibility
to enjoy the company of people from many different countries, it was an in-
credibly enriching experience to spend time with all of you, thanks a lot Amar,
Andrea, Attila, Cristina, Edwin, Evguenia, Gema, Jutta, Kathi, Marina, Mar-
tin and Marta, Mewael, Mohammed, Rossella, and Vera. Andrey deserves a
special mention as it was through him that I discovered the joys of both yoga
and thermal baths.
I would like to thank my oldest friends Anita, Barbara, Dante and Maur-
izio who have always been there for me: you have listened to my complaints,
cheered me up when I was feeling down, and shared my moments of happy-
ness. I owe my sanity of mind, or whatever is left of it, only to you.
ix
Un pensiero speciale va a tutta la mia famiglia che mi ha sempre incoraggiato
e sostenuto, anche quando io stesso dubitavo di farcela. Grazie a tutti voi per
essermi stati vicini, anche quando eravamo lontani.
Finally, I want to devote the last few lines of this acknowledgments to a
special someone I met in Tilburg (one more reason why it was good choice to
come), and who has become very important for me over the years. Na mota
muza, pritelka i partn~orka v ivota, na mota lbima Miliqka:







1 Technology Optimists vs Trade Pessimists 15
1.1 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.1 Intermediate goods and machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.2 Final goods and the production elasticity of pollution . . 23
1.2.3 R&D and innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2.4 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2.5 Environmental regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.2.6 The consumption to output ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 Undirected Technical Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3.1 Autarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3.2 International trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4 Directed Technical Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4.1 Pollution-using vs pollution-saving technical change . . 32
1.4.2 Autarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.4.3 International trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.5 Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A The C/Y ratio in the two regions 43
xi
xii CONTENTS
2 Carbon Leakage Revisited 45
2.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 The Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.1 Equilibrium on the goods and factor markets . . . . . . . 52
2.2.2 Equilibrium on the market for innovations . . . . . . . . 55
2.2.3 General equilibrium under directed technical change . . 56
2.3 Unilateral climate policy and carbon leakage . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3.1 Carbon Leakage under undirected technical change . . . 57
2.3.2 Carbon leakage under directed technical change . . . . . 60
2.4 Discussion and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
B Additional Proofs and Derivations 69
B.1 Existence and stability of the equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.2 The log-linearized model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B.3 Appendix to Proposition 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3 The Direction of Technical Change in Capital-Resource Economies 75
3.1 Growth theory and resource economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2.1 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.2 Balanced Growth Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.3 Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
C Additional Proofs and Derivations 93
C.1 Proof of expressions (3.43) and (3.44) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C.2 Ruling out explosive paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
C.3 Local stability of the BGP equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4 Brain Drain and Distance to Frontier 99
4.1 Education, migration and economic development . . . . . . . . 102
4.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.2.1 Investment in education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2.2 Production and technological progress . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.3 Equilibrium under autarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
CONTENTS xiii
4.4 Convergence under autarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5 Migration and distance to frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.5.1 Uniform probability of migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.5.2 Non-uniform probability of migration . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.6 The role of subsidies in the process of development . . . . . . . 124
4.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
D Proofs of the Results 129
D.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
D.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
D.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
D.4 Proof of Proposition 4.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132




Is technological change good for the environment in a globalized world, or
does it rather lead to more pollution? Are climate policies enlightened at-
tempts to preserve the environment for future generations, or are they just
futile burdens on economic systems? Do efforts to increase the level of ed-
ucation in developing countries lead to faster economic growth, or do they
represent a waste of already scarce resources? These are some of the themes
we investigate in this dissertation: the aim of this work is to contribute some
answers to questions that touch our life, every day.
The focus of this thesis is on the interrelations between technological change,
environmental policy and environmental quality, on the one hand; and be-
tween technological change, human capital accumulation and economic de-
velopment, on the other. Throughout this work we claim that, to understand
these complex phenomena, we need to take into account both the general
equilibrium features of the problems, i.e. the feed-backs between technologi-
cal change and inputs (such as resources and skills) supply; and the dynamic
issues involved, i.e. the evolution over time of the level, and of the composi-
tion of technology and inputs.
Consider, for example, the interaction between environmental policy, tech-
nological change, and pollution in a globalized world. Many argue that glob-
alization is just another way for first world countries to exploit the third world.
In their view, stringent environmental standards set by developed countries
expel polluting industries, forced to relocate in countries with laxer environ-
mental regulation. Opponents of this view, on the other hand, see environ-
mental regulation as the necessary instrument to channel technical progress
in a more energy- and pollution-saving direction. They emphasize the role of
technology transfer from the developed to the developing world as the key
to achieve sustainability. We argue that the feed-backs between international
1
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trade and technological change are richer than either of these views suggest.
Indeed, the development of technologies reacts to economic incentives. At the
same time, however, the availability of cleaner and more efficient technologies
leads to an increase in pollution, if the demand for polluting goods does not
decrease. Hence, both views hold part of the truth, and different outcomes
may obtain in different situations. By emphasizing the key determinants of
these outcomes, we point at the elements that need to be taken into account
when assessing specific cases.
The fact that innovators actually choose what kind of technology to invest in
is crucial in this respect. One of the recurrent ideas of this thesis is that tech-
nological change is the result of purposive activities of research and develop-
ment (R&D), and that the choice of the kind of technology which is developed
depends on the expected profits to be made by exploiting it. Investments in
R&D are incurred only as long as there are returns to be reaped; and the type
of innovation that actually occurs – whether, for example, it pays more to de-
vote resources to the improvement of the performance of a computer like the
one I am typing this introduction on, or to work to make it more energy effi-
cient – is, in the end, just a matter of economic incentives.
Equally important, however, is the understanding that the demand for re-
sources to be used in production – e.g. energy, or the environment’s capacity
to absorb pollution – depends critically on the available technology: firms try-
ing to maximize profits will naturally tend to demand more of the resource,
if they become more productive cœteris paribus. Thus, environmental outcomes
are determined by the contemporaneous working of demand (preference) and
supply (technology) factors: the endogeneity of the links between technology
and resource use is another of the core themes of the work at hand.
As another example, think of the impacts of the emigration of skilled work-
ers on a developing country’s development performance. The fact that em-
igration is possible leads workers to pursue higher levels of education than
they would otherwise. This might have ultimately a positive effect, provided
that not all the skilled workers eventually leave. However, workers might
want to specialize in fields that are in high demand abroad, but not very pro-
ductive domestically. Hence, the composition of skills that are accumulated is
sub-optimal and resources are not used in the most productive way, so that
the growth performance of the country is lower than it could be. The fact that
agents can choose the direction of their investment, thus leads to a slower pace
of economic development.
The examples sketched above show that a thorough understanding of these
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complex and interrelated processes is fundamental when looking for mean-
ingful economic answers to the questions asked at the beginning. In this
thesis we start from this realization and investigate such diverse topics as
North-South trade pollution havens, international differences in climate pol-
icy and innovation, resource-augmenting technical change in capital-resource
economies, and the links between migration, technological development and
growth in developing countries.
Our analysis is consistently carried out by means of dynamic general equi-
librium models, featuring incentive-driven accumulation of knowledge, and
is thus firmly rooted in the tradition of growth theory. However, as mentioned
above, the four chapters that compose this dissertation all have a special fo-
cus on the role of factors’ composition, rather than on their level, in determin-
ing the relevant outcomes. Behind this modelling choice is the belief that a
more detailed level of analysis than usually employed in economic models is
necessary to (try to) understand the complex interplay between economic in-
centives, factors’ accumulation, and policy measures in many fields. The brief
excursus in the literature that follows will help clarify this point.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The long-standing focus of growth theory on the accumulation (and hence the
level) of productive inputs, markedly of physical capital, has deep roots dat-
ing back to the early days of economics as a science. Adam Smith (1776) was
the first to point out that the wealth of a nation depends upon the size of the
market (and hence on capital and labour availability), because this is what de-
termines the division of labour and the proportion of the population engaged
in productive activities. He also remarked that it is the accumulation of wealth
(capital) to cause economic development. Other classical economists such as
Thomas Malthus (1798) and David Ricardo (1817) also focused on the determi-
nants of growth, and underlined the role of capital (and technology) accumu-
lation as means to obtain economic growth. They emphasized, however, the
impossibility of sustained growth in the long-run, due to the pervasiveness of
decreasing returns to productive factors.
Over a century later, with an eye at the broader substitution possibilities
between factors implied by the neoclassical aggregate production function,
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) firmly established capital accumulation as the
key to understanding economic growth. In line with the classics, the central
prediction of neoclassical growth models is that, due to diminishing returns
to each input, in the absence of continuing improvements in technology, per-
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capita growth must eventually cease. To overcome this deficiency, neoclas-
sical growth theorists in the 1950’s and 1960’s generally assumed an exoge-
nous process of technological progress. In this way they could reconcile their
framework with the possibility of long-run growth. Building on the pioneer-
ing work of Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) introduced op-
timal saving decisions in the Solow-Swan framework and de facto completed
the neoclassical growth framework. By focusing on the role of capital accu-
mulation and not addressing the issue of the determinants of technological
change, however, neoclassical growth theory in fact left the fundamental ques-
tion, what causes growth, unanswered.
Serious attempts to incorporate a theory of technological change in the neo-
classical growth model had to wait for the diffusion of tractable models of
imperfect competition (e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). The so-called new growth
theory, started by such contributions as Romer (1986) and (1990), Aghion and
Howitt (1992), and Grossman and Helpman (1991), presents models featur-
ing purposive R&D activities, rewarded by the monopoly power enjoyed by
inventors.
This new literature added an important dimension to the debate on eco-
nomic growth, underlying the role of knowledge accumulation, rather than
capital accumulation, in the process of growth.
This was a welcome and long-awaited development in the growth literature.
Indeed, for many decades an influential literature had been developing, which
stated quite clearly that the growth rate of output seemed to be explained to
a great extent by what came to be known as the Solow residual rather than by
factors’ accumulation. Easterly and Levine, in a paper aptly entitled “It’s not
factor accumulation” (2001), for example, present a critical discussion of this
literature and conclude that “when comparing growth experiences across many
countries, ‘something else’ – besides factor accumulation – plays a prominent role in
explaining differences in economic performances”1. The vast literature on Growth
Accounting developed with the aim of evaluating the ‘proximate causes’ of
growth, i.e. understanding the sources of economic growth, by estimating the
contributions of each productive inputs to output growth.
A common feature of growth accounting exercises is that conventional in-
puts (mainly capital and labour) seem to explain only a small fraction of to-
tal output growth, leading to the puzzling conclusion that the residual, this
“measure of our ignorance” in the words of Moses Abramovitz, accounts for
1Ibid. p. 211.
INTRODUCTION 5
most of output growth. The early works of Abramovitz (1956), Solow (1957),
and Denison (1962) estimated the contribution of this residual to total output
growth at 48-52% for the United States in the first half of the 20th century.2
Successive refinements focused on taking stock of the composition of both
physical and human capital (Jorgenson and Griliches 1967, Denison 1985), as-
certaining that these dimensions play a fundamental role in understanding
economic growth. In Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) the key issue is to accu-
rately include a measure of the quality of the inputs (both capital and labour)
in the estimates. This is achieved by disaggregating the total in many differ-
ent categories: the total factor input then is obtained as a weighted sum of
each component, using the corresponding rental and wage rates as weights.
Thus, changes in the composition of the inputs lead to changes in the explana-
tory power of labour and capital, even if the level in physical terms stays the
same. Denison (1985) presents a complete overview of these attempts and
goes further. Accounting not only for the composition of inputs in terms of
intrinsic characteristics, but also for the structural composition, he focuses on
the shift over time of workers from low-productivity jobs in farming, for ex-
ample, to higher productivity occupations in other sectors. This more sophis-
ticated accounting leads him to report a reduction in the residual from 83% to
44% for the growth of output per worker in the US between 1929 and 1982.
Yet, the residual remained the single most significant contributor to output
growth. Indeed, despite the advances in the statistical methodology, the esti-
mates of the role of the residual for OECD countries between 1960-1995 still
hover around 35%.3
The conclusion from this discussion is that the factor not explained by the
neoclassical growth theory turns out to be the single most important one in
statistical decompositions of economic growth. However, the literature on
growth accounting has pointed out two fundamental directions for further re-
search: first, by showing how the residual shrinks when taking into account
the detailed composition, the sectoral allocation and the increasing quality of
human capital (as proxied, for example, by the level of education), it paved
the way for the in-depth investigation of the links between growth perfor-
mance and human capital accumulation; second, given that most economists,
following Solow (1957), interpreted the residual as a measure of technologi-
cal change, the natural conclusion was to focus research on the economics of
2When measured in terms of output per worker, however, these percentages increase con-
siderably averaging around 85%.
3See Table 10.1 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
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technological change.
These tasks were taken on by the new growth literature which changed the
focus of the economic analysis of growth towards the explanation of the ‘resid-
ual’, both in terms of technological change (Romer 1986, Romer 1990, Gross-
man and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992) and of human capital ac-
cumulation and education (Lucas 1988). As we will discuss later, along both
lines of research, the latest developments have pointed at the necessity of de-
composing the relevant aggregate, be it technological knowledge or human
capital, into their components, in order to grasp the pervasive effects of com-
positional issues on final outcomes.
In this work, we refer directly to these latest developments and incorporate
the endogenous composition of technology and human capital in the analysis
of different problems in environmental, resource and development economics.
In the first of the four chapters, we investigate the issue of North-South trade
and the pollution haven hypothesis taking into account the incentives for the
development of new technologies and the different effects of such technol-
ogy in the two regions. The second chapter deals with differences in climate
policy across countries, their effects on innovation, and the emission of green-
house gases. The emergence of purely resource-augmenting technical change
in capital-resource economies as an equilibrium outcome, constitutes the topic
of the third essay; the complex relation between migration of skilled workers,
the level of technological development, and the growth performance of devel-
oping countries forms the subject matter of the fourth and final one. The rest
of this introduction is devoted to a brief presentation of each of them.
DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The first three chapters of this volume are placed within the framework of
what is called Directed Technical Change (DTC), one of the most recent develop-
ments in the field of economic growth. The development of this approach is
due to Daron Acemoglu who, building upon the seminal work of Paul Romer
(1986, 1990), has addressed the issue of the direction and the bias of endogenous
technological change (e.g. Acemoglu 2002a).
Motivated by the observation that technological change is not neutral in
many circumstances, but is rather aimed at benefiting some productive factors
above others, Acemoglu has extended previous endogenous growth frame-
works to allow for this more realistic feature.4 In his work, technological
4This observation dates back at least to the formulation of the idea of induced innovation by
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change is defined as directed when it is possible for innovators to decide at
which sector to target their innovation efforts. Hence, the amount of R&D
directed at specific sectors is driven by the expected profits from a successful
innovation in each of them. On the other hand, technological change is bi-
ased when it increases the marginal product of one of the productive factors
more than that of the others. In some sense, thus, the direction of technologi-
cal change refers to the economic incentives to innovate, while the bias refers
to the economic (and technological) consequences of the innovation process.
Considering the direction and the bias of technological change provides richer
insights into the interactions between the development of new technology
and the workings of the economic system in which it occurs. For example,
one of the topics where DTC has been usefully applied is the debate on the
skill-complementarity of new technologies. Indeed, the puzzling behaviour
of the skill premium in the US over the last fifty years has spurred much de-
bate (Katz and Murphy 1992, Galor and Tsiddon 1997b, for example): while
the supply of college graduates has increased steadily, the skill premium in-
creased until the early 70’s, then decreased throughout the first half of the 80’s,
and finally soared to reach unprecedented levels with a trend that seems to be
still on-going. This pattern can be explained, it has been claimed, by the skill-
complementing nature of technical change: that is technical change is, by its
own nature skill-biased. This explanation, however, does what neoclassical
growth theorists have done for a long time: it simply assumes an exogenous
process of technical change to explain an economic phenomenon. Yet, techno-
logical change is not skill-complementary by nature as many examples from
the eighteenth and nineteenth century confirm.5 Thus, a solution to the puz-
zle of the skill premium requires a theory for the direction of technical change.
Acemoglu (1998) provides such a theory and shows that the evolution of the
skill premium is consistent with a DTC model in which the relative supply of
skills (the composition of human capital), determines the relative profitability
of new technologies and hence the direction of technical change.
In a long series of papers Acemoglu applies the same type of modelling to
other problems in macroeconomics and labour economics.6 In the first three
chapters of the dissertation, we extend the DTC framework, and analyze dif-
ferent topics in environmental economics. We start by addressing the debate
on the Pollution Haven Hypothesis.
John Hicks (1932).
5See, for example, the discussion in Mokyr (1990).
6Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Acemoglu (2002a), (2002b), (2003a), and (2003b).
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TECHNOLOGY OPTIMISTS VS TRADE PESSIMISTS
The possibility that differences in the stringency of environmental regulation
across countries might lead to a relocation of polluting activities to countries
with laxer environmental standards constitutes the Pollution Haven Hypoth-
esis. This has been a major point of contention in environmental economics
for many years. The natural concern is that international trade would allow
rich countries in the North of the world to clean up their environment, at the
cost of environmental quality in the poorer countries in the South. The coun-
terargument relies on the fact that technology diffuses internationally: if trade
induces the North to specialize in clean production, it might also shift its in-
novation efforts towards cleaner technologies; once these technologies diffuse
to the South, the environment might benefit, overall. In this area, then, the
pessimism of trade theorists is opposed to the optimism of technology special-
ists. In the first chapter of this thesis we analyze the interconnections between
international trade, technological change, and environmental regulation and
assess the merits of these alternative views.
The chapter focuses on the role of endogenous technological change and
technology spill-overs in explaining cross-country differences in pollution,
and the pollution haven effect of international trade. We present a North-
South trade model with two specific features: first, technology is developed
by the North by entrepreneurs who choose the direction of technical change by
determining the amount of resources to invest in the development of sector-
specific innovations. The technologies that become available then diffuse to
the South. Second, environmental regulators in each region choose local envi-
ronmental policies, by trading off the income gains and the disutility from a
rise in pollution.
In the chapter, we argue that the theory of DTC offers new insights in the
relationship between international trade and environmental policy. We show
that trade may induce the North to develop pollution-saving technologies and
the South to reduce pollution, thus reversing traditional reallocation and spe-
cialization effects from trade; however, support for technology optimism is
not the only possible outcome. If pollution-intensive goods are hard to substi-
tute, an increase in innovation efforts in clean sectors by the North, results in
an increased demand for pollution-intensive goods in the South: in this case,
trade induces pollution-using technical change, and this induced technology
response reinforces the incentive for South to increase pollution. Low substi-
tution thus results in technology pessimism.
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We identify two driving forces: on the one hand, the standard terms-of-trade
effect tends to induce specialization, and to increase the pollution differential
across the two regions. So, when the South is the dirtier region in autarchy, its
environmental quality deteriorates with trade. On the other hand, the induced
(directed) technological change leads the North to develop pollution-saving
technologies, leading to a fall in pollution in the North. However, when tech-
nology diffuses to the South, the environment may benefit or not depending
on the elasticity of international demand. This ultimately depends on the de-
gree of substitutability among goods. Hence, both a pollution haven outcome,
or a virtuous circle of environmental improvements are possible.
Technology diffusion from North to South is, therefore, not necessarily good
for the environment in the South, since whether technologies are pollution-
using or pollution-saving depends on the profitability of different innovation
projects, which in turn depends on comparative advantages and substitutabil-
ity between goods with different pollution-intensity. By introducing DTC in
the analysis, we highlight that, contrary to what is often maintained, techno-
logical change is only potentially, not necessarily a blessing.
ASYMMETRIC CLIMATE POLICY AND INNOVATION INCENTIVES
In the second chapter of the dissertation we continue our investigation of DTC
in open economies and turn our attention to climate policy, and to the Kyoto
Protocol. The Protocol is an international environmental agreement requiring
signatory countries to reduce their emissions of green-house gases, mainly
carbon-dioxide, over the so-called ‘commitment period’ 2008-2012. As of July
7, 2006, 164 states and regional economic integration organizations have de-
posited instruments of ratifications, accessions, approvals or acceptance of the
Protocol. Only two of the OECD countries have not ratified the protocol: the
Unites States of America and Australia. The chapter focuses on the debate
about the effectiveness of the protocol in the presence of large non-ratifying
countries. The crux of the argument is that countries outside an environmen-
tal agreement may have incentives to increase their emissions, while others
are trying to reduce them. This phenomenon is called carbon leakage. Such
a behaviour on the part of large not ratifying countries could undermine the
efforts of the participants, which will find themselves paying the cost of the
emissions cut, and at the same time end up without the expected improve-
ment in environmental quality.
Most of the economic literature on the Kyoto Protocol has focused on quanti-
tative evaluations of the degree of carbon leakage in an attempt to evaluate its
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effectiveness, using large computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The
estimates from these exercises are necessarily sensitive to the widely differing
assumptions with respect to the degree of international market integration,
substitution and supply elasticities, and market structure found in the litera-
ture, as a consequence the leakage rates reported in the literature range from
2% to 130%.
In the chapter we argue that to date the role of technological change has been
grossly underestimated in this debate, and develop a two-country framework
in which innovations occur endogenously in both regions. We compare the
effects of an unilateral emission constraint on the pollution decision in the
other country to study the extent of carbon leakage. We show that allowing for
endogenous differences in rates of technological change across sectors, that is
allowing for DTC, radically changes the perception of the problem. We draw
attention to the fact that climate policy, by changing the relative prices (and
supplies) of inputs, alters the incentives for innovation. We show that carbon
leakage is always reduced in our DTC framework, relative to the un-directed
technological change benchmark. Besides, we show that, under particular
circumstances, the pattern of carbon leakage may well be reversed, and that
the introduction of the Kyoto Protocol might bring about technologies that
induce also the non-ratifiers to curb their emissions.
This chapter uses the DTC framework to reach a very important conclusion:
it suggests that the pessimism surrounding the Kyoto Protocol might be mis-
placed, at least as regards emission leakage, and that the available estimates
of the effectiveness of the Protocol might be biased downwards.
DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE IN CAPITAL-RESOURCE ECONOMIES
In the third chapter of this volume, we direct our attention to the issue of sus-
tainability, that is to the question whether long-run growth can be sustained
in the presence of natural resource scarcity. This topic, as mentioned above,
dates back at least to the work of Malthus and Ricardo. In terms of modern
economic theory, however, it is the much celebrated Symposium on the Eco-
nomics of Exhaustible Resources of the Review of Economic Studies in 1974, to be
often recalled as the first close encounter between growth theory and resource
economics.
On occasion of the Symposium, the Capital-Resource model of Dasgupta
and Heal (1974), Solow (1974), and Stiglitz (1974) was introduced to economics.
It is a neoclassical growth model extended to include exhaustible resources
as a production factor, and it has since been considered one of the central
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paradigms in resource economics. More recently, several authors have ex-
ploited new growth theories to analyze capital-resource economies with en-
dogenous technical change: see e.g. Barbier (1999), Scholz and Ziemes (1999),
Groth and Schou (2002), Grimaud and Rougé (2003), Bretschger and Smulders
(2003).
The central aim of both the older and the newer literature is to determine
whether, and under what circumstances, technical progress is effective in en-
suring sustained consumption. In this regard, the common denominator of
both early and recent models is that a strictly positive rate of resource- augment-
ing progress is necessary to obtain non-declining consumption in the long run.
In all endogenous growth models with exhaustible resources, ever-increasing
consumption requires that the resource-augmenting progress strictly exceed
the utility discount rate. The same is true for neoclassical models, where the
rate of resource-saving progress is exogenous. Hence, most contributions in
this field share the view that innovations increase, directly or indirectly, the
productivity of natural resources. However, the existence of purely resource-
augmenting technical progress has not been micro-founded so far. Hence,
one may object that the above models are conceptually biased in favor of sus-
tainability: since technological progress may in principle be capital- rather
than resource-augmenting these authors may just be making a convenient,
but strong assumption.
In the third chapter we investigate whether, and under what circumstances,
technical change is endogenously directed towards resource- augmenting in-
novations. We tackle the issue in a multi-sector DTC framework, where ex-
haustible resources and accumulable man-made capital are both essential for
production.
Our main result is that purely resource-augmenting technical change takes
place along the balanced growth path: although the rate of capital-augmenting
progress may be positive in the short run, it falls to zero as the economy ap-
proaches balanced growth. We thus provide a micro-foundation for Capital-
Resource models featuring resource-augmenting progress, in both the Solow-
Ramsey and the endogenous technical change frameworks: our results contra-
dict the view that such models are too optimistic with respect to sustainability.
COMPOSITION OF HUMAN CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The fourth essay comprised in this thesis takes us away from the field of en-
vironmental economics and into the domain of development economics. In
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this last chapter, we contribute to the debate on the effects of skills’ accumula-
tion on growth: we analyze the interaction between the composition of skills,
the possibility of migration, and the degree of backwardness of a developing
country.
A long tradition, dating back at least to Nelson and Phelps (1966), holds that
a larger stock of human capital matters for economic growth. Along these
lines are, just to mention a few notable examples, the works of Lucas (1988),
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). However,
more recently, a famous contribution by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) found
that the level of education is statistically significantly and positively associ-
ated with subsequent growth, only for the countries with the lowest educa-
tion. As is often the case in economics, this puzzle has spurred a good deal of
research on the issue.
A recent paper by de la Fuente and Doménech (2006), has shown that “these
counterintuitive results on human capital and growth can be attributed to deficiencies
in the data” and that “improvements in data quality lead to larger and more pre-
cise estimates of schooling coefficients in growth regressions”.7 The fact that their
‘improvements’ in data quality involve the accurate decomposition of edu-
cational attainments by level, lends support to our focus on the relevance of
composition.
Along the same lines, some recent theoretical contributions have started in-
vestigating the role of the composition of human capital. Ramcharan (2004),
for example, focuses on the design of optimal educational policy in develop-
ing countries, taking into account the effects of different compositions of the
human capital stock. He concludes that if the composition of human capi-
tal is not taken into account, educational policies may end up promoting the
wrong kind of accumulation, thereby leaving the level of development unaf-
fected. Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006), instead, link the effects
of exogenous changes in the composition of human capital on growth to the
distance from the technological frontier of different countries. In their anal-
ysis, changes in the level of human capital have a positive effect. However,
depending on the level of the available technology, the composition of the hu-
man capital makes a big difference. The closer the economy is to the frontier,
the more it will benefit from an increase in the endowment of skilled workers.
Conversely, the same economy suffers, and the growth rate decreases, when
the share of unskilled workers increases.
7de la Fuente and Doménech (2006), p. 1.
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BRAIN DRAIN AND DISTANCE TO FRONTIER
In this chapter, we extend the work of Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir
(2006) by allowing for the endogenous accumulation of human capital and by
focusing on the distortionary effects of migration in a model which features
an out-flow of skilled workers, the so-called brain drain. Classical studies of
the brain drain suggest that emigration of highly educated people is benefi-
cial for destination countries but harmful for source ones (e.g. Borjas 1994).
These conclusions, however, have been challenged by recent contributions
which focussed on the potential benefits of the brain drain (for example, Stark,
Helmenstein, and Prskawetz 1998, Vidal 1998, Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport
2001). The claim there is that the possibility of emigration induces more skill-
creation than skill-loss on balance and that source countries might actually
increase their stock of human capital.
Motivated by the largely inconclusive empirical work of Beine, Docquier,
and Rapoport (2003), in this chapter we contribute to this debate by focussing
on the role played by the composition of human capital in fostering productiv-
ity growth and, finally, economic development. We argue that not all human
capital is appropriate for the available technology and the current level of de-
velopment. In particular, we postulate that the distance to the technological
frontier is the key determinant for understanding the effects of human capital
accumulation and composition on economic growth. While the accumulation
of human capital seems to imply faster technological advancement and eco-
nomic growth, we point at the different types of human capital that are most
useful at different stages of development. This view reflects the idea that tech-
nological advances become available either through imitation or through in-
novation, and that each activity requires (a different combination of) different
types of skills.
To investigate the distortionary effects of migration on the accumulation of
human capital, we model human capital accumulation by agents as an en-
dogenous decision. By letting the type of skills acquired be determined by
the costs and benefits faced by heterogenous agents, we add one important
dimension to the model. We are in fact able to investigate the interaction
between labour market outcomes, migration possibilities and institutional ar-
rangements, such as the existence of educational policies targeted at satisfying
the needs of the local economy.
Our results show that the possibility of migration does distort the incentives
for agents to accumulate the type of human capital that is appropriate for the
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country of origin, given its level of development. We show that when migra-
tion becomes possible at early stages of economic development the growth
rate of the source economy decreases. We also discuss circumstances under
which this process leads to development traps, i.e. situations where the pro-
cess of convergence to the technological frontier stops prematurely.
Finally, we turn to a more normative analysis and show that educational
policies, in the form of subsidies to particular types of skills, can counteract
the negative effects of migration on growth. Thus, countries wishing to max-
imize their convergence potential should take this mechanism into account
and increasingly subsidize appropriate skills, the further away they are from
the technological frontier, and the easier the prospects of migration.
CHAPTER
ONE
TECHNOLOGY OPTIMISTS VS TRADE PESSIMISTS1
In the debate on pollution havens, trade pessimists radically disagree with
technology optimists.2 From the perspective of standard trade theory, inter-
national goods and investment flows between countries with different envi-
ronmental standards are likely to concentrate pollution in countries with lax
environmental regulations. These countries acquire a (real or apparent) com-
parative advantage in pollution-intensive activities. The natural concern is
that international trade would allow rich countries in the North to clean up
their environment at the cost of environmental quality in poorer countries in
the South. Opposite to this view is the argument that pollution in different
countries is much more technology-driven than trade-driven: while trade lib-
eralization has been important over the last decades, the role of technological
change in determining trade patterns and income levels has been at least as
important. Technology transfer by multinational firms and the diffusion of
clean technologies are often claimed to be a powerful counterbalance to the
pollution haven tendencies. When trade induces North to specialize in clean
production, it might also shift its innovation efforts to clean technology. If
clean technologies diffuse to the South, the environment might benefit.
This chapter formalizes the interconnection between trade, technological
change, and environmental regulation. We model two regions which we call
1This chapter is based on Di Maria and Smulders (2004).
2For a comprehensive review of this literature see, for example Zarsky (1999). Antweiler,
Copeland, and Taylor (2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2004) provide a thorough discussion
of the role on international trade on the environment, both from the theoretical and the em-
pirical point of view.
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the North and the South. Each region produces two tradable goods, with pol-
lution stemming from only one of them. In both regions local environmental
regulators choose environmental policy by trading off the income gains from a
rise in pollution against the disutility due to the lower environmental quality.
Monopolistic firms in the North invest in new technology to maximize profits.
A fraction of these new technologies diffuse to the South since firms there can
copy technologies at no cost.
We show that indeed trade may induce the North to develop pollution-
saving technologies and the South to reduce pollution, thus reversing tradi-
tional reallocation and specialization effects from trade. However, such sup-
port for technology optimism is not the only possible outcome. If it is hard to
find substitutes for pollution-intensive goods, an increase in innovation efforts
by the North in clean sectors results in an increased demand for pollution-
intensive goods from the South; in this case, trade induces pollution-using
technical change and the induced technology response to trade reinforces the
incentive for South to increase pollution. Low substitution thus results in tech-
nology pessimism.
Our analysis involves two main steps. First, we study how costs and bene-
fits of environmental policy in the innovating region differ from those in the
imitating region. The resulting differences in environmental stringency pro-
vide one of the regions with a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive
production as a basis for trade. Second, we study whether international trade
leads to more or less pollution in the South when the technologies developed
in the North diffuse to the South. We identify two effects by which trade af-
fects environmental policy: The conventional terms of trade effect, by which
trade affects domestic producers’ prices and induces them to reallocate pro-
duction according to comparative advantage; and the induced technology effect,
which arises since trade affects profits in the two sectors in the North so that
innovation effort shifts from one sector to another. This affects the mix of tech-
nologies that are available not only in the North, but also - through imitation
- in the South.
The existing literature mainly focuses on trade aspects, identifying different
sources of comparative advantages. First, if environmental quality is a nor-
mal good, increases in the level of income will induce a higher demand for
environmental quality. Richer countries will thus tend to have more stringent
environmental regulation relative to poorer countries, and to develop a com-
parative advantage in the production of less polluting goods (see Cole 2004).
Second, the comparative advantage for the South in the polluting (resource-
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intensive) sector may arise as a consequence of ill-defined property rights on
the common pool resource (as in Chichilnisky 1994). As South does not regu-
late access to resources, it over-exploits them, leading to the emergence of an
apparent comparative advantage vis-à-vis an otherwise identical country. Fi-
nally, comparative advantage in pollution-intensive production may originate
from differences in the relative endowments of productive factors (Copeland
and Taylor 2003). If capital-intensive goods are also relatively more pollution-
intensive, and rich countries are relatively more endowed with capital, they
might enjoy a comparative advantage in the pollution-intensive good. This
might explain the fact that most production of pollution-intensive goods takes
place in developed countries, in spite of their stringent regulation.
We complement this literature with our finding that differences in invest-
ment/innovation opportunities and distortions between the innovating North
and the imitating South generate a source of comparative advantage in pollu-
tion-intensive goods. We isolate this effect by abstracting from the sources of
comparative advantage discussed in the previous paragraph. In particular,
our assumptions on preferences imply that being richer does not lead per se
to more stringent environmental policy; we assume that the property rights
on the resource base are perfectly defined and enforced; and that the relative
factor endowments are identical across regions. Instead, in our setting com-
parative advantage stems from the difference in enforcement of intellectual
property rights in the two regions: the North protects innovators and gener-
ates innovation, the South cannot protect innovators and imitates technology
from the North.3
By almost exclusively relying on trade theory, the theoretical literature on
the pollution haven hypothesis seems to have placed insufficient weight on
the technology aspects of the debate. Indeed, there is also a small literature
that deals with endogenous innovation and pollution havens, e.g. Golombek
and Hoel (2005) and Ben Youssef (2003). We differ from these papers in that we
do not assume a priori that technological change always results in cleaner pro-
duction. Instead we derive the nature of technological change endogenously
from profit incentives (following Acemoglu’s (2002a) theory of directed tech-
nological change). We also differ from these papers by allowing firms, rather
than a planner, to decide on innovation, so that innovation externalities and
second-best policies play a role.
3To avoid confusion with the discussion above, notice that here we refer to intellectual
property rights protection, while the above discussion referred to the institutional setting reg-
ulating ownership of the resource base.
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The organization of the chapter is as follows: section 1.1 introduces the
model, while section 1.2 discusses the equilibrium. In particular, we address
environmental regulation in section 1.2.5. Section 1.3 discusses the pure terms
of trade effect by modelling innovation opportunities such that trade induces
neither pollution-saving nor pollution-using technical change. Section 1.4 is
instead devoted to the analysis of the induced technology effect. Finally, in
section 1.5 we collect and compare our main results, and conclude.
1.1 The model
Our economy is made up of two regions, each comprising a set of small coun-
tries, which we call the North and the South. These two regions only differ
in the institutions regulating intellectual property rights (IPR’s) protection. In
particular, we assume that IPR’s are perfectly enforced in the North, while
they are not enforced in the South.
The economy admits a representative consumer who derives utility (U) at
each moment in time from produced consumption goods (C) and from en-
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where ρ is the rate of time preference and ς is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.4
Here we view environmental quality as the amount of natural resources (Ē)
not devoted to productive use (R) at each point in time. We model it as a flow
variable, since at every moment in time it returns to its maximum level, Ē.
Hence, our variable R represents pollution, or more precisely, extractive use
of natural resources - clean water and clean air, say - for use in production.
Each consumer maximizes the utility in (1.1) subject to the budget constraint5:












4As is usual in growth theory, the Cobb-Douglas/CRRA structure allows for a balanced
growth path with constant environmental quality and a constant rate of growth of consump-
tion. We touch again on this issue on page 27 below. For a complete discussion see Bovenberg
and Smulders (1995).
5To simplify notation, as long as no confusion arises, we suppress time arguments from
now on.
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where M is physical investment, and D is the total amount of research and
development (R&D) expenditure. The production function in (1.2) shows that
final output (Y) is obtained as a CES aggregate of two intermediate goods, YR
and YL, with an elasticity of substitution equal to ε. Moreover expression (1.2)
states that consumption, investment and R&D expenditure are all the possible
uses of the final good.
The pollution-intensive good (YR) is produced using resources and a set
of differentiated man-made inputs which we refer to, for simplicity, as “ma-
chines", mR(j). The range of machines that can be used to produce pollution-
intensive goods is indicated by NR. The labour-intensive good (YL) is pro-
duced using labour and a different set of machines, whose range is NL. The


















For simplicity we have modeled pollution, R, as an input. Stokey (1998) has
shown, however, that the Cobb-Douglas specification in (1.3) can be seen as
the reduced form of a technology with pollution as an output and abatement
possibilities. The key property is that a reduction of marketable output (or
an increase in machine inputs) is necessary to cut pollution, either because
of a need to save on polluting inputs or because an abatement cost has to be
incurred.
Technological change arises from costly innovation: private firms invest in
R&D labs in which blueprints for new machine varieties are developed (as in
Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). Since the R&D stage has to be finished before
production of new machines can take place, R&D costs are sunk. As a con-
sequence, only innovators who expect to wield some monopoly power in the
future will actually engage in R&D activities. This means that innovation will
only take place in the North, where intellectual property rights are protected,
while southern producers are able to copy these innovations.
Since R&D generates new blueprints, the total range of machines, N, in-
creases with R&D investments, D. We consider two alternative specifications.
In the first, R&D decisions affect the rate at which new blueprints are devel-
oped, but innovators cannot know in advance in which of the two sectors
their specific innovation will prove most useful. In this case, which we label
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where D is total R&D investment in the economy and the γi is the exogenous
probability (γR + γL = 1) that an individual researcher’s effort results in a
successful new machine design for sector i. The denominator at the right-
hand side of (1.5) represents the "difficulty of R&D" (cf. Segerstrom (1998)),
which depends on two opposing effects. On the one hand, we assume that the
more innovations in any sector already have been generated, the harder it is to
come up with the next innovation. We capture this by the factor (NR + NL)
ψ ,
where ψ > 0. On the other hand, new innovation opportunities may arise ex-
ogenously over time. This can be viewed as reflecting any kind of innovation
not driven by sector-specific profit incentives. We capture the level of innova-
tion opportunities by parameter η, which we assume to grow at an exogenous
rate ψ g.7
In our second specification of innovation possibilities, technical change is di-
rected, following Acemoglu (2002a), so that innovators can target their efforts






While the denominator is the same and motivated by the same arguments as
in (1.5), the rate of innovation in each sector depends on the total R&D effort
taking place in it, Di, with DL + DR = D.
Although we think the directed technical change variant is more realistic,
contrasting undirected to directed technical change allows us to disentangle
the terms of trade effect and the induced technology effect.
Finally, we assume that labour supply is exogenously fixed at L, while the
environmental regulator in each country puts an endogenously determined
cap on pollution R.
6Throughout the chapter dotted variables indicate time derivatives, that is ẋ = dx/dt.
7Assuming ψ = 0, we would have an endogenous growth model, in which the long-run
growth rate is endogenous. Although generating very similar results, the fully endogenous
growth version of this model involves a more complicated analysis so that we ignore it here.
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1.2 Equilibrium
Firms maximize profits and households maximize utility. They all take as
given prices and factor rewards, with one notable exception: producers of
machines in the North can set their own price as they operate under monop-
olistic conditions. Finally the environmental regulator in each country maxi-
mizes the utility of the representative agent by choosing the nation-wide level
of pollution (resource supply), taking as given international prices. All mar-
kets clear and the resource constraint is satisfied. The final good is chosen as
the numeraire.
In what follows we only focus on the long-run balanced growth path of this
economy, where prices and the amount of natural resources used in produc-
tion are constant and where output, consumption, investment and R&D out-
lays, as well as NR and NL, all grow at the (exogenous) rate g.8
1.2.1 Intermediate goods and machines
We start from the production of intermediate goods. To simplify the exposi-
tion, we let SR ≡ R and SL ≡ L. Firms that employ factor i (i = L, R) maxi-
mize their profits choosing the amount of factor Si to employ and the amount
of machines mi(j) of each type to use. Their maximization problem is then:
max
Si,{mi(j)}




subject to the production functions (1.3) and (2.3), and taking as given both









8With constant factor supply R and L, the constant returns to scale production functions
(1.2)-2.3 imply that output grows at the same rate as NR and NL. The goods market equi-
librium condition (1.2), moreover, requires Y, C, M and D to grow at a common rate. The
innovation functions (1.5) and (1.6) imply that the growth rate of Ni can be constant only if
(NR + NL)
ψ /η is constant (see Jones 1995). Hence, the growth rate of this economy equals
(Ṅi/Ni) = (η̇/η)ψ = g. Given the choice of the final good as numeraire, prices are constant
along the balanced growth path.
9For simplicity, we assume that machines depreciate fully after use. As discussed by Ace-
moglu (2002a), assuming slow depreciation of machinery would not change the balanced
growth equilibrium path.
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Consider first the supply of machines in the North. Since intellectual prop-
erty rights are perfectly enforced, ownership of blueprints allow northern
producers to act as monopolists. Assuming that υ units of the final good
are required to produce each machine and that machine production is sub-
sidized at rate τm, the expression for the profits of a monopolist supplying
the i-complementary machine j is given by πi(j) = (pmi(j)− υ(1− τm)) mi(j),
j ∈ (0, Ni] . Given the demand function in (1.8), the profit-maximizing price
will be set as a mark-up over marginal cost, and will equal pmi(j) = υ(1−
τm)/(1− β). To simplify the algebra, we assume υ to be equal to 1− β, so that
pmi(j) = (1− τm). Substituting for machine prices and demand functions in
the expressions for the profits of the technology monopolist, one gets:
πi(j) = (1− τm)−(1−β)/ββp1/βi Si. (1.9)
Using machine demands (1.8) and prices in the sectorial production func-
tions (1.3) and (2.3), we obtain the supply functions for northern firms, that












Next, turn to the South. IPR’s are not enforced in the South, patent protection
is not effective and the sunk costs associated with the development of new
blueprints cannot be recouped. This effectively rules out the possibility that a
local R&D sector may arise in the South. We assume, though, that southern
producers can copy at no cost blueprints developed in the North. In particular,





Diffusion is incomplete due to a time lag between innovation and imitation,
or because some blueprints are inherently too complex (and thus too costly)
to copy.
As no institutional arrangement protects the monopoly power of machine
producers, and no sunk costs prevent copying by more than one producer,
perfectly competitive markets ensue. The price of machines in the South will
then equal marginal cost: pmi(j) = (1− β). Substituting machine demands












Comparing (1.11) and (1.10), we see that for δ < ((1− β)/(1− τm))(1−β)/β,
productivity (per unit of factor Si) is lower in the South than in the North, so
that the diffusion parameter δ realistically allows the South to be poorer than
the North.
1.2.2 Final goods and the production elasticity of pollution
Final goods’ producers demand intermediate goods up to the point where
marginal productivity equals price. This implies ∂Y/∂Yi = pi, which from









where Υi represents the demand for intermediate good i.
In the rest of the analysis, the production elasticity of polluting inputs will









where we made use of (1.3) to write (∂YR/∂R)(R/YR) = β and we introduced
the production elasticity (and cost share) of pollution-intensive goods in final
goods production, θR ≡ (∂Y/∂YR)(YR/Y) = pRYR/Y. Since the production
elasticity of pollution and θR move together for any given β, we will find it
easier to refer to the latter in the discussion that follows. Moreover, note that
since (1.2) features constant returns to scale, 1− θR = pLYL/Y. Using (1.10) or









This reveals that the share of pollution-intensive goods in production, θR, de-
pends on relative prices, relative factor supply, and technology.
1.2.3 R&D and innovation
Firms in the North have an incentive to innovate whenever innovation earns
a rate of return that is at least equal to the market interest rate. This implies
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where π̃j is the per period flow of expected revenues (dividends) for the holder
of a blueprint j, vj is the market value of blueprint j, and r is the interest
rate. In the model of undirected technical change, expected dividends equal
π̃j = γRπR + γLπL; in the model of directed technological change they equal
π̃j = πi if j’s effort is directed to sector i = R, L.
We assume free entry in research activities, which implies that the value
of a blueprint cannot exceed its cost. From (1.5) and (1.6), this implies vj ≤
(NR + NL)ψ/η. In particular, in the undirected technical change model, this
condition must hold with equality whenever innovation occurs, that is when-
ever D > 0; in the directed technical change model it holds with equality for
j = i, where i = R, L is the sector in which innovation takes place (Ṅi > 0).
In the undirected technical change model, the long-run ratio NR/NL equals
γR/γL, as follows from (1.5). Hence, the relative supply of machine variety
only depends on research technology and cannot be affected by e.g. trade.
Once in a balanced growth path, only shocks to Ni or γi can bring the economy
from its balanced growth path. This allows us to treat NR/NL as a constant in
the undirected technical change model.
In the directed technical change model, along the balanced growth path in-
novation takes place in both sectors, the cost and value of a blueprint is the
same in both sectors (vR = vL) and to satisfy the condition (1.15), we must







The relative profitability of innovations in each sector thus increases with the
price of the intermediate good they are used to produce (the price effect), and
with the relative supply of the factor they complement (the market-size effect).
1.2.4 Households
Households maximize their lifetime utility (1.1), subject to the usual intertem-
poral budget constraint. This results in the Keynes-Ramsey rule stating that
consumption grows at a rate proportional to the difference between the inter-
est rate and consumer’s rate of time preference.
Along the balanced growth path, consumption and output grow at the same
rate, g, so that we may express this equation as:
r = ρ + ςg. (1.17)
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1.2.5 Environmental regulation
We assume that the environmental regulator determines the level of pollution
in the economy.10 We model the regulator assuming that she only aims at cor-
recting the environmental externality from production mentioned above. She
chooses the supply of pollution to maximize the utility of the representative
agent at each moment in time, taking as given the choices made by the other
economic agents in the economy, concerning the level of consumption and of
investment in both machines and R&D.
To gain some intuition, we first derive the environmental policy rule in gen-
eral terms. As in a static context, the maximization of U(C, Ē− R) subject to a
budget constraint of the form C = F(R, · )− D − M, where D and M are the




























Ē− R . (1.18)
This equation balances the marginal benefits from pollution (in the form of
additional consumption goods) and its marginal costs (in the form of lower
environmental amenities), both measured in terms of consumption.
Equation (1.18) also shows how the supply of pollution depends, all other
things equal, on the production elasticity of polluting inputs, on the consump-
tion to output ratio, and, finally, on the share of environmental amenities in








sources more valuable in production and increases the marginal benefits of
pollution. In other words, the costs of reducing pollution become larger, or,
equivalently, the opportunity cost of environmental policy increases. Second,
a lower consumption to output ratio C/Y increases the equilibrium supply of
pollution by increasing its marginal benefits. Intuitively, in an economy with
lower consumption per unit of output consumption is perceived as relatively
scarce, thus the marginal value of production relative to the marginal value
of environmental quality is increased. Finally, a higher share of amenities in
utility, (∂U/∂E)E(∂U/∂C)C , increases the marginal benefits of environmental quality (i.e.
it increases the marginal costs of pollution), shifts the MC curve up, and hence
decreases equilibrium pollution.
10 We also assume that environmental policy is perfectly enforced in both regions.
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We can rewrite (1.18) noting that the share of environmental amenities equals
φ, see (1.1), and that the production elasticity of pollution is given in (1.13).







E/L− R/L︸ ︷︷ ︸
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. (1.19)







































This expression will prove more tractable in the analysis that follows than
(1.19), bear in mind, however, that this condition still states that pollution will
be set at a level that equals marginal benefits to marginal costs. We will use
this expression to determine the level of pollution chosen by each region’s
regulator under autarchy and under free trade, and to discuss how these de-
cisions will be influenced by the directedness of technical change.
In the introduction, we pointed out that our model rules out international
differences in environmental policy due to differences in income, factor en-
dowments, or resource property right regimes. We do so in order to isolate
the effect of endogenous technology from other mechanisms explaining pollu-
tion haven effects in the existing literature. Equation (1.20) reveals how we do
this. First, if output and consumption grow at the same rate, Ω ≡ β/(φC/Y)
is constant. Then, the equilibrium supply of pollution must be the same for
each level of income. This is due to the Cobb-Douglas specification of the
utility function (1.1), which implies that the larger demand for environmental
quality due to higher income is exactly offset by the higher cost of pollution
reduction generated by the increasing productivity of polluting inputs which
drives growth. Second, we assume that relative factor endowments, Ē/L, and
preferences, reflected by φ, are the same in both regions. This leaves us with
11It is important for the analysis that follows to bear in mind that Ω is a constant along the
balanced growth path in each country. Yet, its value depends on the country specific level of
C/Y. Thus, a country with more consumption per unit of final output, will have a lower Ω.
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three determinants for the differences in R/L, as shown in equation (1.20):
differences in the consumption-to-output ratio across countries, prices, and
technology.12
In the next section we discuss the differences in the C/Y ratios between
North and South. We will show that they do not depend either on the trade
regime, or on the assumptions concerning the innovation process. With this in
mind, we can explain the different outcomes of the model under the different
trade regimes in terms of price and technology effects only.
In the remainder of the chapter we will be able to separate price and tech-
nology effects since we will first focus on undirected technological change - in
which case the bias NR/NL is exogenous - and later on directed technological
change - with the bias NR/NL endogenously determined. For each technology
regime, moreover, we will discuss and compare autarchy, where prices differ
across countries, and free trade, where price equalization obtains.
1.2.6 The consumption to output ratio
As mentioned above, the consumption to output ratio constitutes one of the
central elements of our analysis. Here we provide an expression for this ratio
in each country that we can use to substitute in expression (1.20). Appendix





= 1− (1− β) = β, (1.21)










− (1− β)β g
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. (1.22)
Comparing the two expressions above, we note two differences. First, the
North will invest less in physical capital, since northern producers of interme-
diate goods face higher machine prices than their southern counterparts. In-
deed, in the North monopolistic competition, fostered by IPR’s enforcement,
drives prices above marginal cost, while this cannot happen in the South were
patent protection is not enforced. This first effect is reflected by the second
12From (1.20), it is straightforward to see that our analysis using the C/Y ratios, can be
alternatively carried out through differences in φ and E/L. As long as North has higher φ
and/or lower E/L, the analysis is qualitatively similar to the analysis that follows where the
North has an higher C/Y ratio than the South.
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term on the right-hand side of (1.22). As long as the monopolistic distortion is
not off-set by an appropriate subsidy (τm = β), the North will spend less for
machines than the South. Second, the North consumes less than the South out
of its gross output, since part of it is invested in developing new technology
(research expenditures, the third term at the right-hand side of the equation
above). Northern innovators find it profitable to forego some consumption
in order to invest in R&D, whereas this is impossible for southern (potential)
innovators. It is clear that these two effect work in opposite direction and
that, depending on the level of the subsidy, any of the two can dominate. In
particular, it is easy to show that (C/Y)n > (C/Y)s whenever τm <
β(r−g)
r−gβ .
1.3 Undirected Technical Change
In this section we analyze the pollution supply by the two regions assum-
ing that innovators cannot change the long-run composition of technology
NR/NL. We analyze both the autarchy case, where the only interdependence
between the two regions stems from the international diffusion of technology,
and the free trade situation. In this context the only effect of trade is through
changes in prices. This section will provide us with a benchmark for the anal-
ysis of the directed technical change case, in the following section.
1.3.1 Autarchy
Under autarchy, domestic relative demand for final goods equals domestic
supply. Substituting supply (1.10) or (1.11) into the expression for demand
(1.12), we find that the domestic price ratio is given by the following function









where σ = 1 + (ε − 1)β is the elasticity of substitution between R and L in
aggregate production. Substituting this into (1.20), we obtain the following


















We have thus obtained a (relatively) simple equation in the relative factor sup-
ply only. We note that E/L, NR/NL, and σ are the same across countries, while
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Ω differs. Recalling that Ω = β/(φC/Y), it is straightforward to see that the
region with the highest C/Y has the lowest Ω, and thus chooses the lowest
R/L, according to (1.24).
Since a closed form solution cannot be obtained analytically, we derive fur-
ther results graphically. The left-hand side of the equation above is linear
in pollution supply and negatively sloped, while the right-hand side is an
increasing function of R/L with a curvature which depends on σ. We plot
the left- and the right-hand sides of (1.24) in figure 1.1 below, as LHS and
RHS, aut, respectively.13 The solid lines describe the situation under autarchy.
 RHS,Aut 
An 
LHSs LHS, RHS 
Ē/L 
As Fs Fn LHSn 
RHSn,FT RHSs,FT 
R/L 
Figure 1.1: Equilibrium with Undirected Technical Change under Autarchy and Free
Trade
It is easy to see from (1.24) that the line depicting the left-hand side will
be steeper and further to the North-East, the larger Ω, that is the smaller the
consumption to output ratio. In the picture we depicted the situation in which
the North has the largest C/Y and thus the lowest line. The right-hand side
is shared by the two countries, so that the equilibrium will obtain at a point
characterized by less pollution in the North than in the South.
Intuitively, the reason for this result lies in the difference in the marginal
benefits from pollution. Remembering the first-order condition in (1.19), it is
13The figure is drawn for the case where σ < 1. The curves depicting the right-hand side
would be concave for σ > 1, but qualitatively nothing would change in our analysis.
30 TRADE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
immediate to see that, while the marginal cost term (on the right-hand side) is
the same for every country, the marginal benefit term (on the left-hand side)
depends negatively, ceteris paribus, on the C/Y ratio. Loosely speaking, the
more consumption each country obtains out of any unit of output, the lower
the marginal benefit (in terms of consumption) it derives from any marginal
increase in pollution.
1.3.2 International trade
Once goods are traded internationally without frictions, one single price pwi
for each good i = R, L will prevail at the world level. This implies that the
right-hand side of (1.20) is the same across countries. Equating the left-hand


















This shows that, as long as Ωs > Ωn (that is as long as (C/Y)s < (C/Y)n), the
South will pollute more than the North also under free trade. More generally,
we can conclude that countries that consume relatively less tend to impose
laxer environmental regulation and hence to pollute more. From now on we
state that Ωs > Ωn corresponds to a situation in which South has a compara-
tive advantage in polluting goods (if Ωn > Ωs, the North has it).
When international trade is allowed, the equilibrium world relative price is
determined by the market clearing condition on the world markets, that is,
from (1.12) and relative supply: (pR/pL)
























where λn = 1 − λs = [1 + ( 1−τm1−β )(1−β)/βδLs/Ln]−1. The term in the brack-
ets on the right-hand side in (1.26) is the world supply of pollution relative
to labour, in efficiency terms, written as a weighted average of the national
relative factor supplies Rn/Ln and Rs/Ls.





























By interchanging the s and n superscripts we get the condition that determines
equilibrium pollution in the South. To understand the effect of free trade when
technical change is undirected, we need to compare this expression with the
corresponding one for autarchy, (1.24). We do this using once more a graphical
treatment for clarity. First of all, we notice that the left-hand side does not
change, so that the relevant curves are still the solid downward sloping lines
in figure 1.1. As for the right hand side, all else equal it will be below the
corresponding autarchy curve whenever the own country’s Ω is larger than
the foreign one. Assuming once more that the North consumes relatively more
than the South, this means that the northern curve will shift up, while the
southern one will shift down, relative to autarchy. This is represented by the
two dotted lines in of figure 1.1. 14
North and South are interdependent through goods trade and diffusion of
technology from North to South. The literature on international technology
diffusion argues that the two are connected: international communication and
contacts stimulate technology spillovers, e.g. (Keller 2004). We therefore now
study how our results depend on our parameter for technology diffusion, δ.
An increase in δ, the fraction of northern technologies copied in the South,
raises production levels in the South, see (1.11). In autarchy, this raises aggre-
gate production without changing relative variables. In particular, the equi-
librium pollution labour ratio is independent of δ, see (1.20). In free trade,
the increased supply from the South affects the world price: if the South has
a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods (Ωs > Ωn), the world
relative supply of these goods increases with δ (for given relative factor sup-
plies in the regions) and their relative price falls. This lower price for polluting
goods makes it less attractive for both countries to pollute. Indeed, in (1.27)
an increase in diffusion parameter δ lowers λn and increases λs so that the
dashed curves in figure 1.1 shift up and both regions pollute less. A change
in δ, however, can never reverse our finding that the country with compara-
tive advantage in pollution-intensive goods pollutes more in free trade than
in autarchy; this result holds for any 0 < λn = 1− λs < 1 and hence for any
δ, see (1.27).
14To construct the diagram in figure 1.1, it would be sufficient to draw only one of the dotted
lines. As noted above, with international price equalization, the right-hand side of (1.20) must
be the same for every country, in equilibrium. Thus both crossing points Fn and Fs will lie on
the same horizontal line, as drawn in the figure above. We will make use of this in the next
section.
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1.4 Directed Technical Change
When innovators can direct innovation at a particular sector, the nature of
technological change becomes endogenous and responds to shocks, for ex-
ample to changes in international prices. International trade thus naturally
affects environmental policy in both regions, not only directly through prices,
but also indirectly, through the induced changes in technology. Furthermore,
even when there is no international trade in goods, innovation in the North
affects technology and environmental policy in the South, through the inter-
national diffusion of northern technologies.
1.4.1 Pollution-using vs pollution-saving technical change
Under directed technical change, international trade endogenously induces
either pollution-using or pollution-saving technical change, in this subsection
we provide a definition for these concepts.
If innovation occurs at a faster pace in one of the sectors, the NR/NL ra-
tio changes. The effect of this change on the composition of production in
the long run depends on the elasticity of substitution between factors of pro-
duction, σ. In general, a change in the composition of technology affects the
production elasticity of pollution. This either increases or reduces the cost of
pollution reduction in terms of output, i.e. the cost of abatement. When this
elasticity increases, the marginal benefits from pollution increase and thus
the supply of pollution will increase in equilibrium, recall (1.18). We call
this kind of technical change pollution-using. The opposite occurs when the
elasticity decreases, making pollution reduction less costly. In this case we
speak about pollution-saving technical change. The two concepts correspond
to higher and lower abatement costs, respectively. An inspection of equations
(1.24) and (1.27) shows that the right-hand side of both expressions increases
with (NR/NL)
(1−σ)/σ. We can interpret this as showing that an increase in this
term, which we label the technology bias, represents pollution-saving techni-
cal change.
We can make this point more formal recalling, from our discussion in section
1.2.2, that we can proxy the production elasticity of pollution by the cost share
of polluting goods θR. Using equation (1.14) and substituting the autarchy











which clearly shows that, when the technology bias (NR/NL)
(1−σ)/σ increases,
the cost share θR falls for given factor supply, which implies pollution-saving
technical change.15 This also shows that the nature of technical change not
only depends on the direction (the change in NR/NL) but also on the elasticity
σ. For example if firms in the pollution-intensive sector innovate more than
in the other sector, the ratio NR/NL increases. Whether this raises or reduces
the production elasticity of pollution, depends of the elasticity of substitution
σ . If the two goods are gross substitutes (σ > 1), the relatively fast productiv-
ity improvements in the pollution-intensive sector induce a shift towards this
sector and technological change is pollution-using. If however gross comple-
mentarity applies (σ < 1), the same productivity improvements trigger a rel-
ative increase in the demand for the complementary input and technological
change is labour-using, and hence pollution-saving.
1.4.2 Autarchy
The long-run technology bias is determined in the North by the condition
that the profits from innovation are equal across sectors, that is from the no-
arbitrage equation derived in section 1.2.3. We first focus on autarchy, finding













This equation shows that under autarchy the bias of technology in both re-
gions depends only on pollution policy in the North, Rn/Ln. Moreover, we
can immediately see that a decrease in the relative supply of pollution re-
sults in pollution-saving technological change. Hence, the more stringent the
environmental policy in the North, the more pollution-saving technological
change.
To determine equilibrium pollution supply under autarchy, we can substi-
tute the long-run bias derived above into the environmental policy rule (1.24).
The expression differs across countries. For the North the equilibrium condi-
15The corresponding expression for θR under free trade is obtained by substitution of
the international prices from (1.26). Also in the resulting expression θR decreases with
(NR/NL)
(1−σ)/σ for given factor supply. Our classification is thus independent of the trade
regime.





























In figure 1.2 we construct a diagram analogous to the previous one, to il-
lustrate the situation in this case. Once again, we indicate the curves that are







s Fs Fn LHSn 
RHSn,FT RHSs,Aut 
Figure 1.2: Equilibrium under Directed Technical Change under Autarchy and Free
Trade
We start from the curves for the North. The curve that depicts the left-hand
side is identical to the straight line we drew in figure 1.1. The right-hand side
is increasing for σ < 2 and decreasing for σ > 2. In the picture we depict
the case where σ < 1 and Ωn < Ωs. The intersection point An represents the
equilibrium for the North.16 We can use the corresponding value of Rn/Ln
16As long as σ ≤ 2 this equilibrium always exists and is unique. When σ > 2, the line
describing the right-hand side is decreasing and convex, it can intersect the straight line ei-
ther once, twice, or never. When multiple crossings occur, we must rule out the intersection
at which RHS cuts LHS from above, since starting from such a point, slightly increasing pol-
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to construct the curve for the South. This curve intersects the northern one at
An, and is drawn as the lighter curve in the figure. Point As represents the
equilibrium for the South.
This picture enables us to draw some conclusions for the autarchy case. In
the first place, we notice that, as in the undirected technical change case, also
here the country with the highest Ω will pollute more. In this sense the regime
of technical progress does not influence the outcome. As long as the North
enjoys a higher C/Y ratio, it will choose a lower equilibrium level of pollution
than the South.
Second, comparing equations (1.24) and (1.30), we immediately conclude
that the line depicting the right-hand side for the North is steeper under undi-
rected technical change than under directed technical change. This has the
important consequence that any shock (such as changes in Ω via preferences
or subsidies, or in relative endowments, E/L) has a larger impact on pollu-
tion supply under directed technical change than under undirected techni-
cal change. Intuitively, this happens because under directed technical change
the adjustment occurs not only through policy but also through changes in
the composition of technology. For example, assume that preferences become
greener (φ increases), this leads to the adoption of more stringent environ-
mental policy and to a reduction in pollution supply. Under directed techni-
cal change this leads firms to develop pollution-saving technologies, which
would have not occurred had technical change been undirected, and thus to
curb pollution further.
Third, shocks in the North affect the South even without international trade
in goods, through the international technology spillovers. Indeed, once a
shock hits the North both pollution and technology adjust. Technology dif-
fusion will then induce the South to modify its pollution decisions according
to the new available technology. This means, for example, that the South will
benefit from pollution-saving technical change that occurs in the North fol-
lowing a tightening in the stance of environmental policy.
lution supply rises marginal benefits relative to marginal costs to pollution. In other words,
second order conditions are violated. Moreover, the case of no intersection is not of interest
to our discussion, as it implies a corner solution in which both regions produce with zero
pollution in the long run. In the rest of the chapter we thus focus on interior solutions, which
can always be constructed by choosing low enough a value for φ.
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1.4.3 International trade
When technical change is directed, the effects of a liberalization in interna-
tional trade are twofold. First, price changes affect pollution supply through
the traditional terms-of-trade mechanism as with undirected technological
change. Second, price changes now also affect the direction of technological
change. In this section we will show that, while the terms-of-trade effect tends
to increase differences in pollution supply, the effects of changes in technology
can either exacerbate or dampen this tendency. In particular, we show that the
effect of the induced technical change may prove strong enough for the non-
innovating country to reverse the terms-of-trade effect. Thus, provided that
factors of production are sufficiently good substitutes, both regions might end
up changing their environmental policy in the same direction.
As in the previous section, we get the long-run technology bias from the no-




















This equation shows that changes in the relative factor supply affect the bias
of technological change through two terms: (Rn/Ln)1−σ, which represents
the market-size effect; and [λnRn/Ln + λsRs/Ls]−(1−σ)/σ, which captures the
price effect.
The market-size effect relates the direction of technical change to the poten-
tial market for factor-specific innovations. For example, for given prices, a
reduction in pollution (relative to a constant labour supply) reduces the po-
tential profits from innovations in the pollution-intensive sector, and directs
R&D expenditure to the labour-intensive sector. The price effect works in the
opposite direction. Imagine, for example, a reduction in pollution at the world
level for given domestic supply (because pollution is reduced elsewhere), this
leads to higher prices for dirty goods. As a consequence, innovation in the
pollution-intensive sector becomes more attractive.
As we discussed above, under autarchy a pollution reduction in the North
always results in pollution-saving technological change. In the presence of
international trade, this is no longer necessary. In this case, indeed, it is the
world supply of factors rather than the northern one to determine the price
level. Accordingly, changes in the northern pollution supply have a relatively
weaker impact on prices than before. As northern pollution is reduced, in-
novation in the pollution-intensive sector becomes less attractive through the
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market-size effect and this tends to reduce NR/NL. Compared to autarchy,
the mitigating effect of an increase in the relative price of the polluting goods
is now less salient. Hence, more stringent environmental policy makes NR/NL
decrease more under free trade than autarchy. Whether this implies a pollution-
saving or pollution-using technical change relative to autarchy depends once
more on whether polluting inputs and labour are gross substitutes or gross
complements, see section 1.4.1.
Substituting (1.25) into (1.32) and using the new expression to substitute for
the technology bias in (1.27), we find the condition that determines equilib-
























This equation solves for pollution in the North under free trade and can be
compared to the corresponding equation for autarchy, (1.30). Notice that, for
given Rn/Ln, the right-hand side of (1.33) is larger than the one in (1.30), pro-
vided that Ωs > Ωn (and smaller otherwise). Hence, when opening up to
trade the North reduces (increases) pollution supply if it was relatively clean
(dirty) in autarchy. Thus, the effect of trade on pollution in the North is similar
to the undirected technology case. The reason is that the technology response
to trade in the North is governed by the same incentives as the environmen-
tal policy response: to exploit the comparative advantage and benefit from
the trade-induced increase in the relative price for labor-intensive goods, the
North shifts production to the the labour-intensive sector not only by pollut-
ing less but also by innovating more in that sector.
In contrast, the effects of trade in the South might change due to fact that
trade induces technical change and that this change is determined by condi-
tions in the North.
In terms of figure 1.2, when opening up to trade, the right-hand side curve of
the North (the dashed line) shifts up so that the intersection necessarily moves
to the left for North. The equilibrium under trade in the North is indicated by
the point Fn. Just as in the section 1.3 we know that prices and technology
are common to the two regions. To determine the equilibrium for the South
we just need to find the intersection of the LHSs curve with the horizontal
line through Fn. It is clear that this intersection might be above or below As,
implying opposite effects of international trade on pollution in the South. The
rest of this section is devoted to discussing this point.
Let’s continue assuming Ωs > Ωn for concreteness. This implies that the
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North pollutes relatively less than the South in the autarchy equilibrium. When
the South opens up to trade trade with the relatively cleaner North, the price
of the pollution-intensive goods increases for any given level of pollution in
the South, see (1.26). This is the conventional terms-of-trade effect that makes
it attractive for the South to specialize in the production of the dirty good and
hence to increase pollution.
The increase in pR/pL might be mitigated and even offset by a fall in the
technology bias NR/NL, see (1.20). Indeed, when the North opens up to trade,
NR/NL falls.17 The North changes the direction of technical change towards
the sector in which it has a comparative advantage. When this happens, the
South faces pollution-using technical change if σ < 1, but pollution-saving
technical change if σ > 1. From (1.27) we see that we need an increase in the
technology bias (NR/NL)
(1−σ)/σ, that is pollution-saving technical change, to
offset the terms of trade effect (i.e. the fact that the term in brackets falls when
opening up to trade).
This means that, as long as the goods are gross complements, the induced
technical change effect has the same direction as the terms-of-trade effect,
while it has an opposite effect when σ > 1. In other words, if σ < 1, not
only for the North but also for the South trade has the same effect as with
undirected technological change. When goods are gross substitutes, instead,
it is possible that the effects of international trade on pollution decisions in the
South are reversed.
In Figure 1.3 we presents numerical examples to show that it is indeed pos-
sible that the South reduces pollution upon opening up to trade. The param-
eters values we used18 were such that Ωs > Ωn, so that the South pollutes
more than North. Above the line, combinations of the elasticity of substitu-
tion σ and the diffusion parameter δ are such that the South pollutes less in
free trade than in autarchy; below the line, the opposite holds. As derived
above, if σ < 1, trade always increases pollution in the South. The figure fur-
ther reveals that better substitution or more diffusion of technologies make it
more likely that trade improves the environment in the South. The reason is,
first, that with a larger elasticity of substitution trade results is smaller price
changes so that the conventional terms-of-trade effect that drives pollution
17We know that when the North opens up to trade its pollution supply (Rn/Ln) falls. From
(1.16) this implies that the northern relative price of pollution-intensive goods pR/pL will then
rise. Finally, from (1.20), this implies that NR/NL falls.
18For the simulations, the following values of the parameters were used: Ln = 1, Ls =
3, Ē/L = 0.5, g = 0.015, β = 0.2, ρ = 0.025, ς = 1, φ = 0.06, τm = 0.
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Figure 1.3: Pollution policy in the South under Free Trade
havens is small. Second, with more diffusion (larger δ), the effective size of
the South, as measured by λs, is larger and any change in Northern pollu-
tion supply has a smaller effect on world prices and a relatively larger effect
on the market size for innovations in the labour-intensive sector. Thus, more
diffusion implies a large change in the technology bias. 19
We end this section by discussing the case with Ωn > Ωs, in which the North
pollutes more than the South, reversing our earlier assumption on compara-
tive advantage. Indeed, now the North has a comparative advantage in the
production of polluting goods and starts innovating more in the pollution-
intensive sector, once trade is opened. As a result, NR/NL now rises. If σ < 1,
this implies pollution-saving technical change and the South reduces pollu-
tion after trade is opened. This result is qualitatively similar to the one ob-
tained with terms-of-trade effects only in section 4. If σ > 1, however, trade
induces pollution-using technical change, so that the technology effect might
offset the terms-of-trade effect. For sufficiently large σ and δ, the South will
increase pollution. Hence, if the innovating region has a comparative advan-
tage in pollution-intensive goods, if these goods are good substitutes for other
goods and if a large fraction of the new technologies diffuse to the imitating
19In figure 1.2, a larger σ makes the RHS curves flatter, while a larger δ, by increasing λs,
shifts the RHSn, FT curve up. As a result, the vertical distance between the autarchy points
An and As is small and the vertical distance between An on the one hand, and Fn and Fs on
the other hand, is large, such that it becomes more likely that Fs is above As.
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region, trade is bad for the environment in both regions.
1.5 Summary and conclusions
In our model the North innovates and technologies diffuse to the South. Since
only a fraction of the technologies diffuse, the South is less productive and has
lower income than the North. By construction, this income difference does not
lead to differences in environmental stringency in our model. Instead, a coun-
try that consumes a relatively large part out of income has a relatively large
demand for environmental quality, as produced consumption goods and envi-
ronmental amenities are traded off in utility. Whether the South or the North
has higher demand for environmental quality, thus depends on investment
opportunities and investment distortions. On the one hand, the North has to
incur the cost of innovation (while the South gets innovations for free), which
makes consumption scarce and reduces demand for environmental quality
in the North. On the other hand, intermediates are priced above cost in the
North. This introduces a distortion not present in the South and reduces in-
vestment. Which of the two effects will prevail will depend on the level of
subsidies to technological change.
In this chapter we have discussed the two possibilities separately, one in
which the North pollutes less than the South, and the other in which it pollutes
more. These situations correspond to a comparative advantage for pollution-
intensive goods in the South or in the North, respectively. When trade is
opened, prices change and the regions exploit their comparative advantage.
By this terms-of-trade effect, environmental quality always improves in the
country that has most stringent environmental policy in autarchy and always
deteriorates in the other. Induced technological change never reverses this
pattern in the North, but may do so in the South provided that pollution-
intensive and labour-intensive goods are gross substitutes (σ > 1).
While the terms-of-trade effect has opposite effects on environmental qual-
ity in the two regions, the induced technology effect affects environmental
quality in both regions in the same direction. The reason is that technology is
determined by profit conditions in the North and then diffuses to the South.
Northern innovation activities will shift in the direction of the sector that uses
intensively the relatively abundant factor (pollution or labour) and thus in-
creases the relative supply from this sector. If these goods are gross substi-
tutes for goods from the other sector, world demand shifts away from goods
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in which the South has a comparative advantage. Hence, if the South has a
comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods, the induced technology
effect nevertheless makes production of these goods less profitable and tight-
ening environmental policy become less costly in the South. Thus, effectively,
abatement costs have fallen, the net effect may be that trade induces more
stringent environmental in both regions. However, if the North started as the
dirty region, the net effect may be that trade induces more pollution in both
regions by raising abatement costs.
Technology diffusion from North to South is therefore not ambiguously good
for the environment in the South, since whether technologies are pollution-
using or pollution-saving depends on the profitability of different innovation
projects, which in turn depends on comparative advantages and substitutabil-
ity between goods with different pollution-intensity. Our results highlight that
endogenous technological change is potentially but not necessarily a blessing.
The main reason is that the lack of intellectual property rights protection in
the South creates distortions. Innovating firms cannot recoup their costs in the
South and only direct their efforts to Northern markets, so that the resulting
technologies cannot be in the interests of the South in all respects. Moreover,
innovation costs are asymmetrically born by Northern consumers, which cre-
ates asymmetries in the costs associated to environmental policies, the driving




THE C/Y RATIO IN THE TWO REGIONS
Consider the final good market equilibrium condition (1.2). In both the North
and the South, the total cost of producing machines in sector i amounts to
υ mi Ni (i = R, L), where υ represents the unit cost of production and mi Ni is
the total amount of machines produced. Since the machines share in interme-
diate producers’ output is given by 1− β, we rewrite total cost as (υ/pmi) (1−
β) pi Yi. Substituting the appropriate expressions for prices and marginal costs
in the two regions, pnm = (1− τm) and psm = υ = 1− β, and summing over
the two sectors, we find total expenditure in machines in the North and in the
South, respectively, as:





Yn, and Ms = (1− β)Ys.
In the South, whatever is not needed for physical investment will be con-





= 1− (1− β) = β.
In the North, however, investment also occurs in R&D. To characterize the
consumption-output ratio in the North, we need to derive the equilibrium
R&D investment outlays. Starting with the directed technical change case,
from (1.6) it is possible to write the R&D investment in each sector as Di =
gNi(NR + NR)ψ/η, where g is the growth rate of the economy. From (2.18),
(1.10), and the definition of the interest rate along the balanced growth path(
r = η(NR + NR)−ψ πi
)
, we find Ni/(η(NR + NR)−ψ) = piYiβ(1− β)/r. Sum-
ming over both sectors, we can write the total expenditure in research and
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development, D = DL + DR, as
D = (1− β)β g
r
Y.
Following the same steps it is straightforward to obtain the same expression
for the case of undirected technical change.
















An important threat to climate policy is that actions undertaken without
universal participation may prove to be ineffective: any partial agreement to
reduce emissions, of carbon dioxide (CO2) for example, may be undermined
by the behaviour of countries outside the agreement. Indeed, increases in CO2
emissions by unconstrained countries can off-set the reductions secured by the
agreement participants, a phenomenon known as carbon leakage.2
The behaviour of unconstrained countries in reaction to a reduction of CO2
emissions of other countries is mainly driven by two economic mechanisms.
First, when the production of energy-intensive goods is reduced in constrained
countries due to the introduction of an emission constraint, the international
prices of such goods will increase. This gives countries outside the abating
coalition incentives to expand their production of these goods and export
them to signatory countries (the terms-of-trade effect). Clearly, this implies an
increase in emissions by countries outside the agreement. The second mecha-
nism of carbon leakage works through the price of fossil fuels: as the price
of fossil fuels decreases following the reduction in demand on the part of
1This chapter is a slightly revised version of Di Maria and van der Werf (2005).
2Estimates of the size of this effect rely on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models.
The leakage rates for the Kyoto Protocol (the percentage of the reduction in emissions offset
by the increase in emissions by countries outside the Protocol) reported in the literature range
from 2% to 41% (see, for example, Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins 2000, Light, Kolstad, and
Rutherford 2000). Babiker (2005) even finds a leakage rate of 130% for one of his scenarios.
These differences in the estimates stem from widely differing assumptions with respect to the
degree of international market integration, substitution and supply elasticities, and market
structure.
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the constrained countries, countries outside the agreement might decide to
substitute other inputs with fossil fuels, thus increasing their emissions (the
energy-market effect).
In sum, climate change policy affects the relative prices of both goods and
factors, thus inducing the leakage of carbon emissions. These price changes,
however, also modify the incentives for innovation, changing the level and,
most importantly, the direction of technological change (i.e. how technology
levels develop across industries). This effect, known as induced technological
change, was already postulated by Hicks (1932), and has since been the focus
of many influential contributions, both theoretical and empirical.3 Once the
available technology changes as a result of climate policy, however, so do the
responses of the unconstrained countries. Yet, this additional mechanism has
to date been almost completely ignored in the climate change policy litera-
ture.4
In this chapter, we study the consequences of induced (directed) technolog-
ical change on carbon leakage using a stylized theoretical model of the in-
teractions between constrained and unconstrained countries, which focuses
on transmission mechanisms based on terms-of-trade effects. In order to be
able to highlight the effects of induced technological change, we model two
countries that are perfectly symmetric as refers to preferences, technology and
endowments. In this way we rule out any other potential source of carbon
leakage, which would cloud the effects of technological change. Indeed, we
only allow the two countries to differ in one crucial respect: one country im-
poses a binding emission cap, while the other remains unconstrained. As the
countries are symmetric before the imposition of the cap, the adjustment pro-
3For early contributions, see Kennedy (1964) and Drandakis and Phelps (1965). Recently,
Acemoglu (1998, 2002a) has provided a tractable theoretical framework to investigate the is-
sue. Among the empirical contributions, Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) study the effect of
energy prices and government regulations on energy-efficiency innovation. They show that
changes in energy prices affect the direction of innovation for some products, and induce
changes in the subset of models offered for sale. They conclude that "the endogeneity of the
direction, or composition of technological change is surely at least as significant [as] the over-
all pace of technological change" (p. 971). Popp (2002) shows that changes in energy prices
(including the effects of environmental policy) positively and quickly affect environmentally
friendly innovations.
4Grubb, Chapuis, and Ha Duong (1995) first noted the importance of induced technolog-
ical change for carbon leakage. However, in their paper induced technological change does
not come from profit-maximizing behaviour. Instead, it is assumed to occur through an ex-
ogenous decrease in the emissions intensity of non-abating countries, following the decrease
in emissions intensity in abating countries.
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cess represents a pure response to policy. In this sense, the chapter analyzes a
‘policy-induced pollution-haven effect’.
To single out the contribution of technological change in the adjustment pro-
cess, our analysis proceeds in two steps. We start from a situation of com-
plete symmetry and analyze the effect of introducing an exogenous emission
cap. The first step refers to analyzing a model where unilateral climate pol-
icy induces trade (in either energy-intensive goods, or directly in energy), but
(the composition of) technology does not change. This is what we call the
‘undirected technical change’ scenario, where purely trade effects are at work.
We then compare this benchmark to the case where technology levels of the
labour- and energy-intensive industries are allowed to develop at different
rates, i.e. the ‘directed technical change’ scenario. We show that, when (the
composition of) technology is allowed to adjust endogenously, induced tech-
nological change always leads to a reduction in the degree of carbon leakage.
We refer to this as the induced-technology effect.
Our work contributes to the theoretical literature on carbon leakage by high-
lighting the role of directed technical change in this framework. The early lit-
erature on the topic addressed asymmetric international environmental policy
from a public economics point of view (e.g. Hoel 1991, Barrett 1994, Carraro
and Siniscalco 1998). Stressing the roles of free-riding incentives and strate-
gic behaviour among nations, but abstracting from both technical change and
international trade, this literature concludes that emissions among countries
are strategic substitutes and that unilateral climate policy will lead to leakage
of emissions. More recently, however, Copeland and Taylor (2005) show that
in the presence of international trade and environmental preferences, a coun-
try’s response to a rest-of-world emissions reduction is ambiguous: emissions
among countries can be either strategic complements or substitutes depend-
ing on key elasticities in the model. In their static two-good, two-factor, K-
country model without technical change, this result follows from allowing for
income and substitution effects on the consumption side to offset the terms-
of-trade effect on the production side. The mechanism underlying their result
therefore differs from ours, both in terms of modelling and in terms of eco-
nomic content.
Closer in spirit to our work, Golombek and Hoel (2004) study the effect of
international spillovers of abatement technology on leakage, using a static par-
tial equilibrium two-country, one-good model with transboundary pollution.
In each country a central planner chooses research and development (R&D)
expenditures and abatement levels to minimize total costs that include envi-
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ronmental damages. Research activities lead, by assumption, to reductions in
abatement costs, while international technology spill-overs allow technology
to diffuse across borders at no cost. Hence, the authors effectively build in
their model a mechanism that counteracts the free-riding incentives under-
lined by previous literature. In our model, on the other hand, the nature of
technical change is endogenous, as it is itself driven by profit incentives, and
depends on the characteristics of production.
The rest of the chapter develops as follows. We introduce the model in sec-
tion 2.1. In section 2.2 we present equilibrium conditions for the four ver-
sions of our model: with and without unilateral climate policy, and with and
without directed technical change. Section 2.3 contains the main results. We
first introduce the terms-of-trade effect and study carbon leakage when en-
trepreneurs cannot aim new technologies to one of the sectors; we then focus
on carbon leakage under directed technical change and show how the induced
technology effect changes the results found before. We finally provide some
conclusions in section 2.4.
2.1 The Model
Our economy consists of two countries, c and u, that have identical production
technologies and endowments, while only differing in their environmental
policies.5 We assume that country c (for constrained) imposes a binding cap on
polluting emissions. We focus on a situation of free trade noting that, as long
as the two countries do not differ in environmental policies, there will be no
actual scope for trade.
In each country, final output Y is obtained as a CES aggregate of two (inter-











where r = c, u is the country index.6 We assume that good YE is produced
using energy (E) and a specialized set of differentiated machines. The range of
5In this chapter we are only interested in the effect of climate policy on technology and in
the ensuing production choices. We therefore do not discuss growth rates or welfare. Since
in addition we assume balanced trade, (intertemporal) preferences play no role and the con-
sumption side of the model is redundant.
6For simplicity, we set the share parameters in the CES to one, as they will only introduce
an additional constant term in the expressions.
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types of machines available to produce energy intensive goods is indicated by
NE. Instead, YL is produced using labour (LL) and a different set of machines,
whose range is indicated by NL. Following Acemoglu (2002a), the production





















where β ∈ (0, 1) and krj (i) is the amount of machines of type i employed in
sector j = L, E in country r. Both intermediate goods are traded internation-
ally.
To produce each type of machines, producers need a blueprint invented by
the R&D sector, as will be discussed below. We assume that machines devel-
oped to complement one factor of production cannot be usefully employed
in the other sector and that blueprints can be traded internationally. Accord-
ingly, NE and NL represent global levels of technology and producers in each
country can use all machine types globally available for their sector. For a
given state of technology, that is for given NE and NL, both (2.2) and (2.3) ex-
hibit constant returns to scale. However, when NE and NL grow due to R&D
activities the returns will be increasing at the aggregate level.7
We assume that in each country an amount of labour equal to L is inelasti-
cally supplied at each point in time and that it is immobile across countries.
Labour can either be employed in the production of the labour intensive good
YL or in the production of energy:
L = LrL + L
r
E, (2.4)
where LrE is the amount of labour in energy production in country r. As in
Babiker (2005), we assume that energy has to be produced using labour and




where φ ∈ (0, 1). Energy generation causes emissions of carbondioxide. We
assume that CO2 emissions, Z, are proportional to the amount of energy pro-
duced, so that Z = E.
7In other words, our model exhibits endogenous growth through variety expansion. See
for example Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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When country c introduces a binding constraint on the amount of carbon-
dioxide emitted, it de facto imposes a cap on the amount of labour allocated
to energy production. Indeed, when Zc is the maximum amount of emissions
permitted at any point in time, the allocation of labour in country c must sat-
isfy LcE = (Z
c)1/φ.
The last part of our model consists of the process of technical change. We
consider two alternative possibilities in this chapter: technical change can
either be ‘undirected’ or ‘directed’. With undirected or ’traditional’ techni-
cal change, prospective innovators invest in the development of blueprints
whenever it is profitable to do so, yet they cannot choose the sector they want
to develop a new machine for. Instead, we assume that the newly developed
blueprint will be energy-complementing with probability γ ∈ (0, 1) and it will
be labour-complementing with probability (1− γ). As a consequence the (ex-
pected) relative marginal productivity is constant, as is common in traditional
(one-sector) models of endogenous growth.8
Using a lab-equipment specification for the process of technical change, we
assume that investing one unit of the final good in R&D generates ν new inno-
vations.9 The total number of innovations in this case will therefore develop
according to:
Ṅ = ν (Rc + Ru) , (2.6)
where Rr indicates total R&D investment by country r, and a dot on a variable
represents its time derivative, i.e. ẋ = dx/dt.
The second regime of technical change that we consider is directed techni-
cal change.10 In this case prospective innovators, besides deciding upon the
amount of their R&D outlays, are able to choose the sector they want to target
their innovation efforts to. Hence they will invent new machines for the sector
that promises the highest returns. The development of new types of machines
8Hence, with undirected technical change the relative level of technology in the two sec-
tors, NE/NL, is exogenous and constant. Moreover, since NE/NL equals γ/(1− γ), any value
of NE/NL can be calibrated by an appropriate choice of the probability γ.
9See Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
10The seminal work in this field is due to Daron Acemoglu. See, for example, Acemoglu
(2002a).
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takes place according to the following production functions:11
ṄE = ν (RcE + R
u
E) , (2.7)
ṄL = ν (RcL + R
u
L) . (2.8)
A new blueprint must be developed before the innovator can sell it to pro-
ducers, thus the costs of R&D are sunk. As a consequence, machine producers
must wield some monopoly power in the market for machines, in order to re-
coup the development costs. For this we assume that an innovator is awarded
a global patent for her invention and that patents are perfectly enforced in
both countries. As a result, each innovation will take place only once and no
international overlap in blueprints occurs.12
Furthermore, we simplify the analysis by assuming that machine produc-
tion is local, that is innovators license their blueprints to one producer in each
region, so that blueprints are traded across countries, but machines are not.
2.2 The Equilibrium
In this section we derive the general equilibrium allocation of labour. We first
derive a necessary condition for equilibrium on the goods and factor markets.
For the model with undirected technical change, this condition gives the gen-
eral equilibrium amount of labour in energy production. For the model with
directed technical change we need to take another step and also study the
equilibrium on the market for innovations. Joint consideration of these two
conditions will give the general equilibrium allocation under directed techni-
cal change.
11For simplicity we assume that R&D is equally productive in the two sectors. Relaxing
this assumption introduces a constant in the expressions that follow, but does not alter our
qualitative results.
12Di Maria and Smulders (2004) also deal with directed technical change in an open-
economy framework, but develop a North-South model to explain pollution-haven effects.
They focus on the asymmetry of intellectual property rights’ protection: since patents are not
protected in the South all innovation takes place in the North. As a consequence the relevant
market for innovators is the northern one, and the technology developed is inadequate to the
factor composition in the South. Hence, the level of emissions in the South might increase
once international trade in goods is allowed.
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2.2.1 Equilibrium on the goods and factor markets
The market for the final good is perfectly competitive and we choose the final
good’s price as the numeraire. It follows that a necessary condition for the
optimal demand for labour- and energy-intensive goods is that the marginal










where pj is the price of good Yj , j = E, L. Notice that we introduced a su-
perscript d to indicate demand and avoid confusion with supply in (2.2) and
(2.3). Prices will be equalized across the two regions since countries are either
symmetric or trade at no cost.
Producers of the intermediate good Yj maximize profits taking prices and
technology as given. In particular, they choose the amount of inputs taking as
given the prices of their output (pj), of the primary input they use (wj) and of
the machines they use (pk j(i) for a machine of type i complementing factor j),
and the range of available machines Nj.13
Using (2.2) and (2.3) we can derive the local demand for a machine of type













By the same token we can derive the (inverse) local demand for energy and




















As mentioned before, the holder of a patent licenses production to only one
producer in each region. Consequently, local producers act as monopolists on
their local market. We assume that the production of machines in both sectors
entails a constant marginal cost equal to ω units of the final good, and that
machines depreciate immediately after use. Each monopolist maximizes her
13Throughout the chapter we will refer to energy (E) and labour used in the production of
YL (LL) as primary inputs, although in the model labour is the only "truly" primary input.
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profits subject to the appropriate demand function in (2.10). As a result, each
monopolistic producer will set her price as a constant mark-up over marginal
cost, that is pk j(i) = ω/(1− β). Letting ω = 1− β for convenience, we can set
the price of machines in both sectors equal to 1.14
Using this result we obtain an expression for the relative supply of goods
that depends on relative prices, relative (primary) factors supplies and relative
technology,
Yw = p(1−β)/βSwN. (2.13)
In the remainder of the chapter we define variables without a subscript as ra-
tios, with the convention that the variables at the numerator refer to the energy
sector E, while the ones at the denominator refer to the clean sector. Hence,
we refer to N ≡ NE/NL as the (global) technology ratio. Moreover, we let
the global relative factor supply be Sw ≡ (Ec + Eu) / (LcL + LuL), and define as
Yw ≡ (YcE + YuE) / (YcL + YuL ) the world relative supply of intermediate goods.
Superscript w indicates that the variable concerned represents a global (world)
amount or ratio.
Equating relative supply (2.13) and relative demand (2.9) yields the market
clearing relative price for intermediate goods, for given technology:
p = (NSw)−β/σ , (2.14)
where we define σ ≡ 1 + (ε− 1)β. From (2.14) we see that a higher level of
technology in the sector for energy intensive goods, or a higher relative supply
of energy decreases the relative price of the dirty good.
We now turn to the market for factors. Substituting machine demands (2.10)
into the inverse demand functions for energy (2.11) and labour (2.12), we ob-
tain an expression for the relative factor rewards. Using this and the market
clearing relative price for intermediate goods (2.14), we get the following ex-
pression for the relative factor rewards for given technology:
w = N(σ−1)/σ (Sw)−1/σ . (2.15)
The relative price of energy decreases with energy supply, while the effect of
the technology ratio N depends on whether σ is larger or smaller than unity.
Solving equation (2.15) for Sw gives Sw = Nσ−1w−σ, which informs us that σ
14Notice that all machines are equally productive in intermediate goods production and
entail the same cost. Thus, the amount of each machine used in sectorial production will be
the same, kj say. This symmetry simplifies the structure of the sectorial production functions





j , for j = E, L.
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is the elasticity of relative factor demand with respect to their relative price.
As will be discussed later, the effect of the technology ratio on relative factor
rewards depends on whether relative energy demand is elastic or inelastic.15
To fully characterize the equilibrium on the goods and factor markets for
given technology, we need to determine the way in which labour is allocated
between production of the labour intensive intermediate good and energy
production. As noted in section 2.1, when country c faces a binding emis-
sion constraint, the amount of labour in energy production is exogenously
determined by the cap, LcE = (Z
c)1/φ. In an unconstrained country however,
each energy producer chooses the amount of labour so as to maximize her
profits, subject to the production function in (2.5) and taking prices wL and wE
as given. This gives an unconstrained country’s demand for labour in energy







Equating this expression and (2.15) we find an expression representing the
equilibrium allocation of labour in country u, for a given technology ratio N






φ(1−σ)+σ] + LcE + LuE = 2L. (2.16)
In this expression we allow for the possibility that each country chooses a
different level of labour in energy production. It is clear that, as long as no
binding emission cap is introduced, a symmetric expression holds for country
c. In this case, given that countries are identical, they will choose the same
equilibrium amount of labour in energy production so that we can rewrite the
above expression, letting LuE = L
c
E = LE, as
φ−σN1−σLφ(1−σ)+σE + LE = L. (2.17)
Here LE is the amount of labour employed in energy production in each coun-
try, when both countries are unconstrained.
In sum, when country c faces a binding emission constraint, its emissions,
energy generation and amount of labour in energy producion are determined
by the cap. Yet expression (2.16) still holds for the unconstrained country, u,
15From the definition of σ as 1 + (ε− 1)β, it is clear that σ ≷ 1 ⇔ ε ≷ 1. Thus relative factor
demand is elastic if and only if intermediate goods are gross substitutes in the production of
the final good, and inelastic if and only if they are gross complements.
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and solves (implicitly) for the amount of labour in energy production in the
unconstrained region for given N.
As we saw in section 2.1 the technology ratio N is constant when technical
change is undirected. Consequently, in this case equations (2.16) and (2.17)
determine the general equilibrium allocation of labour. However, for the case
of directed technical change we need to study the equilibrium on the market
for innovations to determine the general equilibrium allocation of labour.
2.2.2 Equilibrium on the market for innovations
Under directed technical change innovators choose both the amount and the
direction of their innovation efforts. Quite naturally they will invest in the
sector which is expected to yield the highest rate of return. Using (2.10), the









At each point in time, then, the direction of innovation will be determined
by relative profits: π = p1/βSw. This expression clearly shows that the en-
trepreneurs’ choice of the sector to invest in is determined by the relative price
of the intermediate goods (the price effect) and by the relative amount of factors
to which a machine type is complementary (the market-size effect). In particu-
lar, for given technology, a decrease in energy supply leads to a reduction in
relative profits through the market size effect and to an increase through the
price effect, see (2.14). Which of the two effects prevails depends on the elas-
ticity σ, as will be discussed later.
Each potential innovator maximizes the net present value of the stream of
future profits that she expects to enjoy over time. Along the balanced growth
path of the economy, profits will not change over time.16 Since entry is free in
the R&D sector, we know that the value of an innovation cannot exceed its cost
(see (2.7) and (2.8)). Moreover, along the balanced growth path both types of
innovation must occur at the same time, leading to the following no-arbitrage
equation for the research sector:
πEν = πLν.
Substituting the appropriate expression for profits from (2.18), this can be re-
16We define a balanced growth path as a situation in which prices are constant and NE and
NL grow at the same constant rate.
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arranged to read,
p1/βSw = 1. (2.19)
This no-arbitrage equation enables us to solve for the equilibrium level of the
technology ratio N. Indeed, using the expression for relative prices in (2.14),
we may solve (2.19) for N, obtaining the following expression for the balanced
growth path equilibrium ratio of technology levels in the two sectors:
N = (Sw)σ−1. (2.20)
From this expression we see that, as noted above, the effect of a decrease in
energy supply on the direction of technical change, that is on whether N in-
creases or decreases, depends on the size of σ. When labour- and energy-
intensive goods are gross complements in final goods production (σ < 1), the
price effect in (2.18) outweighs the market size effect and a decrease in energy
supply induces an increase in the range of energy complementary machines.
However, when σ > 1 the result is reversed and the reduction in energy sup-
ply induces an increase in the range of labour-complementary machines.
2.2.3 General equilibrium under directed technical change
In the previous sections we have derived equilibrium conditions for the goods
and factor markets and for the market for innovations. We are now ready to
derive the general equilibrium allocation of labour for the model with directed
technical change, as it obtains when both markets are in equilibrium at the
same time.17
Substituting (2.20) into (2.16) yields the general expression for the equilib-






(φ(σ−1)−1)/(σ−2)] + LcE + LuE = 2L.
(2.21)
Interpreting LcE as the constrained level of labour used in energy generation
in country c following the introduction of an emissions cap, this expression
solves for LuE in the unconstrained country under directed technical change.
Alternatively, assuming that no environmental policy is in place, we can in-
terpret (2.21) as one of the two (symmetric) expressions that determine the
17It is possible to show that the model has an interior stable equilibrium for σ ∈ (0, (1 +
φ)/φ). The stability of the equilibrium requires that in the (LE, N) plane the line depicting the
goods market equilibrium (2.16) is steeper than the no-arbitrage equation (2.20), at the point
of intersection. See the Appendix to this chapter for the details.
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equilibrium level of LcE = L
u
E = LE under directed technical change. Substi-
tuting LE for the country specific variables yields the following expression:
φ1/(σ−2)L(φ(σ−1)−1)/(σ−2)E + LE = L. (2.22)
The above equations summarize the long-run equilibrium of our model with
and without unilateral climate policy, under directed technical change. In-
deed, they solve implicitly for the optimal level of LuE (LE, respectively), from
which we can immediately derive all the other variables of the model.
2.3 Unilateral climate policy and carbon leakage
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of unilateral climate policy, in terms
of carbon leakage, across different regimes of technical change. To compare
different scenarios, we need to start from a common baseline. The natural
baseline to choose is the long-run equilibrium of the model with directed tech-
nical change when both countries are unconstrained, equation (2.17). This
baseline is characterized by the (symmetric) equilibrium level of labour de-
voted to energy generation LE and by the corresponding (endogenous) tech-
nology ratio N. In order to have comparable baselines across technology
regimes, we need to choose γ, the probability for an innovator to end up with
an energy-complementing blueprint, such that γ/(1−γ) = N equals the level
prevailing under directed technical change, see Section 2.1.
Starting from this common equilibrium, we introduce an emissions con-
straint in one of the countries and study the degree of carbon leakage that
occurs along the balanced growth path. We first study carbon leakage when
technical change is undirected. Then we move on to the model with directed
technical change and discuss how and why the results from this model differ
from the model with ’traditional’ endogenous growth.
2.3.1 Carbon Leakage under undirected technical change
Carbon leakage occurs when the unconstrained region increases its emissions
in reaction to a reduction in emissions by the other country (i.e. when LuE >
LE). Intuitively it would seem clear that there should always be some carbon
leakage: when a country exogenously reduces its supply of energy by intro-
ducing a limit to the amount of emissions, the energy intensive good becomes
scarcer on its domestic market, giving rise to an increase in its relative price.
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This creates some scope for trade: the unconstrained economy now enjoys a
comparative advantage in the production of the dirty good and will expand
its production thereof. As a consequence LuE and hence emissions Z
u increase.
We call this the terms-of-trade effect of a unilateral emission constraint. This re-
sult indeed holds in the case of undirected technical change, as formalized by
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. When technical change is undirected, carbon leakage will always
be positive along the balanced growth path.
















Assume that LuE ≤ LE. Then the right hand side is larger than or equal to one
while the left hand side is smaller than one. So we have a contradiction, hence
LuE > LE.
We illustrate this result in Figure 2.1, where the dark dashed line represents
emissions (or equivalently energy production) in each country when both are
unconstrained. The amount of emissions by the unconstrained country when
the other country faces a binding emission constraint, under undirected tech-
nical change is represented by the solid black line.18 The figure clearly shows
that emissions in the unconstrained region always increase following the in-
troduction of the cap. In addition, we see that the amount of energy produced
in the unconstrained region is declining with σ, the elasticity of relative de-
mand for energy with respect to its relative price. The higher this elasticity,
the lower the demand for energy in the constrained economy following the
imposition of the constraint, hence the lower the export-led increase in energy
generation.
When technical change is endogenous but undirected, unilateral climate pol-
icy is undermined by emission increases by unconstrained countries. How-
ever, it seems intuitively clear that changes in relative prices cœteris paribus
18The figures in this chapter are obtained from numerical simulations, using as baseline
parameters values: L = 1, φ = 0.4, and σ ∈ (0, 3.5). For each value of σ the corresponding
value for N for the model with directed technical change were computed and the appropriate
γ calibrated such that both models start from the same baseline. We conducted numerous
robustness checks for the local results derived in Propositions 2.2 and 2.4. In all cases the
qualitative results were unchanged. For the sake of graphical clarity, the graphs are plotted
over a smaller range for σ.
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Figure 2.1: Emissions in the unconstrained model (Z), in the constrained model
under undirected technical change (ZuUTC), and under directed technical change
(ZuDTC)
will not lead to an increase in global emissions. Climate policy will shift pro-
duction to the unconstrained country (proposition 2.1), but the increase in the
relative price of the carbon intensive good will at the same time lead to a re-
duction in global energy demand. To address this formally, we look at the







and derive the following result:
Proposition 2.2. When technical change is undirected, global emissions will always
decrease following a tightening of the emission constraint.


























be total emissions. Thus, Ew decreases with a tight-
ening of the cap whenever dEw/dLcE > 0. Differentiating E
w, and rearranging
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−1 − (LcE)φ−1 + (LuE)φ−1 < 0.
Since LcE < L
u
E and φ ∈ (0, 1), the above inequality is always true.
To illustrate this result, in Figure 2.2 we present the leakage rate, the ratio of
the induced increase in emissions in the unconstrained country and the emis-









as a function of σ. The leakage rate for the case of undirected technical change
is represented by the dark line. As the figure shows, the leakage rate is always









Figure 2.2: Leakage rate under undirected (UTC) and directed (DTC) technical
change
2.3.2 Carbon leakage under directed technical change
In this section we focus on the central point of our analysis and derive our
main results comparing the effects of an emission cap across regimes of tech-
nical change. We start by noting that allowing for directed technical change
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effectively provides the economy with an additional instrument to cope with
the consequences of the introduction of a binding cap in the constrained coun-
try. Changes in the composition of technology may enable the unconstrained
country to meet the increased demand for energy intensive goods while di-
verting less labour from its relatively more productive use in the YL sector.
This is what we call the induced-technology effect of a unilateral emission con-
straint. We will show that this effect has the opposite sign to the terms-of-trade
effect introduced above and hence tends to reduce carbon leakage.
We can compare the two versions of the model using the Le Chatelier prin-
ciple (see e.g. Silberberg 1990). Taking the total differential of (2.16) and rear-

















where DTC indicates directed technical change and UTC undirected technical
change. We can interpret this expression as saying that the overall effect of the
cap when allowing for directed technical change (the left hand side) can be
decomposed in a terms-of-trade effect, represented by the first term at the right-
hand side, and an induced-technology effect. Whether these two effects act in
the same direction or not ultimately determines under which regime we can
expect leakage to be higher. In order to draw any conclusion, we need to sign
the components of the above equation, thus getting the following result:
Proposition 2.3. For σ 6= 1 carbon leakage will be smaller with directed technical
change than with undirected technical change. For σ = 1 it will be identical across
regimes.





As for ∂LuE/∂N · dN/dLcE, consider first the case where σ < 1. From (2.20),
it is immediate that dN/dLcE < 0. Moreover, from (2.16), when N (and hence
N1−σ) increases, LuE must decline to satisfy the equation, cœteris paribus. Thus,
∂LuE/∂N < 0. Hence ∂L
u
E/∂N · dN/dLcE > 0.
Consider now σ > 1. By symmetric arguments, dN/dLcE > 0 and ∂L
u
E/∂N >
0, implying once more ∂LuE/∂N · dN/dLcE > 0.
Finally, consider σ = 1. In this case N equals 1, irrespective of the value of
Sw, hence dN/dLcE = 0.
This result shows that the induced-technology effect works against the stan-
dard terms-of-trade effect of Proposition 2.1. It thus lowers the amount of
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carbon leakage that would occur if technical change were not directed. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows the two effects. The pure terms-of-trade effect can be read from
the upwards shift of emissions from the dashed dark line (the model without
a cap) to the dark solid line (the model with a cap and undirected technical
change). The induced technology effect is summarized by the move from the
solid black line to the light gray one (the model with a cap and directed techni-
cal change). Indeed, the amount of emissions is lower when technical change
is directed, with the exception of the case where σ = 1. This is due to the
fact that when σ = 1 our CES specification in (2.1) reduces to a Cobb-Douglas
production function, in which case technical change will always be neutral to
the inputs concerned.19
The key mechanism at work here, is that the type of technical change in-
duced by the emission constraint proves to be always energy-saving. To show
this, we first analyze how the composition of technology is affected by the in-
troduction of the cap. Successively we address the interaction between changes
in N and the level of σ, to explain the impact of technical change on the evo-
lution of the relative factor shares in our economy.
The composition of technology evolves according to the relative profitabil-
ity of R&D in the different sectors. As noted in section 2.2.2, the final effect
of introducing a cap (i.e. a change in Sw) on relative profits depends both on
changes in the relative market size and in relative prices. Climate policy re-
duces the amount of energy produced, and hence decreases the potential size
of the market for new energy-complementing innovations. At the same time,
it makes energy scarcer, thereby rising the price of energy and making an in-
novation for the energy intensive good more valuable. Whether the negative
market size effect or the positive price effect dominates depends on σ, the
elasticity of the relative demand for energy with respect to its relative price.
Since in the long-run equilibrium the technology ratio is given by (2.20), we
see that whenever σ < 1 the price effect dominates and the introduction of
a cap induces an increase in N. When σ > 1 on the other hand, the market
size effect dominates and N decreases. This relation between N and σ is plot-
ted in Figure 2.3, where the dark line represents the ratio of technology under
undirected technical change, while the lighter one depicts the case of directed
technical change.
Recalling the expression for relative factor productivity from (2.15), we can
19Notice that, formally, we would need share parameters summing up to one in (2.1) to









Figure 2.3: Technology ratios (N) under undirected and directed technical change
write the relative value share of energy to labour in country u as,
wEEu
wLLuL
≡ wSu = N(σ−1)/σ(Sw)−1/σSu.
We see that, for given N, the effect of the introduction of the cap (a decrease
in Sw) is to unambiguously increase the share of energy in the unconstrained
country. We know from the result in Proposition 2.1 that, when N is con-
stant, leakage is always positive. Once we allow N to change in response to
economic incentives, however, some form of induced energy-saving technical
change occurs. The expression above shows how the effect of a change in the
technology ratio on relative factor shares depends on σ. As discussed above,
when σ < 1, N is higher than in the case of undirected technical change (see
Figure 2.3). Thus, N(σ−1)/σ is lower, and the increase in the energy share due
to the cap is counteracted by the induced change in technology. The same
is true when σ > 1. In this case, however, both N and N(σ−1)/σ are below
their baseline levels. Thus, irrespective of the level of σ, the effect of the in-
duced change in technology (N(σ−1)/σ) is to mitigate the terms-of-trade effect
(which works through (Sw)−1/σ). We can conclude that the technical change
induced by the introduction of unilateral climate policy reduces the share of
64 CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED
energy. Thus, technical change is endogenously energy-saving in our model.
As shown in Proposition 2.3, directed technical change unambiguously leads
to lower rates of carbon leakage.
The last question we want to address is whether the induced-technology
effect we just highlighted can more than offset the terms-of-trade effect, and
lead to a situation where carbon leakage is negative. Figure 2.1 shows that an
affirmative answer is in order. Indeed, the curve representing emissions under
directed technical change (the light curve) dips below the graph of the baseline
case (the dashed curve), as σ gets larger. The following proposition makes it
formal using a log-linearized version of our model, derived in Appendix B.2:20
Proposition 2.4. When technical change is directed, carbon leakage due to a marginal
tightening of the emission constraint will be positive for σ < 2, zero for σ = 2, and
negative for σ > 2.
Proof. In section B.3 of the Appendix we use a log-linearized version of the






(1− η) φ + χ LcELuE
)
(2− σ) (ηφ + χ) + 1− φ . (2.25)
As discussed in Appendix B.3, a necessary condition for a stable equilibrium
is that the term at the denominator be positive. Moreover, the second term
in parenthesis at the numerator is always positive. Hence, around a stable
equilibrium, we have L̃uE/L̃
c
E R 0 whenever σ R 2.
This proposition shows that, when technical change is directed, the induced-
technology effect can outweigh the terms-of-trade effect, provided that the
elasticity of the relative demand for carbon-based energy is ‘sufficiently large’.
Whether σ larger than two is a plausible case, however, is difficult to assess
from the available literature. In our model energy, E, implicitly stands for en-
ergy generated from fossil fuels rather than energy tout-court, as its generation
directly causes the emissions of carbon dioxide. Where long-run own-price
elasticities for ‘broad’ energy are estimated in the range 0.2 to 1.76 (see, e.g.
Pindyck and Rotemberg 1983, Popp 2001, Gately and Huntington 2002), the
estimates for fossil fuel products have values of up to 2.72 (see, e.g. Bates and
Moore 1992, Espey 1998, Taheri and Stevenson 2002). Since σ can be inter-
preted as the price elasticity for aggregated fossil fuels, the former estimates
20Although this proposition represents a local result, all our simulations confirm this pat-
tern for the model in levels.
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may provide a lower bound for σ while the latter may be seen as an upper
bound. In this respect, a long-run value for the demand elasticity of fossil
fuels of around 2 does not seem implausible.
2.4 Discussion and conclusions
The refusal of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is seen by many as
a serious threat to the Protocol’s effectiveness. If a coalition of technologically
advanced (and hence fossil-fuel dependent) economies decides to voluntar-
ily reduce its emissions of carbon dioxide, this will increase the price of dirty
goods within this coalition. Unconstrained countries, such as the US, might
benefit from increasing their production of dirty goods and exporting them to
coalition members, thereby offsetting the decrease in emissions by the ratify-
ing countries (carbon leakage).
However, environmental policy affects relative prices, and hence it modi-
fies the relative profitability of inventing for the clean or dirty goods industry.
The effects of changes in the direction of technical change on carbon leakage
cannot be ignored. In this chapter we studied these effects taking explicitly
into account that a technologically advanced country is outside the coalition.
We presented a stylized theoretical model, which compares the results of a
scenario where technology in the clean and dirty sectors is allowed to de-
velop differently (directed technical change), to those derived from a model
of ‘traditional’ endogenous technical change. We have shown that taking into
account the endogeneity of the direction of technical change always leads to
lower leakage rates than when this induced technology effect is ignored. We
have also discussed the possibility that the sign of carbon leakage be reversed.
When the elasticity of demand for carbon-based energy is sufficiently high,
the change in technology due to the emission constraint is such that it becomes
optimal for the unconstrained country to cut back on its emissions.
In order to emphasize the role of technical change on carbon leakage as
clearly as possible, we had to abstract from several other mechanisms that
play a role in determining the degree of leakage. Clearly, preferences, endow-
ments, and production possibilities all play a role in determining the global
effect of unilateral climate policy. However, by abstracting from these aspects,
we were able to highlight the effect of profit incentives on innovation and
ultimately on carbon leakage. Comforted by the empirical literature (see foot-
note 3), we believe that our results highlight a general and relevant mecha-
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nism: energy-saving technical change in the presence of climate policy. In-
deed, when technology is given, the global ratio of energy to other inputs de-
creases (see Proposition 2.2), a result that has been found in virtually all of the
CGE literature. This, in turn, induces energy-saving technological change, as
we discussed in section 2.3.2. Relative to a situation without directed techni-
cal change, the global demand for carbon-based energy, the demand for fossil
fuels in the unconstrained country, and hence the degree of carbon leakage,
will all be lower.
Of course reality is more complicated than our stylized model. As men-
tioned in the introduction, there is at least one other important channel through
which emissions leak from one country to the other. This we can broadly label
the energy-market channel. When an emission cap is introduced, the price of
carbon intensive fuels tends to decrease relative to cleaner ones, due to the de-
creased demand by constrained countries. As dirtier inputs become cheaper,
countries outside the climate agreement tend to increase their demand, lead-
ing to additional carbon leakage.21 The strength of this mechanism depends
on the ease of inter-fuel substitution (whether it is technically possible to sub-
stitute natural gas for coal, for example), on the elasticity of supply of the
different fuels, and on the possibility of trading different types of fuel inter-
nationally. The technical possibility to substitute one fuel for the other affects
the size of the shift in demand following a change in the relative price. On the
other hand, changes in relative prices also depend crucially on the decision
of fuels producers whether to reduce supply as the price falls, and to what
extent. Finally, if fuels (or some of them) are not easily traded internationally,
the scope for substitution (and for carbon leakage through this channel) might
also be limited.
The sensitivity of carbon leakage rates to changes in the key elasticities de-
termining substitution, supply responses and trading flows have been com-
prehensively analyzed by Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins (2000). They con-
clude that the rate of leakage is higher, the higher the inter-fuel elasticity of
substitution, the lower the elasticity of supply, and the higher the Armington
elasticities among different fuels. Any of these elements could be the focus
of possible extensions to our model. However, as long as the elasticities of
21Given the differences in model assumptions for CGE models (see footnote 1), it is hard
to say anything about the relative sizes of the energy market channel and the channel that
works through trade in CO2-intensive goods. According to Kuik (2005), CGE modelers seem
to agree that the former channel is quantitatively the most important, at least in the short to
medium term.
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supply are not too small (as seems reasonable, given the long-run perspective
of our analysis), and as long as trade in coal is limited (which seems sensible,
given that coal is a very bulky fuel which requires expansive infrastructures
and entails high transport costs), the degree of carbon leakage will be lower
than 100%. Recalling the discussion above on energy-saving technical change,
this suggests that also in this more complex framework, the same mechanism
would be preserved and carbon leakage would be lower when the direction
of technical change is endogenous.
Our results lend some support to the position of those who advocate the Ky-
oto Protocol, and other forms of unilateral climate policy as effective means to
reduce carbon emissions. We have shown that the leakage rates that inform
the current debate might prove overestimated, since the available quantita-
tive literature neglects the role of endogeneity in the direction of technical
change. As a consequence, unilateral climate policy might be more effective
than generally claimed. Moreover, we also hint at the (theoretical) possibility
that, when the demand for carbon-based energy is sufficiently elastic, rati-
fiers’ efforts could be compounded by emission reductions by unconstrained
countries.
Finally, we should note that the quantitative impact of the mechanisms we
have highlighted in this chapter depends on the key elasticities of the model.
Thus, our theoretical conclusions need to be assessed through quantitative
methods, first and foremost using CGE models that incorporate directed tech-
nical change. The calibration of such a model, however, would require reliable
sector-specific data on technical progress. Building such a model, and finding




ADDITIONAL PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS
B.1 Existence and stability of the equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the model requires that equilibrium on the goods
market (18) and equilibrium on the market for innovations (21) are satisfied
















We have the following result:




there exists a unique stable (interior) equi-
librium. When σ > 1+φφ , the stable equilibrium collapses to the corner where LE = 0.
Proof. Here we sketch the proof without presenting the full (tedious) algebraic
derivations.
We proceed to prove the proposition resorting to a graphical analysis, in-
terpreting TECH and GME as lines in the (LE, N) plane. We distinguish four
different cases:
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i. σ ∈ (0, 1). In this case both TECH and GME are downward sloping, and
both have a vertical asymptote at LE = 0 (See Figure B.1). Moreover,
both cross the horizontal axis at LE = L. Since the limit of the ratio of
TECH/GME as LE → 0, goes to 0, it is clear that GME is above TECH in a
neighbourhood of LE = 0. Analyzing the slope of both curves at LE → L
reveals that, since the slope of TECH→ ∞ while GME’s tends to 0, TECH
is above GME as LE approaches its maximum value (L). This is enough to
prove that there is at least one point of interception such that LE ∈ (0, L).
Moreover, since GME is strictly convex while TECH is convex-concave
with one inflection point, it follows that this equilibrium is unique.1
Let us now consider the dynamics of the system outside the equilibrium.






we see that when σ < 1 an increase in LE above the level that satisfies
the no -arbitrage condition π = 1 (that is, a point to the right of TECH),
the relative profitability of innovation in the energy sector decreases. The
subsequent adjustment requires an increase in innovation effort (and thus
in the number of blueprints) in the labour-intensive sector, that is a de-
crease in N. The opposite is true for a decrease in the amount of labour
employed in the energy sector.
Since the composition of labour across sectors adjusts immediately, the
dynamics of the system will be such that it will always move along the
GME locus. As the graphical illustration in Figure B.1 makes clear, an
equilibrium will be stable only if there GME is steeper that TECH. In the
case depicted in the picture, the only stable equilibrium will be the interior
one, since at the corner solution where LE = L the TECH curve is steeper
than the curve of GME.
ii. σ ∈ (1, 2]. The analysis of this case is specular to the one above. In this
case both curves are upward sloping and both have an asymptote at LE =
L. Analyzing the relative positions and the curvatures, we can conclude
once again that only one stable equilibrium exists and it is the interior one.





. As in the previous case, both curves are upward slop-
ing. However, the curvatures of the two curves change with σ, and when
1The tedious algebraic derivations are omitted for brevity.





Figure B.1: Stable Equilibrium when σ < 1
σ > 2 GME falls below TECH in the neighbourhood of L so that the
previous argument does not hold anymore. In order to prove that an
equilibrium still exists we focus on a marginal change in σ, starting from
σ = 2, for which case we know that an interior stable equilibrium exists
at LE = φ1/1−φ. Simple comparative statics tell us that GME pivots clock-
wise around a point whose abscissa is LE =
φ
1+φ L, whereas TECH pivots
counter-clockwise around a point further to the right. Since LE =
φ
1+φ L is
necessarily to the right of LE = φ1/(1−φ) for L ≥ 1, it follows that the two
curves will move in opposite directions, and they will cross even after the
marginal change. The equilibrium point will shift to the left and towards
the origin. We can iterate this argument as long as the curvatures are sta-
ble, tracing the stable equilibrium in its approach to the origin. When σ
reaches the boundary point 1+φφ , the interior equilibrium collapses to the
origin which becomes the only stable equilibrium.
Since TECH is above GME around LE = 0 and LE = L, and since we have
just proved that they cross at least once, this implies that they will actually
cross twice. Another equilibrium point indeed exists, but it can be shown






. In this (degenerate) case the two curves only cross at the
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origin of the axes, thus the only equilibrium obtains where LE = 0. As
this case is not interesting for our analysis, we restrict our attention to the





This concludes our sketch of the proof.
B.2 The log-linearized model
The linearized version of the goods market equilibrium condition (2.16) reads:
(σ− 1) Ñ = [(1− φ) σ + ηφ + χ] L̃uE +
[






where a tilde, ˜ , over a variable denotes a small percentage change, and where








)φ ∈ (0, 1), and χ ≡
LuE
2L− LcE − LuE
. (B.2)
The percentage changes in LuE and L
c
E denote any marginal change in the re-
spective variable. For example, a decrease in LcE (that is a L̃
c
E < 0) from
LcE = LE would represent the introduction of a marginal emissions cap in the
country, while a decrease from any LcE < LE would represent any marginal
tightening of an existing cap.
When we linearize the equilibrium condition for the market for innovations,
(2.20), we find:
Ñ = (σ− 1)
(





L̃cE + (σ− 1) (ηφ + χ) L̃uE. (B.3)
B.3 Appendix to Proposition 2.4






(1− η) φ + χ LcELuE
)
(2− σ) (ηφ + χ) + 1− φ . (B.4)
The denominator of this expression will be positive around any stable equi-
librium. Indeed, the dynamics of the system require that at any stable equili-
birum the slope of the goods market equilibrium condition be steeper than the
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R&D equilibrium condition in the (LE, N) space. The relevant slopes can be













= (σ− 1)(ηφ + χ),
where the subscripts GME and R&DE indicate the goods markets and the
R&D market equilibrium conditions, respectively. The sign of the inequality
is reversed for the case when σ > 1. Since in both cases one can easily verify
that the stability condition simplifies to
(2− σ) (ηφ + χ) + 1− φ > 0,




THE DIRECTION OF TECHNICAL CHANGE IN
CAPITAL-RESOURCE ECONOMIES1
The so-called New Growth Theory has formalized the determinants of produc-
tivity growth in economies where technological progress results from R&D ac-
tivity. In this framework, horizontal (vertical) innovations improve the quan-
tity (quality) of intermediate goods, and sustained growth obtains through
endogenous technical change (ETC hereafter).2
In the field of resource economics, this generation of models has been ex-
ploited to provide new answers to an old question: the problem of sustaining
growth in the presence of natural resource scarcity. A vast body of recent lit-
erature extends endogenous growth models to include natural resources as
an essential input. The central aim of this literature is to determine whether
technical progress is effective in ensuring sustained consumption over the
long-run. This issue has been addressed in the endogenous technological
change framework by Barbier (1999), Scholz and Ziemes (1999), Groth and
Schou (2002), Grimaud and Rougé (2003), amongst others. These contribu-
tions present models where
(i) the direction of technical change is exogenous, and
(ii) technical progress is, explicitly or implicitly, resource-augmenting.3
1This chapter is based on Di Maria and Valente (2006).
2This literature was started by the seminal works of Romer and (1986, 1987, 1990), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
3In section 2 we give a precise definition of implicit and explicit rates of resource-
augmenting progress.
75
76 TECHNICAL CHANGE IN CAPITAL-RESOURCE ECONOMIES
It should be stressed that assumption (ii) is crucial with respect to the sus-
tainability problem: in the vast majority of growth models with exhaustible
resources, ever-increasing consumption requires that the resource-augmenting
progress strictly exceed the utility discount rate. The same reasoning un-
derlies neoclassical models of optimal growth, where the rate of resource-
saving progress is exogenous. Hence, most contributions in this field share the
view that innovations increase, directly or indirectly, the productivity of nat-
ural resources. However, to our knowledge, the existence of purely resource-
augmenting technical progress has not been micro-founded so far. Hence,
one may object that the above models are conceptually biased in favor of sus-
tainability: since technological progress may in principle be capital- rather
than resource-augmenting, specifications (i)-(ii) might reflect a convenient,
but strong assumption.
Recently, three important contributions by Daron Acemoglu (1998, 2002a,
2003a) developed models with directed technical change (DTC), where final out-
put is obtained by means of two inputs, e.g. capital and labor, and technical
progress may in principle be either labor- or capital-augmenting, or both. The
respective rates of technical progress are determined by the relative profitabil-
ity of developing factor-specific innovations, so that the direction of technical
change is determined endogenously. Hence, DTC models can be considered
an up-to-date formalization of the Hicksian notion of induced innovations - in-
novations directed at economizing the use of those factors that become expen-
sive due to changes in their relative prices.4
This chapter investigates whether, and under what circumstances, techni-
cal change is endogenously directed towards resource-augmenting innova-
tions. We tackle the issue in a multi-sector DTC framework, where exhaustible
resources and accumulable man-made capital are both essential for produc-
tion. This allows us to represent in more general terms the so-called Capital-
Resource Economy - the central paradigm in resource economics since the pio-
neering contributions of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974). Elab-
orating on Acemoglu (2003a), we assume an R&D sector where capital- and
resource-augmenting innovations increase the number of varieties of factor-
specific intermediates. Our main result is that purely resource-augmenting
technical change takes place along the balanced growth path: although the
rate of capital-augmenting progress may be positive in the short run, it falls
to zero as the economy approaches balanced growth. We thus provide a
4See Hicks (1932, p. 124). Early formulations of the Hicksian notion of induced innovations
include Kennedy (1964) and Drandakis and Phelps (1965).
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possible micro-foundation for Capital-Resource models featuring resource-
augmenting progress, in both the Solow-Ramsey and ETC frameworks: in
this perspective, our results contradict the view that such models are too op-
timistic with respect to sustainability.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 provides a classification
of capital-resource economies in terms of technology specifications, and de-
fines implicit and explicit rates of resource-augmenting technical progress. In
section 3.2, we characterize the balanced growth path of the Capital-Resource
economy under directed technical change, and derive the main results. Sec-
tion 3.3 concludes.
3.1 Growth theory and resource economics
The much celebrated Symposium on the Economics of Exhaustible Resources is of-
ten recalled as the first close encounter between growth theory and resource
economics. The Capital-Resource model of Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow
(1974), and Stiglitz (1974) - i.e. an extended neoclassical growth model includ-
ing exhaustible resources as a production factor - has since been considered
a central paradigm in resource economics. More recently, several authors ex-
ploited new growth theories to analyze capital-resource economies with en-
dogenous technical change: see e.g. Barbier (1999), Scholz and Ziemes (1999),
Groth and Schou (2002), Grimaud and Rougé (2003), Bretschger and Smulders
(2003).
A central aim of this literature is to determine whether, and under what
circumstances, technical progress is effective in ensuring sustained consump-
tion (Bretschger 2005). In this regard, the common denominator of both early
and recent models is that a strictly positive rate of resource-augmenting progress
is necessary to obtain non-declining consumption in the long run. We used
italics in order to stress that the type of technological progress is a crucial
element in Capital-Resource economies: from the perspective of sustainabil-
ity, the ’direction’ of technical change (whether it is resource-augmenting or
capital-augmenting) is even more important than its ’nature’ (i.e., whether it
is exogenous or endogenous). To clarify this point, consider the following
technologies:
Y (t) = F (K (t) , M (t) R (t)) , (3.1)
Y (t) = A (t) K (t)α1 R (t)α2 , (3.2)
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where Y is output, K is man-made capital, R is an exhaustible resource ex-
tracted from a finite stock, F is concave and homogeneous of degree one, and
α1 + α2 ≤ 1. Technology (3.1) features an explicit rate of resource-augmenting
progress equal to Ṁ/M: the underlying assumption is that the economy de-
velops resource-saving techniques that directly increase the productivity of R.
Specification (3.2) combines the Cobb-Douglas form with disembodied tech-
nical progress: the Hicks neutral rate is equal to Ȧ/A.
Firstly, consider the neoclassical framework: in this case, technology (3.1)
exhibits M (t) = eηt, with η > 0 exogenous and constant. Then, if cosumption
obeys the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule, a necessary condition for sustained
consumption in the long run is ρ ≤ η, where ρ is the utility discount rate.5
This is a generalization of a well-known result by Stiglitz (1974), who instead
assumed technology (3.2) setting A (t) = eωt with ω > 0 exogenous and con-
stant. In this case, the necessary condition for non-declining consumption
becomes ρ ≤ ω/α2. Hence, from the perspective of sustainability conditions,
what is crucial is not the total effect of technical change on output levels (ω)
but rather its resource-saving effect.6 Indeed, technology (3.2) can be rewrit-




, where (ω/α2) is the implicit rate of resource-
augmenting progress. This implies that assuming disembodied progress in as-
sociation with a Cobb-Douglas form is not innocuous for the problem at hand:
under specification (3.2), technical change is indirectly resource-augmenting.
The same reasoning applies with respect to ETC models, where Ṁ/M or
Ȧ/A are determined endogenously by R&D activity. On the one hand, sus-
tained consumption still requires that the resource-augmenting rate be at least
equal to the discount rate: see e.g. Amigues, Grimaud, and Moreaux (2004).
On the other hand, also in this framework, most technology specifications fall
in either category (3.1) or (3.2). For example, technical progress is explicitly
resource-augmenting in Amigues, Grimaud, and Moreaux (2004), whereas
Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch. 5), Barbier (1999), Scholz and Ziemes (1999),
and Grimaud and Rougé (2003) assume variants of the Cobb-Douglas form
(3.2).7
5See Valente (2005). The same technology is assumed in Gaitan and Roe (2005).
6Actually, Stiglitz (1974) considers Y = K (t)α1 R (t)α2 L (t)α3 eωt, where L is labor supplied
inelastically. Results do not change under specification (3.2), which is chosen for expositional
clarity.
7Bretschger and Smulders (2003) assume a peculiar CES technology where innovations
are not directly resource-augmenting, but spillovers from capital-augmenting innovations di-
rectly affect resource productivity. In this case, resource-augmenting spillovers become nec-
essary to sustain the economy, and the underlying logic is the same.
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Hence, the common denominator of capital-resource models is that techno-
logical progress is, explicitly or implicitly, resource-augmenting by assump-
tion. But is this assumption plausible? In principle, one might object, techni-
cal progress can be purely capital-augmenting instead. For example, suppose
that Y = Υ (NK, R), where N represents purely capital-augmenting progress
and Υ exhibits an elasticity of substitution different from unity. In this case, the
production function does not allow for implicit resource-augmenting progress,
and prospects for sustainability change dramatically. It follows from these
considerations that a crucial issue is to determine whether (3.1)-(3.2) exhibit
sound microeconomic foundations: if not, all mentioned contributions are
conceptually biased in favor of sustainability because technologies (3.1) and
(3.2) reflect a convenient, but strong assumption.
Tackling this issue requires assuming that the direction of technical change
is endogenous. In the context of multi-sector economies, the DTC framework
has been developed by Acemoglu (1998, 2002a, 2003a), who assumes that the
rates of capital- and labor-augmenting technical change are respectively de-
termined by the relative profitability of factor-specific innovations. In particu-
lar, Acemoglu (2003a) shows that a typical Capital-Labor economy exhibits
purely labor-augmenting progress under directed technical change. In the
field of environmental economics, models with DTC are analysed by André
and Smulders (2006), Di Maria and Smulders (2004) and Di Maria and van der
Werf (2005): Di Maria and Smulders (2004) study the role of endogenous tech-
nology in explaining cross-country differences in pollution and the pollution
haven effect of international trade; Di Maria and van der Werf (2005) ana-
lyze carbon leakage effects under directed technical change considering clean
versus dirty inputs; André and Smulders (2006) consider a Labor-Resource
economy and compare equilibrium dynamics with recent international trends
in energy supply and consumption. To our knowledge, however, the exis-
tence of purely resource-augmenting technical progress in a Capital-Resource
Economy has not been micro-founded so far.
In order to address this point, this chapter studies whether, and under what
circumstances, R&D activity is endogenously directed towards resource- aug-
menting innovations, given the alternative of developing capital-augmenting
innovations. In particular, we assume a CES technology of the form Y =
F (NK, MR) with an elasticity of substitution below unity, and investigate the
endogenous dynamics of N and M along the balanced growth path. The main
difference with respect to Acemoglu (2003a) is that, since we substitute fixed
labor with a resource flow extracted from an exhaustible stock, input units and
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factor rewards (that is, R and resource rents) are necessarily time-varying: the
extracting sector exploits the natural stock over an infinite time-horizon, and
resource prices therefore obey the Hotelling rule (Hotelling 1931). This im-
plies that we cannot translate a priori the result of ’purely labor-augmenting
progress’ of Acemoglu (2003a) into ‘purely resource-augmenting progress’ in
our model, until we prove that the Hotelling rule fully supports the time-paths
of intermediate goods prices compatibly with balanced growth. We will show
that this is actually the case in our model.
3.2 The model
The supply-side of the economy consists of five sectors: (i) the final sector
assembles capital-intensive and resource-intensive goods (K̃ and R̃). These
goods are produced by (ii) competitive firms, using n varieties of capital-
specific intermediates (yK(j) with j ∈ (0, n]), and m varieties of resource-specific
intermediate goods (yR(j) with j ∈ (0, m]), respectively. Factor-specific interme-
diates are supplied by (iii) monopolists producing yK(j) by means of available
man-made capital (K), and producing yR(j) by means of extracted resource (R);
the resource is supplied by (iv) an extracting sector that exploits a finite stock
(H) of exhaustible natural capital. Finally, (v) the R&D sector consists of firms
that develop capital-augmenting innovations (blueprints that increase n) and
firms that develop resource-augmenting innovations (blueprints that increase
m). The productivity of R&D firms depends on the amounts of ’scientists’
employed in the two subsectors (SK and SR, respectively).










σ + (1− γ) R̃ σ−1σ
] σ
σ−1 , (3.3)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a weighting parameter, and σ is the (constant) elasticity
of substitution between K̃ and R̃. From the point of view of resource eco-
nomics and sustainability theory, the interesting case is that featuring σ < 1:
when resource-intensive goods are essential, natural resource scarcity binds
the economy over the entire time-horizon considered, t ∈ [0, ∞).
Competitive firms produce K̃ and R̃ by means of factor-specific intermedi-
ates, yK(j) and y
R
(j). In each instant t, there are n (t) varieties of y
K
(j) and m (t)






















where β ∈ (0, 1). Intermediates yK(j) and yR(j) are supplied by monopolists who
hold the relevant patent, and exploit linear technologies
yK(j) = K
(j) and yR(j) = R
(j), (3.5)
where K(j) indicates units of man-made capital used to produce yK(j), and R
(j)
indicates units of resource used to produce yR(j).
8 The value of patents held by
monopolists equals the present-value stream of instantaneous profits implied
by capital- and resource-augmenting innovations (πK and πR, respectively),







t (r(ω)+δ)dωdv, with i = K, R. (3.6)
For future reference, on the basis of (3.6) we can define an index of relative




n (v) πK (v)
m (v) πR (v)
dv. (3.7)
Denoting aggregate capital by K (t), and the total amount of extracted re-
source by R (t), market-clearing requires
∫ n(t)
0
K(j) (t) dj = K (t) and
∫ m(t)
0
R(j) (t) dj = R (t) . (3.8)
For simplicity, we assume that the capital stock, K, does not depreciate. The
amount of resource R is supplied by the extracting sector. Denoting the in-
terest rate by r and the resource price by q, the present-discounted value of
future profits for the extracting sector is
∫ ∞
0
q (t) R (t) e−
∫ t
0 r(v)dvdt, (3.9)
8It is worth noting, at this point, the role of symmetric technologies for factor-intensive
goods and intermediates. In this chapter, we are interested in the direction of technical change
as driven by the ’general nature’ of primary inputs, i.e. reproducibility (of man-made capital)
versus exhaustibility (of the natural resource). Symmetric technologies in (3.4) and (3.5) are
essential to this aim: assuming factor-specific elasticities - setting e.g. βK 6= βR in (3.4) - or
different marginal costs for monopolists in (3.5) would create trivial distortions in the relative
profitability of factor-specific innovations, without addressing the main issue.
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where we have ruled out extraction costs for simplicity. Assuming that the
natural resource is exhaustible, extraction plans face the following constraints:
Ḣ (t) = −R (t) and
∫ ∞
0
R (t) dt ≤ H (0) , (3.10)
where H indicates the resource stock.
In this model, the source of endogenous growth is given by increases in the
number of varieties: ṅ (t) > 0 corresponds to capital-augmenting technical
change, and ṁ (t) > 0 corresponds to resource-augmenting technical change.
Increases in varieties are obtained through R&D activity. In this sector, free-
entry conditions ensure that firms make zero extra profits. Firms developing
capital- and resource-augmenting innovations employ SK and SR scientists,
respectively. An important assumption is that scientists are fully mobile be-
tween the two types of firms: in each instant, scientists can be reallocated
between capital- and resource-augmenting activity, according to the relative












where δ > 0 is the obsolescence rate of both innovations, and bK and bR are
constant productivity indices. The number of scientists affects the produc-








. The function φ (.) is







/∂Si > 0. On the one hand, assuming φ′ (.) < 0 captures crowding
effects among scientists (when more scientists are employed in one sector, the
productivity of each declines); on the other hand, the net effect of a marginal
increase in employed scientists on the rate of innovation is positive: ṠK > 0









are taken as given when firms compete for hiring sci-
entists. We further assume that the number of existing scientists (S) suffices to
have a stationary mass of varieties (ṁ = ṅ = 0):
S > S̄K + S̄R (3.13)








= δ by definition.
To close the model, we consider a representative agent with logarithmic in-
stantaneous preferences, and a constant utility discount rate ρ > 0. Assuming
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unit mass population, and denoting aggregate consumption by C, an optimal
consumption path is a plan {C (t)}∞t=0 that maximizes
∫ ∞
0
log C (t) e−ρtdt, (3.14)
subject to the aggregate wealth constraint
K̇ = rK + qR + wS− C, (3.15)
where rK is capital income (r is the marginal reward of capital), qR represents
resource rents, and w is the wage rate for scientists, so that wS is total labor
income.9 Our results do not change if we substitute logarithmic preferences
with a CRRA instantaneous utility function: in (3.14), the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution is set equal to one to simplify the exposition.
3.2.1 Equilibrium
Denote by pK and pR the prices of capital- and resource-intensive goods (K̃,

















, r, q, w
}∞
t=0














such that, for given prices in the respective sectors: consumption and in-
vestment plans maximize (3.14) subject to (3.15); allocations of capital- and
resource-intensive goods maximize final sector profits; allocations of capital-













9To see why this is the case, consider total wealth as the sum of the value of capital and
of the resource stock W = K + qH. The budget constraint of the representative consumer
is: Ẇ = rK + q̇H + wS − C. Equation (3.15) follows immediately from substituting Ẇ =
K̇ + q̇H + qḢ in the budget constraint, and recalling that Ḣ = −R. See for example, Groth
and Schou (2005).
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subject to demand schedules for yK(j) and y
R
(j); extracted resource flows maxi-
mize (3.9) subject to (3.10); scientist allocations SK and SR imply zero profits
for all R&D firms; and all markets clear.
Setting aggregate output as the numeraire good, the equilibrium is charac-






σ and pR = (1− γ) (Y/R̃) 1σ , (3.18)
























Monopolists producing factor-specific intermediates maximize (3.17) taking
schedules (3.20) as given, obtaining first order conditions
χK(j) = rβ
−1 and χR(j) = qβ
−1. (3.21)
Expressions (3.21) imply that equilibrium instantaneous profits πK(j) and π
R
(j)
are invariant across varieties: from the market clearing condition (3.8), we
have
yK(j) = K
(j) = K/n and yR(j) = R
(j) = R/m, (3.22)
so that equilibrium profits read
πK = r (1− β) (nβ)−1 K and πR = q (1− β) (mβ)−1 R. (3.23)























As regards resource extraction, maximizing (3.9) subject to (3.10) yields the
standard Hotelling rule
q̇/q = r, (3.26)
which implicitly defines an optimal depletion path.
In the R&D sector, the value of the marginal innovation in the two types of























which takes into account possible corner solutions. When equilibrium levels


















at any instant in which both types of innovations are developed. Finally, con-
sumption dynamics follow the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule
Ċ/C = r− ρ. (3.29)
Integrating (3.4) using (3.22) we obtain
K̃ = n
1−β
β K and R̃ = m
1−β
β R. (3.30)
Substituting (3.30) in (3.20), and using conditions (3.21) we obtain
r = βpKn
1−β
β and q = βpRm
1−β
β . (3.31)
In order to characterize dynamics, it is useful to define elasticity-adjusted
indices of intermediates varieties as N ≡ n
1−β
β and M ≡ m
1−β
β . From (3.30) we
can thus rewrite aggregate output Y = F(K̃, R̃) in equilibrium as








Expression (3.32) clarifies the role of innovations in determining the rates of
technical progress through expansions of intermediates varieties. For this rea-
son we will refer to Ṅ/N and Ṁ/M as the (net) rates of capital-augmenting
and resource-augmenting technical progress.
Since F is homogeneous of degree one, we can express the augmented output-
resource ratio Y/MR in intensive form as follows,
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Where we have indicated the production function in intensive form as f (x)




Rewriting (3.18) using f (x), yields:
pK = f ′x (x) = γ ( f (x) /x)
1
σ , (3.35)
pR = f (x)− f ′x (x) x = (1− γ) ( f (x))
1
σ ; (3.36)








σ ⇒ ∂ξ/∂x < 0. (3.37)





σ (1− γ) γσ−1





σ γσ (1− γ)σ−1 + (1− γ)σ
]1/(σ−1) ⇒ ∂pR/∂x > 0, (3.39)
where the sign of both derivatives follows from σ < 1. When capital- and
resource-intensive goods are complements, an increase in the augmented capi-
tal-resource ratio (x) leads to a decrease in the relative capital share (ξ), a de-
crease in the price of capital-intensive goods (pK), and an increase in the price
of resource-intensive goods (pR). On the basis of the above relations, the dy-
namics of x can be expressed in terms of the two indices of intermediates va-
rieties:


















10Expressions (3.38)-(3.39) can be derived from price-index normalization. Multiplying





)σ−1 + (1− γ)σ
]1/(σ−1)
. Substituting from
(3.18) the price ratio pK/pR = γ (1− γ)−1 x−(1/σ) yields (3.39). Symmetric steps yield (3.38).
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From (3.31) and (3.35), the interest rate equals
r = f ′x (x) βN. (3.42)
Differentiating the expression for q in (3.31) we obtain q̇/q =(ṗR/pR)+(Ṁ/M).
Substituting ṗR/pR from (3.41), q̇/q = r from (3.26), and the interest rate from
(3.42), we obtain the dynamic law (3.40).
Equation (3.40) shows that the augmented capital-resource ratio increases
(decreases) when the interest rate exceeds (falls short of) the net rate of re-
source -augmenting technical change, Ṁ/M. Neoclassical and ETC models
with purely resource-augmenting progress can be seen as particular cases of
this general rule: the basic difference here is that N and Ṁ/M are both en-
dogenous. If we normalize N = 1 and assume Ṁ/M = η > 0 (exogenous
constant) in equation (3.40) we have the dynamic rule for the capital-resource
ratio in the Ramsey model with exogenous progress (see Valente 2005, eq.16).
Alternatively, normalising N = 1 and keeping Ṁ/M endogenously deter-
mined by R&D activity, we have purely resource-augmenting progress à la
Amigues, Grimaud, and Moreaux (2004).
3.2.2 Balanced Growth Path
We begin our characterization of long-run equilibria by considering possible
Balanced Growth Paths (BGPs). We will denote by y∞ the limit limt→∞ y (t),
and by y∗ the value of y along the balanced growth path, for any variable y.
Following the standard definition, a BGP equilibrium features (Ċ/C)∞ = g∗
with g∗ finite and constant. We now show that (Ċ/C)∞ = g∗ implies a constant
augmented capital-resource ratio in the long run. Starting from (3.40), we
have three possible cases regarding the asymptotic value of x: in general, the
augmented capital-resource ratio may approach zero (x∞ = 0), diverge to
infinity (x∞ = ∞), or converge to a positive steady-state value, x = x̄ with
x̄ > 0 a finite constant. The next Proposition establishes that only the third
case (x = x̄) is compatible with BGP.
Proposition 3.1. If (Ċ/C)∞ = g∗ finite and constant, then x∞ = x̄ > 0 finite and
constant.
Proof. The proof builds on the fact that x∞ = 0 and x∞ = ∞ have the following
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implications:
x∞ = 0 ⇒ SK∞ = S ⇒ (ṅ/n)∞ = bKSφ (S)− δ ⇒ (ṁ/m)∞ = −δ, (3.43)
x∞ = ∞ ⇒ SK∞ = 0 ⇒ (ṅ/n)∞ = −δ ⇒ (ṁ/m)∞ = bRSφ (S)− δ, (3.44)
Expressions (3.43) and (3.44) are proved in the Appendix, using the index of
relative profitability defined in (3.7). From (3.43), if the augmented capital-
resource ratio approaches zero, all scientists are employed in developing capital-
augmenting innovations, and the number of resource-specific intermediates
m will approach zero due to depreciation. From (3.44), in the opposite case, x
diverges to infinity, all scientists are employed in resource-augmenting inno-
vations, and the number of capital-specific intermediates will approach zero
in the long run. But neither (3.43) nor (3.44) are compatible with BGP. Recall-
ing the Keynes-Ramsey rule (3.29), having (Ċ/C)∞ = g∗ requires a constant










which implies that ṗK∞ and Ṅ∞ are either both zero or of opposite sign. First,
suppose that ṗK∞ > 0 and Ṅ∞ < 0: from (3.38), ṗK∞ > 0 ⇒ ẋ∞ < 0 ⇒ x∞ =
0; but then, expression (3.43) would imply Ṅ∞ > 0, which contradicts the
supposition. Second, suppose that ṗK∞ < 0 and Ṅ∞ > 0: from (3.38), ṗK∞ <
0 ⇒ ẋ∞ > 0 ⇒ x∞ = ∞; but then, expression (3.44) would imply Ṅ∞ < 0,
which contradicts the supposition. Hence, in order to have a constant interest
rate we need ṗK∞ = Ṅ∞ = 0, which implies ẋ∞ = 0 from (3.38). Consequently,
if the economy converges to BGP, x∞ = x̄ > 0 with x̄ finite and constant.
Proposition 3.1 shows that balanced growth requires ẋ∞ = 0 and Ṅ∞ =
ṅ∞ = 0, so that if the economy approaches a BGP equilibrium we have x∞ =
x∗ and N∞ = N∗. A constant level of N means that the net growth rate of
capital-specific intermediates is zero. Note that, due to obsolescence (δ > 0),
ṅ∞ = 0 does not imply zero R&D activity in capital-augmenting innovations:
a positive number of scientists (SK∞ > 0) must work in the capital-augmenting
sector in order to keep n, the number of capital-specific intermediates, con-
stant over time. More important,
Proposition 3.2. Convergence to BGP implies purely resource-augmenting technical









= r∗ = f ′x (x∗) βN∗. (3.46)
CHAPTER 3 89
Proof. From Proposition 3.1, balanced growth requires ṗK∞ = Ṅ∞ = ẋ∞ = 0.
Substituting (3.42) in (3.40) and setting ẋ∞ = 0 completes the proof.
This is the main result of the chapter. The intuition for (3.46) is that balanced
growth requires constant prices of both capital- and resource-intensive goods
(ṗK∞ = ẋ∞ = 0 implies, from (3.36), that ṗR∞ = 0 as well). On the one hand,
since the price of resource-intensive goods is proportional to q/M - from (3.31)
- balanced growth is possible only if the net rate of resource-saving progress
exactly offsets the growth in the resource price. On the other hand, efficient
exploitation of the exhaustible resource requires the resource price to grow at a
rate equal to r by virtue of the Hotelling rule (3.26), implying (Ṁ/M)∞ = r∗.11





R̃∗/R̃∗ = Ẏ∗/Y∗ = Ċ∗/C∗ = r∗ − ρ, (3.47)
Ṙ∗/R∗ = −ρ, (3.48)
ṁ∗/m∗ = β (1− β)−1 r∗, (3.49)
ṅ∗/n∗ = 0, (3.50)
π̇K∗ /πK∗ = r∗ − ρ, (3.51)
π̇R∗ /πR∗ =
1− 2β
1− β r∗ − ρ, (3.52)
Substituting (3.51)-(3.52) in (3.24)-(3.25) we obtain the BGP values of patents:
if the economy converges to balanced growth, we have
VK (t) =
(1− β) r∗
β (δ + ρ) n∗






1−β r∗ + δ + ρ
) · q (t) R (t)
m (t)
, (3.54)
for any sufficiently large t. Equations (3.53)-(3.54) imply that both nVK and
mVR will grow at the balanced rate r∗ − ρ. Finally, equilibrium in the ’labor









m (t) VR (t) , (3.55)
11Formally, this reasoning provides an equivalent proof of Proposition 3.2: differentiating
q from (3.31) and substituting the Hotelling rule q̇/q = r, we obtain r =(ṗR/pR)+(Ṁ/M).
Taking the limit and substituting ṗR∞ = 0 we obtain (3.46).
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where SK∗ = S̄K and SR∗ = S− S̄K.






/∂SK > 0, a
unique couple of values (x∗, SK∗ = S̄K) satisfies r∗ = f ′x (x∗) βN∗ with N∗ de-
termined by SK∗ , and the BGP equilibrium is therefore unique. As regards
other possible long-run equilibria, the BGP described above is the only pos-
sible long-run equilibrium provided that the economy exhibits non-cyclical
paths: in this case, (Ċ/C)∞ = ∞ cannot be an equilibrium. The proof is iden-
tical to that in Acemoglu (2003), and is reported in the Appendix.
As regards the dynamic stability of the BGP equilibrium, in the Appendix we
show that linearizing the five-by-five system of differential equations describ-
ing the dynamics of the model, we can show that the system is locally stable.
In particular, we show that the Jacobian matrix obtained from the lineariza-
tion procedure, J, evaluated at the steady state x∗, N∗, SK∗ , C∗/K∗, R∗/H∗, has
three positive and two negative eigenvalues.
3.2.3 Remarks
We have formalized directed technical change in a Capital-Resource economy
by extending the benchmark DTC model of Acemoglu (2003a) to include nat-
ural capital. Acemoglu (2003a) assumes that final output is a combination of
capital-intensive and labor-intensive goods, and shows that, when both goods
are essential, there exists a unique balanced growth path with purely labor-
augmenting technical change. In this chapter, raw labor inputs are replaced
by resource flows extracted from an exhaustible natural stock. We have shown
that the equilibrium time-path of resource prices, which obeys the standard
Hotelling rule, fully supports the time-path of intermediate goods prices that
is compatible with the BGP equilibrium. In particular, the asymmetric role
of the two types of innovation follows immediately from equilibrium condi-
tions (3.31). Balanced growth typically requires a constant interest rate (the
rental price of capital): given that q (the price of natural resource) must grow
forever, fulfilling (3.31) for given prices pK and pR requires differentiated inno-
vation rates ṁ/m 6= ṅ/n. As a consequence, in our Capital-Resource economy
we were able to find a BGP equilibrium, which is locally stable, and features
purely resource-augmenting technical change.
From Proposition 3.2, the asymptotic rate of resource-augmenting progress
exactly equals the interest rate. A similar result can be obtained in the neo-
classical framework, but following an inverse logic: for a given exogenous
rate of resource-augmenting technical progress η, the marginal product of
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capital converges to η, determining constant factor shares in the long run
(Stiglitz 1974). In the present context, instead, the rate of technical change
is endogenous and its behavior complies with the Hicksian principle of in-
duced innovations: technical change tends to be directed towards those factors
that become expensive, in order to compensate relative scarcity with increased
real productivity. As a consequence, balanced growth requires that Ṁ/M con-
verges to the growth rate of resource price, which is in turn equal to the inter-
est rate.
Two final remarks are as follows. Firstly, the uniqueness and the local stabil-
ity of the BGP equilibrium hinge on the assumption of poor substitution possi-
bilities: setting σ > 1 leaves room for multiple long-run equilibria, and in par-
ticular, the possibility that the economy shifts towards alternative paths along
which the net rate of capital-augmenting technical progress is positive (for de-
tails, see Acemoglu 2003a). However, in the present context, our assumption
σ < 1 relies on a precise economic reasoning: natural resource scarcity mat-
ters for sustainability to the extent that exhaustible resources are essential for
production. Secondly, the necessary condition for non-declining consumption













≥ ρ + δ, (3.56)
which is obtained by imposing (Ċ/C)∞ = (Ṁ/M)∞ − ρ ≥ 0 in the BGP equi-
librium. From (3.56), lower monopoly profits for intermediate firms, as well
as higher depreciation rates for innovations, reduce prospects for sustained
consumption in the long run.
3.3 Conclusion
The vast majority of capital-resource models assumes that technical progress
is, explicitly or implicitly, resource-augmenting. This assumption is necessary
to obtain sustained consumption in the long run, but it has not been micro-
founded so far. At least in principle, R&D activity can also be directed towards
capital-augmenting innovations, leaving room for the possibility that tech-
nical change does not exhibit resource-saving properties: in this case, most
capital-resource models would be too optimistic with respect to the problem of
sustainability, and specifying resource-augmenting progress would be a con-
venient, but strong assumption.
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Elaborating on Acemoglu (2003a), we addressed the problem in the con-
text of a multi-sector economy with directed technical change, where the re-
spective rates of capital- and resource-augmenting progress are determined
endogenously by the relative profitability of factor-specific innovations. We
characterized the balanced growth path, showing that the rate of capital-aug-
menting technical progress tends to zero in the long run, and the economy
exhibits purely resource-augmenting progress. This result provides sound
microfoundations for the broad class of capital-resource models in both the
Solow-Ramsey and the ETC framework, and contradicts the view that such
models are conceptually biased in favor sustainability.
We have shown that the net rate of resource-saving progress must equal the
interest rate along the balanced growth path. While this confirms a standard
result of the neoclassical model, the presence of directed technical change pro-
vides a different, and very intuitive explanation for this result. On the one
hand, since the natural resource stock is exhaustible, the growth rate of the re-
source price is exactly equal to the interest rate Hotelling (1931). On the other
hand, balanced growth requires that the rate of resource-saving progress ex-
actly offset the growth in the resource price: this is in compliance with the
view that factor-specific innovations are induced by the need of enhancing
the real productivity of scarce resources, in order to compensate for their in-
creased expensiveness Hicks (1932). Actually, we do not know whether Hicks
and Hotelling had been close friends. But making them meet seventy-five
years later was a great pleasure for us.
APPENDIX
C
ADDITIONAL PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS
C.1 Proof of expressions (3.43) and (3.44)
Results (3.43) and (3.44) hold true in a Capital-Labor economy as well, so that
the proof is identical to that of Lemma 1 in the Appendix of Acemoglu (2003a,
p.28-29). We make use of the index of relative profitability ∆ (t) defined in
(3.7), and follow a simple logic: when x∞ = 0, the relative profitability of
capital-augmenting innovations grows unboundedly (∆∞ = ∞) shifting all
scientists into that R&D subsector; symmetrically, x∞ = ∞ implies ∆∞ = 0,
and all scientists will be employed in developing resource-augmenting inno-
vations.










Being σ < 1, if x∞ = 0 then ∆∞ = ∞. From (3.7) and (3.27), this will imply
SK∞ = S and SR∞ = 0, from which (ṅ/n)∞ = bKSφ (S)− δ and (ṁ/m)∞ = −δ as
in expression (3.43). Conversely, if x∞ = ∞ then ∆∞ = 0. From (3.27) it follows
SK∞ = 0 and SR∞ = S, and hence (ṅ/n)∞ = −δ and (ṁ/m)∞ = bRSφ (S)− δ in
expression (3.44).
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C.2 Ruling out explosive paths
On the basis of (3.46), we can exclude the possibility of non-balanced growth
paths. Unbounded consumption growth can be ruled out as follows: suppose
that (Ċ/C)∞ = ∞, which in turn requires (Ẏ/Y)∞ = ∞. Then, rewrite (3.33) as








Expression (C.2) has the following implications. If x∞ = ∞ then (x
σ−1
σ )∞ = 0,
which implies (Ẏ/Y)∞ =(Ṁ/M)∞+(Ṙ/R)∞ < ∞. Also if x∞ = x̄, where x̄ is a
finite constant, then (Ẏ/Y)∞ =(Ṁ/M)∞+(Ṙ/R)∞ < ∞. Finally, if x∞ = 0 we
have (Ẏ/Y)∞ <(Ṁ/M)∞+(Ṙ/R)∞ < ∞. Consequently, (Ẏ/Y)∞ = ∞ cannot
be an equilibrium, implying that (Ċ/C)∞ = ∞ cannot be an equilibrium as
well.
C.3 Local stability of the BGP equilibrium
The dynamics of the system are represented by five differential equations rep-
resenting the dynamics of x, N, SK, c ≡ C/K, and u ≡ H/R.
We get the first one, describing the evolution of x over time, substituting





f ′x (x) x
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Differentiating the right hand side of (C.3) with respect to x we have
σ
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Evaluating (C.4) at the steady-state equilibrium (where f ′x (x) βN = Ṁ/M















f (x∗) f ′′xx (x∗) , (C.5)
where f ′′xx < 0 implies axx < 0. Differentiating (C.3) with respect to N we have
axN = σβ f (x∗) > 0, (C.6)
and with respect to S we have
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S− SK)) /∂SK < 0. Differentiating with
respect to c and u, we get axc = axu = 0.



























Again, we obtain aNc = aNu = 0.
The third equation is obtained as in Acemoglu (2003a, p.32). Since SK∗ > 0
and SR∗ > 0, the equilibrium condition (3.28) holds in an open set around the
BGP equilibrium where both types of innovations are developed. Differenti-
























































(1− β) φ (SK)
βφ (S− SK)
[
ρ + δ + β (r∗ − ρ) (1− β)−1
] , (C.13)
B4 (x) = ξ (x∗)− ξ (x) , (C.14)
where the capital share ξ (x) is defined in (3.37) and exhibits ∂ξ/∂x < 0. Dif-
ferentiating (C.10) with respect to SK and x we have
ṠK
SK





where little algebra shows that aSx > 0 and aSS > 0. Once more, aSc = aSu = 0.
The fourth equation illustrates the dynamic behaviour of the consumption
to capital ratio: c ≡ C/K. Using the Keynes-Ramsey rule in (3.29), and expres-
sions (3.33) and (3.42), we get:
ċ
c
= βγN f ′x(x)− ρ− N
[
γ + (1− γ)x 1−σσ
] σ
σ−1 + c.
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The partial derivatives of this expression with respect to the other relevant
variables, evaluated at the steady state, are:
acx = βN∗ f ′′xx(x∗)− (1− γ)N∗
[








acN = βγ f ′x(x∗) +
[






acS = 0; acc = 1; acu = 0.
Finally, the fifth differential equation we consider concerns the dynamics of
the variable u ≡ R/H. Using the fact that û = R̂ + u, and the definition of x
from (3.34), we get:
û = σ
f (x)
f ′x (x) x
[

































γ + (1− γ)x 1−σσ
] σ
σ−1 + c + u.
The coefficients of the linear approximation are:
aux = axx − (1− γ)N∗
[








auN = axN +
[

























axx axN axS 0 0
0 0 aNS 0 0
aSx 0 aSS 0 0
acx acN 0 acc 0














The determinant of the coefficients matrix, J say, can be written as:










Hence, auu > 0 and acc > 0 are two positive eigenvalues of J. Studying the
determinant and the characteristic equation of A provides the three additional
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eigenvalues of the system. Since the determinant of A is axNaNSaSx > 0, we
have either three positive roots, or one positive and two negative (or complex
with negative real part) roots. The three remaining eigenvalues (λi) are also
zeros of
P (λ) = −λ3 + λ2 (axx + aSS) + λ (aSxaxS − axxaSS) + aSxaNSaxN = 0,
where (aSxaxS − axxaSS) > 0 and aSxaNSaxN > 0. Hence, regardless of the
sign of (axx + aSS), the polynomial always shows one variation of signs (either
-,+,+,+ or -,-,+,+). This implies the existence of one and only one positive root.
Our analysis thus shows that the system in (C.16) has three positive and two
negative roots. Indeed, two initial conditions N0 = N(0) and x0 = N0K0M0R0 are
needed to converge to the long-run equilibrium. Notice that u0 is univocally
determined by x0, according to u0 = N0K0M0H0x0 , and is thus not an independent
jump variable. To conclude, the number of negative eigenvalues equals the




BRAIN DRAIN AND DISTANCE TO FRONTIER1
Classical theoretical studies on the Brain Drain hold that emigration of highly
educated people is beneficial for destination countries and harmful for source
ones (e.g. Borjas 1994, Borjas 1995). For immigration countries, the inflow of
highly skilled individuals increases the pool of available human capital, and
boosts economic growth in the long-run. A specular logic seems to imply that
the outflow of ‘brains’ is damaging for the source countries.2
This theoretical prediction, however, is at odds with the experience of some
sending countries that grew faster than their relatively more closed neigh-
bours. Examples include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore as op-
posed to Bangladesh, India and Indonesia, for example.3 A recent literature
on the effects of the outflow of skilled workers has focused on the potential
for a Beneficial Brain Drain (BBD), or a Brain Gain. The central proposition of
studies such as Mountford (1997), Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997)
and (1998), Vidal (1998), and Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001) is that, if
the possibility of emigration induces more skill-creation than skill-loss, source
1This chapter builds on Di Maria and Stryszowski (2006).
2Several theoretical studies have pointed at the potential negative effect of the outflow of
human capital on source countries, among others: Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), Kwok and
Leland (1982), Galor and Tsiddon (1997a), and Miyagiwa (1991).
3Japan and, to a greater extent, South Korea experienced high levels of skilled emigration
in the past decades. South Korea, for example, still had a rate of brain drain of over 9% among
highly skilled workers in 1990. In the same year Taiwan and Singapore exhibited even higher
rates: 15.2% and 24.8%, respectively. By comparison India (3.9%), Bangladesh (2.1%), and
Indonesia (3.9%) suffered a much smaller drain of human capital. This high rates of brain
drain notwithstanding, Japan and the Asian Tigers where much more successful in terms of
economic performance than the countries in the other group.
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countries might actually increase their stock of human capital, as the possi-
bilities of moving and working abroad increase. One of the simplest mech-
anisms behind results of this type is that the possibility of emigration might
lead economic agents to invest more in their human capital. Yet, since not all
of them emigrate in the end, also those who stay in the country of origin have
a higher human capital than would otherwise have been the case. Under such
circumstances, the simple ‘drain’ effects emphasized by earlier contributions
are (possibly) more than compensated by these ‘gain’ effects.
Empirical investigations of the effects of skilled migration on source coun-
tries have provided mixed results. While most authors would agree that mi-
gration of skilled workers is positive for the destination country,4 there is no
consensus as refers to the effects on the source economies. Recent empirical
work by Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2003) has indeed shown that the net
effect of the brain drain can be either positive or negative. Despite the sig-
nificant and positive effect on human capital accumulation that they are able
to identify, Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport show that the effects in terms of
annual GDP growth are more mixed. Indeed, according to their estimates the
BBD hypothesis is supported by the data only for a small number of countries.
The authors conclude by noting that "the simple fact that, among sending coun-
tries there are winners and losers, points to the necessity of a better understanding of
the circumstances and factors favouring the occurrence of a detrimental brain drain".5
In this chapter we aim at contributing to the debate on the brain drain by fo-
cussing on the role played by the composition of human capital in fostering
productivity growth and, finally, economic development.
The BBD hypothesis implicitly assumes that the human capital that is accu-
mulated with a view to emigration can prove useful once people remain in
their country of origin. One might ask if this is a realistic assumption. Indeed,
it runs counter to some empirical evidence showing that countries with sim-
ilar levels but different compositions of education (which we use as a proxy
for human capital accumulation) by type have very different performances in
terms of convergence and growth. If all human capital would be useful, a
higher level thereof would imply faster GDP growth, irrespective of its com-
position, all else equal.
Although not much addressed in the literature, the different roles played by
different types of human capital at different stages of development has been
recognized by a number of authors. Both Durlauf and Johnson (1997) and
4An excellent reference on these issues is Borjas (1990).
5Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2003), p.35.
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Krueger and Lindahl (2001) provide evidence as to the heterogenous effects
of education on growth across countries with different levels of development.
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2001), instead, discuss the
existence of non-linearities in the education-growth relationship.
Based on this, in what follows we claim that not all the human capital accu-
mulated in view of possible emigration is appropriate for the technology avail-
able in the source country, and for its level of development. In particular, we
postulate that the distance to the technological frontier is a key determinant
for understanding the effects of human capital accumulation/composition on
economic growth. While the accumulation of human capital seems to imply
faster technological advancement and economic growth, we point at the dif-
ferent types of human capital that are most useful at different stages of de-
velopment. This view reflects the idea that technological advances become
available either through imitation or through innovation, and that each activ-
ity requires (a different combination) of different types of skills. It is reason-
able to assume that imitation requires a more technically inclined work force,
whereas the more complex activity of innovation requires more than technical
skills alone. Indeed, the closer economies are to the frontier, the more complex
their economic and institutional systems, the higher their need for a balanced
work force comprising technical skills, creativity, humanistic competencies,
legal and managerial expertise. Conversely, at earlier stages of economic de-
velopment, when the main task is to copy and adapt available technologies,
a more intense specialization in technical skills can prove helpful in catching
up.
Following Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006), we model two eco-
nomies that can be parameterized by their distance from the technological
frontier. Economic development is driven by productivity growth, and pro-
ductivity improvements depend on the amount and the composition of the
human capital available in the country, besides on the distance from the tech-
nological frontier. Once at the frontier of technology, productivity advances
are only possible through innovation, whereas imitation occurs further away
from the frontier. Following on our argument above, we assume that imitation
is more intensive in technical skills than innovation.
To investigate the distortionary effects of migration on the accumulation of
human capital, we model human capital accumulation by agents as an en-
dogenous decision. By letting the type of skills acquired be determined by
the costs and benefits faced by heterogenous agents, we add one important
dimension to our model. We are in fact able to investigate the interaction
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between labour market outcomes, migration possibilities and institutional ar-
rangements, such as the existence of educational policies targeted at satisfying
the needs of the local economy.
Our results show that the possibility of migration distorts the incentives for
agents to accumulate the type of human capital that is appropriate for the
country of origin, given its level of development. We show that when migra-
tion becomes possible at early stages of economic development the growth
rate of the source economy decreases. We discuss circumstances under which
this process leads to development traps, i.e. situations where the process of
convergence to the technological frontier stops prematurely. Furthermore, we
show that educational policies, in the form of subsidies to particular types of
skills, can counteract the negative effects of migration on growth. Assuming
that in democratic societies migration cannot be (completely) prevented, our
analysis delivers a clear policy recommendation: Countries that wish to max-
imize their convergence potential should take this mechanism into account
and increasingly subsidize appropriate skills, the further away they are from
the technological frontier, and the easier the prospects of migration.
4.1 Education, migration and economic development
At the aggregate level, the relationship between brain drain and economic
growth is far from univocal. To illustrate this point, we consider the growth
rates of the GDP for 128 countries in 2000 and their rate of brain drain – mea-
sured as the percentage of tertiary educated residents who emigrate – ten
years earlier. Figure 4.1 presents the scatter plot of the two variables and the
regression line. The two variables show very little evidence of being corre-
lated, in fact the correlation coefficient, ρ, equals 0.06.6
The lack of any significance of this aggregate relationship does not mean
much, however, as it simply hides a whole range of situations where countries
experienced different degrees of brain drain and various degrees of success in
terms of economic growth. Among these, we find the experience of the East
Asian economies to be one of the most interesting.
In the last fifty years countries like Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singa-
pore, Hong Kong and Taiwan all exhibited astonishing growth rates. At the





growth rates are derived from the Penn World Table 6.1 from Heston, Summers, and Aten
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Figure 4.1: GDP growth and brain drain.
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 and Docquier, Lohest, and Marfouk (2005).
same time, they pursued a policy of open borders, i.e. a significant share of
their highly skilled workers left over the years to work abroad. Compared to
countries with similar rates of brain drain and initial levels of development,
however, these East Asian economies performed much better and managed to
catch-up with first-world standards of living (and technological knowledge)
within a short time period.
There are many important lessons to be learned from the experience of these
countries and, indeed, many pages have been filled with analyses of the East
Asian “miracle”.7 Here we draw attention to one specific aspect of these
economies that has not been fully appreciated by previous analyses: all these
economies have exhibited a marked commitment of the government to pro-
mote the accumulation of particular types of skills. As World Bank (1993)
puts it, “public funding of post-secondary education focused on technical skills [. . . ]
The result of these policies has been a broad, technically inclined human capital base
well-suited to rapid economic development”.8
Despite having shares of public expenditure on education in line with, and
7Two important references analyzing, and rethinking, the East Asian economies’ impres-
sive performance are World Bank (1993) and (2001).
8Ibid., page 15. Emphasis added.
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Figure 4.2: Share of science and engineering students on total tertiary education
(1980).
Source: Own calculations on United Nations Common Data-Base (UNCDB) data.
sometimes lower than those in other developing countries,9 the East Asian
economies chose to support the accumulation of specific types of skills which
were deemed most useful to economic development. As shown by the graph
in Figure 4.2, there is no clear relationship between the accumulation of ‘tech-
nical’ skills and the level of economic development. The Figure reports the
percentage of science and engineering students in the total, in 1980, for an in-
dicative cross-section of developed and developing countries.10 One remark-
able feature of these data is that both poor and rich countries exhibit either
high or low shares of technical students (China vs. India or Finland and Swe-
den vs. New Zealand and Canada, for example), so that no clear pattern is
visible. What is apparent, instead, is that countries like the Republic of Korea,
Hong Kong and Singapore are at the top of the distribution.
Can this high share of technically skilled workers explain, at least in part,
the success of the East Asian economies? Another simple graph lends support
to this claim. Figure 4.3 plots the growth rate of a number of developed and
developing countries in 1990, against the share of science and engineering
9In 1960, for example, the Republic of Korea spent 2.0% of its GDP on education, in the
same year Brazil’s share was 1.9%, and the average for Sub-Saharan African countries was
2.4%. In 1989, Korea’s budget for education increased to 3.6%, Brazil’s reached 3.7% and for
the same sub-set of African countries the share topped 4.1%. These figures are taken from
World Bank (1993), table 5.3.
10Figure 4.2 is based on computations by the authors on UNCDB data.
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students on total tertiary education in 1980 and the corresponding regression
line.11 The plot seems to imply that having a higher share of science and
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Figure 4.3: GDP growth (1990) and the share of S&E students (1980).
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 and UNCDB.
The other interesting aspect is how such a composition of human capital
was obtained. Most East Asian economies, in fact, represent clear examples
of the government’s intervention into the structure of the tertiary education.
In Japan, for example, the system comprising the National Institute for Edu-
cational Policy Research (NIER), founded in 1949, and the Ministry of Educa-
tion, Sports and Culture,12 has for a long time been perceived as the “Super-
ministry” responsible for adjusting the structure of Japanese schooling to the
needs of local industries. Similar institutional structures also exist in the coun-
tries of the group of the so-called “Asian Tigers”.
More recently, however, there has been an increasing effort to move away
from the predominance of the government and towards the utilization of mar-
ket mechanisms, especially in Japan where a deep reform of the educational
system is currently under way. Analysts have argued that such moves reflect





sample consists of 53 countries. Data derived from the Penn World Table 6.1 and the UNCDB.
12In January 2001, the former Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture and the former
Science and Technology Agency were merged and the new Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology was founded.
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fundamental shifts in the mode and direction of social development. To quote
a recent OECD report “the increased diversity and complexity of the modern soci-
ety and its needs, necessarily have made centralized decision and control obsolete [. . . ]
[M]arket mechanisms will be the only way to achieve diversified and multidimensional
changes”.13
This shift in paradigm is consistent with the main ideas of our proposed
framework. Since the advancement of knowledge, which is at the basis of
economic growth, can either occur through the creation of new technologies
(ideas) or through the adoption of old technologies from abroad, and since
the two activities require different compositions of human capital, the optimal
structure of human capital depends crucially on the stage of development of
any given economy. Thus, in the presence of distortions, different types of
public policies can be necessary to favour the accumulation of different types
of human capital at different stage of development.
We focus on the possibility of migration as one such potential distortion. By
blurring the borders between economic systems at different levels of economic
development, migration distorts the incentives for the optimal accumulation
of human capital: agents in lagging countries prefer to acquire the type of
human capital that would be more profitable in case of successful migration.
Thus the distance to frontier in different countries could offer a useful key to
understand the effects of the brain drain on economies at different stages of
development.
Moreover, policy could provide a way to offset this harmful effect of brain
drain on human capital composition, by regulating the structure of education,
as we will argue in what follows.
4.2 The model
We describe an economy consisting of two countries, one large destination
country and one small source one. We assume that the destination country
(which we can think of as the group of the OECD countries for concreteness)
is the technological leader, whereas the source country is technologically less
developed.14
13This quote is from the Japanese National Report of the OECD IMHE-HEFCE project on
international comparative higher education financial management and governance, 2004.
14In what follows, we use the terms destination country, technological leader, and leading coun-
try interchangeably. The same applies to the terms source country, technological follower, and
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The economies are populated by workers and firms. Workers accumulate
skills, and supply skilled labour to firms. Skill accumulation is costly in that
some time is necessary to acquire knowledge. We assume that workers differ
in their abilities (their ‘talent’), so that certain types of skills are more diffi-
cult to accumulate (i.e. more time is required) for some agents than for oth-
ers. For simplicity, we assume that all workers accumulate skills and that it
is only possible to acquire two types of skills which we broadly label ‘techni-
cal’ and ‘general’. Consequently, in the model there are two types of workers:
technically-skilled (T) and generally-skilled (G) ones.
Since the net rewards to the accumulation of different skills depends on the
wage commanded by the specific skill and the cost it entails (in terms of fore-
gone earnings), each worker decides on the type of skills she wants to acquire
based on her specific type.
Each firm engages in production of an intermediate, needed in the produc-
tion of the final good, and invests in technology improvements. We assume
that workers are only used in the latter activity. Hence, firms decide how
many workers of each type to employ in the ‘research’ sector, given that tech-
nology can be improved either through R&D activities (innovation proper), or
by adopting existing technologies from the world technological frontier (imi-
tation).
In the next subsections we describe in greater details the accumulation deci-
sions made by workers and the parallel innovation choices facing firms. We
discuss the choices in a situation of autarchy, that is a situation in which no
migration possibility exists. This discussion fully characterizes the destina-
tion country, given our assumption that it is large enough that smaller for-
eign markets are not relevant to its agents’ decisions. Notice, moreover, that
throughout the chapter we ignore the possibility that goods be traded; we do
this to be able to clearly identify the effect of migration on workers’ accumula-
tion decisions. Hence, the alternative to autarchy in our framework is simply
a situation in which workers are allowed (with some positive probability) to
move from the lagging to the leading country.
4.2.1 Investment in education
Each period new cohorts of workers of fixed size are born in each country,
thus there is no population growth. We assume that the population size in the
lagging country.
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leading country, L̄, is larger than L, the population in the lagging country. We
further assume that the share of entrepreneurs in the population is the same
in both economies. This has two consequences: first, the number of firms is
larger in the leading rather than in the lagging country; second, the number
of workers per firm will be the same across countries. In this fashion, the
relative size of the two economies plays no role in the model. Without loss of
generality, as long as we only look at one country at the time, we can simplify
the analysis by letting the population size equal 1.
Workers only live for one period: each period new agents are born, they
decide about their education, they work for a wage, consume all their income
and finally die.
Workers are risk neutral and differ only with respect to the cost they have
to incur to accumulate different types of human capital. They are indexed by
j according to their talent and uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1],
with the convention that j = 1 corresponds to the most talented individual.
The talent of an agent determines her relative cost of acquiring general skills.
Agent j needs to spend a fraction 1− j of her time to acquire these skills, while
we assume that the time-cost of acquiring technical skills is independent of
talent and equal to 1− ξ for all workers, where ξ ∈ (0, 1) .15 Agent j will thus
be able to offer j units of general skills, or ξ of technical skills. Our modelling
choices don’t make general skills overly costly for any individual, however,
for some of them technical skills are easier to acquire and they will therefore
invest in that direction.
The composition of skills between technical and general ones will be deter-
mined by the relative costs of skills accumulation, and by the relative rewards
to the particular kind of skills. Letting the salary for a G-skilled worker at time
t be wGt = ωGt At−1 – where ωGt is the wage per effective unit of human cap-
ital provided at time t, and At−1 indicates the level of total factor productivity
at time t − 1 – and the salary for a T-skilled individual be wTt = ωTt At−1,
it is possible to identify the marginal worker, j′. Agent j′, the worker who is
indifferent between acquiring technical skills (and earning wT per each unit
she provides) and general ones (thereby earning wG per unit), must satisfy the
following condition:
ωTt ξ = ωGt j′. (4.1)
15Effectively this only means that, using the difficulty of developing technical skills as a
benchmark, general skills are relatively easier to acquire for some individuals, and more dif-
ficult for others.
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All agents indexed by j ∈ [0, j′], will accumulate technical skills, conversely,
agents with j ∈ (j′, 1] will choose to become generalists.











which can be easily solved for j′, yielding:
j′ =
√
1− 2 Gt. (4.2)
Rearranging equation (4.1) and using the above expression to substitute for







Finally, note that the constraint that j ∈ [0, 1] implies that the supply of grad-
uates with technical background depends on the supply of G-skills. Hence,
the supply of T-skilled labour is given by:
Tt = ξ j′ = ξ
√
1− 2 Gt. (4.4)
4.2.2 Production and technological progress
In the leading country there are N̄ firms, while in the lagging country there are
only N < N̄ of them. As discussed above, the number of firms in each country
is proportional to the number of workers in each country, so that the size of
the economy is immaterial. Thus, for the sake of generality, we indicate the
number of firms by ν in what follows. Each firm produces one intermediate in-
put for the production of final output, and engages in productivity-enhancing
activities employing skilled workers.
Final output is produced competitively using a continuum of mass ν of in-







where α ∈ (0, 1) and xi,t is the amount of intermediate good i used to produce
Y at time t .
16Notice that this specification implies G ≤ 1/2.
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Each intermediate producer acts as a (local) monopolist and produces good i
using the final good with a one-to-one technology. It is then easy to show that,
for a given level of At, the equilibrium demand for input i equals xi,t = α
2
1−α At.
Hence, profit maximization on the part of intermediate goods’ producers im-
plies that for each firm monopoly profits equal:
πt = ζ At, (4.6)
where ζ ≡ 1−αα α
2
1−α .
Thus, firms maximize their profits by maximizing their productivity level.
Moreover, using the expression for inputs’ demand derived above, it is straight-
forward that the level of final output is linear in the level of technology and,
as a consequence, the growth rate of output will be the same as the growth
rate of technology. Keeping this in mind, we now analyze the choice faced by
firms in formulating their technological development plans.
Firms employ skilled workers to increase productivity. We assume that pro-
ductivity can be improved by directly involving in R&D activity or by adopt-
ing existing technologies from the world technological frontier:17




nt + (Āt−1 − At−1)TσmtG1−σmt . (4.7)
Here Tnt represents the amount of T-skills used in innovation at time t, while
Tmt refers to the amount in imitation. The same applies to Gnt and Gmt. We
assume that both types of skills are needed in both innovation and imitation,
and that the two activities differ in that the productivity of G-skilled workers
is higher in innovation than in imitation, i.e. we let σ > φ.
Furthermore, the technological improvement function in (4.7) implies that
imitation is more productive the further away a country is from the techno-
logical frontier, Ā. This is intuitive since a larger technological gap means that
more innovations can be usefully adopted from abroad. Innovation, instead,
becomes more productive with the own technology level, A, formalizing the
idea that a broader technological base is needed to push the frontier further.
4.3 Equilibrium under autarchy
To characterize equilibrium situations under autarchy, we need to discuss
three possible types of equilibrium according to the regime of technological
17This modelling choice closely follows Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006), who,
in turn, derive it from Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti
(2006).
CHAPTER 4 111
change that takes place. In what follows, we distinguish between equilibria
that occur under innovation, equilibria that obtain under imitation, and mixed
equilibria where both activities take place at the same time.
Let us start with the case where innovation is the only type of productivity-
enhancing activity performed in equilibrium. In this case, new technologies
develop according to:18





Profit-maximizing firms will choose the amount of each type of skilled labour




πt = ζ Āt − ω̄Tt Āt−1T̄t − ω̄Gt Āt−1Ḡt, (4.9)
subject to (4.8).















The above equations, together with (4.3) constitute the equilibrium. Taking
the ratio of (4.10) and (4.11) and substituting for T̄ from the expression in (4.4),










Using this and the supply function in (4.3), we can illustrate the equilibrium
graphically in the (ω, Gt) plane (see Figure 4.4, where ω ≡ ω̄Gt/ω̄Tt). The
demand for generalists is represented with the downward sloping curve D̄,
whereas the supply is represented by the upward sloping curve S. The equi-
librium obtains when both conditions are satisfied simultaneously, that is at
a point like (ω̄∗, Ḡ∗). This point represents the equilibrium when a country
is fully specializing in innovation, thus this is the equilibrium prevailing the
destination country.
18From now on, we identify variables that refer to the innovation-only case by an upper
bar. Variables without the upper bar refer the imitation-only equilibrium. When necessary,
we will distinguish the mixed equilibrium variables with a tilde: ∼.
















Figure 4.4: The equilibrium without migration in the two countries.
Analytically, it is straightforward to solve for the equilibrium level using









where we have used Φ ≡ φ1−φ .
At the other extreme, we focus on the case in which a country only resorts to
imitation to increase their technological level. Local firms, thus fully specialize
in imitation. Except for this, they behave exactly like their counterparts in the
previous case: amending the relevant production function, they choose Gt and





At−1 + (Āt−1 − At−1)Tσt G1−σt
]
−ωTt At−1Tt −ωGt At−1Gt.
(4.13)









Since σ > φ, the demand curve for the case of imitation (the dashed line D in
Figure 4.4) lies below the demand curve for innovation. Intuitively, it is clear
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that, since skills of type G are more productive in innovation than in imitation,
for any given relative wage firms specializing in innovation would demand
relatively more G skills than firms specializing in imitation. Just as before, the
equality of demand and supply will determine the equilibrium levels of the









where Σ ≡ σ1−σ .
From σ > φ, we conclude that when countries fully specialize, the country
that does so in innovation will have a higher level of G.
To complete our analysis, we need to address what happens when firms
don’t fully specialize in either activity. In this case, they will adopt the com-
bination of the two activities which allow them to maximize their profits. In
terms of Figure 4.4, equilibria of this type will correspond to points along the
supply curve S, comprised between E and Ē. The weight of each type of activ-
ity, innovation and imitation, will be determined by the relative productivity
of each. The higher is the weight of imitation, the closer the mixed equilibrium
will be to E, and vice versa for innovation.
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, the productivity of imita-
tion is higher, the wider the technological gap. Innovation, on the other hand,
is more productive the closer a country is to the technological frontier. Thus, at
an intuitive level it seems reasonable that, as we move up along the technolog-
ical ladder, we encounter countries progressively more active in innovation.
In terms of Figure 4.4, this implies that the equilibrium would gradually shift
from point E, where only imitation occurs, to point Ē, where innovation is the
only activity taking place.
Given the structure of (4.7), countries that have a low level of technology
have larger incentives – represented by the term (Āt − At) – to engage in imi-
tation. These incentives, however, decrease with the reduction of the distance
to frontier. Thus, it would seem that imitation occurs far away from the fron-
tier; imitation and innovation coexist as the distance to frontier gets smaller;
while only innovation takes place for low levels of the technological gap. In-
deed, in the proposition that follows we show that the choice of the type of
activity to undertake only depends on the distance-to-frontier parameter, that
we define as at = Āt/At ≥ 1.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the economy described above. There exist two critical
values of the distance to frontier – ãl and ãh – such that, when at−1 < ãl, only
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innovation occurs in the equilibrium; when at−1 > ãh, only imitation occurs in the
equilibrium; and when at−1 ∈ (ãl, ãh), both activities take place in the equilibrium.
Proof. See Section D.1 in the Appendix for the proof, and for the expressions
of ãl and ãh.
According to this proposition, there are values of the distance-to-frontier for
which both innovation and imitation occur simultaneously: this is indeed the
case when at−1 lies between ãl and ãh, as defined in Section D.1 of the Ap-
pendix. In this case, the equilibrium is characterized by a value of the wage
that depends on at−1, ω̃(at−1), defined as
ω̃(at−1) ≡
[








and such that ω̃(at−1) ∈ (ω∗, ω̄∗). The corresponding level of the total sup-
ply of skills, G̃(at−1) say, can be read on the labour supply curve, S in Figure
4.4.
Hence, our economies have an equilibrium at (ω∗, G∗) for all levels of at−1 ∈
[ãh, +∞), in which case full-specialization in imitation will obtain; the equilib-
rium switches to a non-specialization regime with both imitation and inno-
vation happening at the same time, and (ω̃(at−1), G̃(at−1)) for intermediate
levels of a i.e. for at−1 ∈ (ãl, ãh); finally, full specialization in innovation will
occur when at−1 = ãl. In this last case, the wage rate and the equilibrium level
of G-skills are ω̄∗ and Ḡ∗, respectively.
Before moving on to considering how the distance to frontier of the lagging
country evolves over time, there is another important point to make. Since the
labor market is competitive, the wages equal marginal products, hence there
are no extra profits from innovation. However the monopoly profits in the
market for intermediates depend on the productivity level. In the absence of
any external distortions, thus, the technological level is maximized. Since the
growth rate of technology is given by gt = (At − At−1)/At−1, and At−1 is
predetermined, the maximization of technology improvements results in out-
put growth maximization at each point in time. In other terms, in the absence
of any other distortions, the market mechanisms are enough to generate the
appropriate incentives for firms and workers to allocate resources optimally
(in terms of growth). We close this section with the following result:
Proposition 4.2. In the absence of migration, the market solution is growth maxi-
mizing.
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Proof. See Section D.2 in the Appendix.
4.4 Convergence under autarchy
Having described the possible equilibria, in this section we analyze the evolu-
tion over time of the distance to frontier in the source country when no migra-
tion is possible. We show that the lagging country tends to grow faster than
the leading one, and converging over time towards the technological frontier.





thus, as long as the growth rate of the lagging country is larger than the growth
rate of the leading one, convergence towards the frontier will occur, that is at
will decrease over time.
Under autarchy, both the leading and the lagging country enjoy a growth
maximizing allocation of workers across skills, that is the ratio Tt/Gt that
arises in equilibrium, maximizes the growth rate as shown above in Propo-
sition 4.2.







and it only depends on the equilibrium levels of T̄t and Ḡt, which are inde-
pendent of at and constant over time.
To determine the evolution over time of the distance to frontier of the lagging
economy, we need to compare its growth rate with the growth rate of the
frontier country, ḡ. Consider first what happens when the source country is
very far from the frontier and, in particular, when its distance to frontier, at,
is larger than the critical value ãh. Under these circumstances, the lagging
country fully specializes in imitation and its growth rate is given by (at−1 −
1)Tσt G
1−σ
t . Contrary to what happened in the leading country, in this case
the growth rate increases with the distance to the technological frontier, as
imitation is more productive the larger the technological gap. The lagging
country thus grows faster than the technological leader and gets closer (at
decreasing rates) to the frontier.
When the distance to frontier reaches the threshold ãh, firms in the lagging
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country also begin innovating, as it now proves profitable for them to do so.19
By combining the two activities firms maximize their productivity, and the
growth rate of the lagging economy remains higher than the rate of expan-
sion of the frontier (ḡ). The process of convergence continues until the dis-
tance to frontier reaches the level at which companies in the lagging country
fully switch to innovation, i.e. until at−1 = ãl. Once the lagging country has
reached this threshold, it makes use of the same production function as the
leading country to increase productivity: the growth rates of the two coun-
tries are now equal, and the process of convergence is completed. These is
summarized by the following:
Proposition 4.3. In the absence of migration, the lagging country achieves conver-
gence, and reaches the steady-state distance to frontier ãl.
Proof. See Section D.3 in the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is relatively straightforward: recall that firms
always choose the composition of innovation/imitation that maximizes the
rate of productivity growth, indeed, we know from Proposition 4.2 that in
the absence of migration the market outcome is growth maximizing. When a
country is lagging away from the frontier, i.e. when the distance-to-frontier
parameter at−1 is larger than ãl, it is advantageous for firms to perform at
least some imitation and not to fully specialize in innovation: firms exploit
the higher productivity of imitation (away from the frontier) relative to inno-
vation, for any given level of the relative supply of skills. Thus, as long as there
is some gains to be earned by imitating, the average productivity (and hence
the growth rate) will be higher for the lagging country than for the leading
country. At any distance from the frontier larger than ãl, the lagging country
has a growth rate higher than ḡ and the technological distance that separates
it from the frontier tends to decrease.
This catching-up effect, reminiscent of similar effects in the technology dif-
fusion literature (see, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), chpt. 8), vanishes
when the technological gap disappears. When there are no longer advantages
to be derived from imitation, innovation is the only means to foster produc-
tivity; full specialization occurs (see Proposition 4.1), and convergence to the
group of technological leaders has been accomplished.
19As discussed in the proof of Proposition 4.1 in Appendix D.1, the value of ãh and ãl only
depend on the values of the production elasticities, and on the equilibrium levels of ωG and






Figure 4.5: Convergence without migration.
Graphically, this is presented on the (at, gt) plane in Figure 4.5. The hori-
zontal dashed line N, stands for the growth rate of the innovating, frontier
country, ḡ. The upward-sloping line M describes the growth rate reported
by the economy that employs technological adoption as its only means to in-
crease productivity. This line slopes upwards because of the increasing ben-
efits of lagging behind the frontier, as discussed above. The solid lines with
arrow represents the lagging economy’s process of convergence towards the
frontier, through the three different phases of imitation-only (the straight part
of the solid line), imitation-innovation (the curved part) and innovation-only,
when it reaches the distance at = ãl, where convergence is complete.
4.5 Migration and distance to frontier
We now turn to analyzing the effects of the possibility of migration on the
growth rate of the lagging country, and on its steady-state level of income.
Assume that both G-skilled and T-skilled workers in the lagging country
have some non-negative, exogenous probability, pG and pT respectively, to
migrate to the more developed leading country. We assume that migration
is random, i.e. there is no possibility of screening potential migrants, and
hence workers of each type face the same probability of migration. First, we
study the case when the probability of migration is the same for both types of
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workers. Next, we analyze what happens when one type is favoured by the
destination country, i.e. when agents of a given type have a higher probability
of migrating.
4.5.1 Uniform probability of migration
Suppose that both types of skilled agents G and T have the same chances to
migrate to the frontier country: i.e. having acquired their skills, workers will
be able to offer their labour services abroad with probability pG = pT = p ∈
(0, 1).
The possibility of migration influences the accumulation decisions of work-
ers only in the source country. Indeed, since wages in the lagging country
are lower than in the leading one, migration proves unappealing to skilled
workers from the leading country. In the lagging country, however, rational
workers will take into account that with some probability they will be able to
migrate to the more advanced country and obtain higher wages.
In this context, the condition for the marginal worker in the destination
country reads:
(p at−1 ω̄Tt + (1− p)ωTt) ξ = (p at−1 ω̄Gt + (1− p)ωGt)j′. (4.15)




we immediately see that (4.15) implicitly expresses the supply of G-skilled
labour in the source country, for any level of p and at−1. In a graph similar
to the one in Figure 4.4, the supply curve under migration is characterized by
a lower level of ω than the original curve S, for each level of G. Indeed, for
workers to supply any level of G-skills (smaller than Ḡ∗) the domestic relative
wage has to be lower than before, given that the relative wage abroad is never
lower than at home. Figure 4.6 presents the relative graph. Notice that in
the specific case where the migration probability is the same for both types of
workers, the two lines coincide when both countries specialize in innovation
(at point Ē in the figure).20





1−p , where ωno-µ =
ξ√
1−2G expresses the wage under autarchy, for
each level of G. Since ω̄ is the maximum value for the equilibrium level of the relative wage,
it follows that indeed, in the (G, ω) plane, the supply of G-skills under migration is below S
for a > ãl , or, which is equivalent, for G < Ḡ∗.
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Firms’ decisions to hire workers only depend on domestic conditions: given
our assumption that the share of entrepreneurs is the same in the two coun-
tries, the number of workers per firm is the same in the two countries and
across regimes. Thus, the possibility of migration does not affect the firms de-



















Figure 4.6: Demand and Supply under Migration.
As before, labour demand and labour supply jointly determine the equilib-
rium level of G and T. The probability of migration influences these equilib-
rium levels by distorting the accumulation incentives of the workers.
To understand why, remember that while workers respond to price incen-
tives from both countries, firms only face domestic prices. Thus, at every equi-
librium there will be a wedge between the wage ratio perceived by workers
and the wages faced by firms. With the exception of point Ē where countries
are de facto identical as refers to wage rates and technology, at every other mi-
gration equilibrium workers will perceive higher wage rates than firms. In
particular the wage rate ω perceived by workers will be higher than the one
perceived by domestic firms. This is due to the fact that the alternative to
working at home is to work abroad, where only innovation takes place: since
generalists are more productive than technicians in innovation, they are rela-
tively more rewarded in the leading economy. Thus, workers naturally bias
their decision towards G-skilled labour. From Figure 4.6, it is apparent that,
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with the exception of point Ē, where only innovation occurs, every equilib-
rium point under migration will be characterized by a higher level of G-skills
than the corresponding autarchy equilibrium. As this happens, the economy
moves away from the growth-maximizing factor composition, T∗/G∗ (see
Proposition 4.2), at each level of the distance to frontier larger than ãl. Hence,
the growth rate of the source economy declines, leading to the following re-
sult:
Proposition 4.4. When migration of skilled workers is possible, the growth rate of
the lagging economy is reduced for all a ∈ (ãl, ∞).
Proof. In text.
As before, however, when the distance to frontier is ãl, firms still specialize in
innovation at point N; offer a relative wage equal to ω̄∗; and hire Ḡ∗ workers.
Indeed, when the probability to migrate is the same for both types of workers,
the distortionary effect of migration decreases with the level of specialization
in innovation, or which is the same, it increases with the distance to frontier,
see (4.15). When the lagging country fully specializes in innovation, the pos-
sibility of migration ceases to play any role. In this situation the education
incentives for agents are identical in both countries.
Elsewhere, however, things are more complicated. For firms it will still be
profitable to combine innovation and imitation for any level of the distance
to frontier larger than ãl. The range (in terms of a) where the two activities
coexist, however, is larger now than under autarchy. The supply of G-skills is
in fact larger along the E′ − Ē line than along the S line, for any ω. As a con-
sequence, at ãh the level of G (and of T) will differ from its optimal level G∗.
Hence, imitation only is not productive enough at ãh to justify full specializa-
tion in this activity. Specialization will necessarily occur at a level of a larger
than ãh, call it ãh1, given that the productivity of imitation increases with the
distance to frontier. This discussion leads us to our next result:
Proposition 4.5. When migration of skilled workers is possible, and pG = pT = p,
the lagging country converges at a steady-state distance to frontier equal to ãl.
Proof. See Section D.4 in the Appendix.
The conclusion from this and from Proposition 4.4 is that when no type of
skill is favoured by the leading country in terms of migration, the lagging
country still converges to the same level of development as before the intro-







Figure 4.7: Convergence with migration, and pG = pT.
We can summarize the effects of the probability of migration in this situation
as follows: in the first place migration distorts the accumulation of human
capital reducing the growth rate (from imitation). Graphically, this is pre-
sented in Figure 4.7, where the downward sloping line M1 is below the line
M, that represents the growth rate without migration. Second, since imita-
tion is now less productive cœteris paribus, firms will tend to begin innovating
further away from the technological frontier. Indeed, the threshold value for
innovation, ãh, shifts right to ãh1 in Figure 4.7.21 Third, the process of con-
vergence, however, continues up to the point ãl, the same one as in the no-
migration case, since the distortionary effect of migration is irrelevant when
both countries specialize in innovation and the probability of migration is the
same across workers’ type.
4.5.2 Non-uniform probability of migration
In the previous subsection we have shown that, if both types of human capi-
tal have the same probability of migration, the lagging country achieves full
convergence and the steady-state distance to frontier is ãl. When the proba-
bilities of migration differ across skill types, however, workers’ incentives to
accumulate skills are distorted to an even larger extent.
21This can be easily seen from expression (D.2) in Appendix D.1. The introduction of mi-
gration makes technicians scarcer and reduces the relative wage faced by firms, since σ > φ
this signifies an increase in the threshold level ãh.
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The analysis here parallels the analysis performed above for the case of uni-
form probabilities, with the exception that we assume that G-skilled workers,
being more productive in innovation, will be more demanded in the frontier
country than T-type workers and will accordingly face a higher probability of
migration, i.e. we assume that pG > pT. Let us first rewrite (4.15), allowing
for different probabilities of migration in different sectors:
(pT at−1 ω̄Tt + (1− pT)ωTt) ξ = (pG at−1 ω̄Gt + (1− pG)ωGt) j′. (4.16)
As in the previous case, the probability of migration distorts the accumu-
lation of human capital and reduces the growth rate, all else equal. Here,
however, the fact that pG is larger than pT increases the expected value of ac-
cumulating G-skills to a larger degree. One of the consequences is that, in this
case, the distortion affects the accumulation of skills also when the distance
to frontier equals ãl. Indeed, from equation (4.16), it is apparent that, even
when workers face the same wages per unit of effective labour both at home
and abroad (ω̄G and ω̄T), the relative wage perceived by potential migrants is
higher than ω̄∗, causing an over-supply of G-skills.
Moreover, the conclusions from Proposition 4.4 also hold in this case, and
are further reinforced by the positive difference between pG and pT. Thus,
the growth rate decreases further relative to the case where the probability of
migration is expressed by the common p. From these two observation we can
derive the following:
Proposition 4.6. When migration of skilled workers is possible, and pG > pT, the
steady-state distance to frontier of the sending economy increases. Moreover, complete
specialization in innovation is never achieved by the lagging country.
Proof. See Section D.5 in the Appendix.
We use Figure 4.8 to complete the discussion of this case. The line M2 in
the figure lays strictly below the M line, which represents the growth rate
without migration possibilities. However, based on our discussion above, we
know that this line also lies below the line, M1, that we used in Figure 4.7 to
illustrate the case of common p.
The mechanism at work is the same as before: far away from the frontier it
pays to concentrate skills in imitation, since this is the most profitable activity.
The decrease in the distance to frontier, however, reduces the productivity
gap between imitation and innovation. When the productivity has decreased
enough, we observe a switch away from pure imitation. This happens for a
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Figure 4.8: No convergence with migration, and pG 6= pT.
value of a equal to ãh2 > ãh1 > ãh, given the existence of larger distortions
in this context (the possibility of migrating and the different probabilities of
doing so).
That the economy is distorted to a larger degree, finally, is evident from the
fact that the lagging country experiences a development trap in this case. The
fact that generalists are more favoured in migration means that technical skills
become scarcer in the source country also at ãl. Thus the growth performance
of the lagging country cannot exceed the growth performance of the leading
country (which is the speed of expansion of the frontier) at ãl. By the conti-
nuity of the function expressing the growth rate, and the fact that it increases
with the distance to frontier (see the Appendices for the details) we conclude
that the process of convergence towards the frontier must stop short of ãl. We
identify this long-run rest-point of the system by ãtrap in the Figure, to empha-
size the suboptimal nature of this outcome. Despite having the potential to
reach the other countries at the frontier, the distortions induced by the work-
ers’ migration prospects lock the country in a vicious circle of inappropriate
accumulation of skills, lower economic growth (relative to potential) and per-
sistently larger distance from the frontier.
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4.6 The role of subsidies in the process of develop-
ment
In the previous sections we have shown the effects of human capital’s com-
position on the rate of economic growth and the potential convergence of a
developing country. We concluded that the prospect of migration distorts the
composition of human capital in the lagging countries and that, as a conse-
quence, the brain drain translates into smaller growth rates and, potentially,
into steady-states with larger gaps from the technological leaders.
A natural concern for policymakers in developing countries might then be
to design policies aimed at correcting the distortions, and at adjusting the for-
mation of human capital to the needs of local entrepreneurs. In this section
we investigate one such instrument: targeted subsidies to education.
Under migration, the composition of human capital is suboptimal from the
lagging country perspective, thus subsidies might be used as additional incen-
tives to adopt the ‘appropriate’ type of skills. To off-set the negative impact of
brain drain on human capital composition, policymakers in the lagging coun-
try could consider subsidizing the acquisition of technical education or, which
is equivalent, taxing general skills. Without loss of generality, in what follows
we consider subsidies to technical education.
Formally, we present subsidies as an increase in the returns to this type of
education. Workers offering ξ units of technical skills on the market will re-
ceive a compensation of wT ξ(1 + τ), where τ > 0 is the subsidy rate. Our
modelling of subsidies provides a rather general representation of monetary
transfers, in fact, every agent of type T works the same hours, and thus re-
ceives the same amount of subsidies.
To see how the subsidy to technical education corrects the distortionary ef-
fects of the possibility of migration, consider Figure 4.9.
In the figure we draw the expected income of agents accumulating T- and G-
skills as a function of the agent’s type, j ∈ [0, 1]. Investment in T-skills requires
(1− ξ) units of time, irrespective of the agent’s type. Hence, labour income
equals wT ξ for any agent. The cost of accumulating G-skills, instead, depends
on the type of the agent. An agent indexed by j must spend (1− j) units of her
time to accumulate capital. She can subsequently derive an income equal to
wG j from her skills. Point A, the point where the horizontal wT ξ line crosses
the sloping (0−wG) one, identifies j′, the agent who’s indifferent between the


















Figure 4.9: Effects of a subsidy (τ) to technical education.
according to (4.3) and (4.4).
In the absence of migration, this point determines the optimal supply (and
composition) of skills. When migration possibilities enter the picture, how-
ever, expected wages increase for both skill types, and both schedules shift
up. The wages raise from wG to w′G and wT to w
′
T. However, since G-skills
are relatively more rewarded abroad, the upwards shift in the sloping line is
more marked, the relevant curves now cross in B, and the indifferent agent
has a lower index: j′′. Accordingly, the supply of G-skills increases, while that
of T-skills decreases. This yields a suboptimal result in terms of the availabil-
ity of skills for domestic firms. As discussed in previous sections, this results
in a reduction of the growth rate and, when pG > pT, in an increase of the
long-run distance to frontier: a development trap.
Increasing the returns to accumulating technical skills tends to correct the
distortion caused by the migration prospects. The provision of a subsidy in-
creases the wages of T-skilled workers, and raises the horizontal line in the
figure further up. When the subsidy is set optimally, the indifferent agent is
once again indexed by j′. Since the subsidy does not distort the demand for
skills, this is sufficient to repristinate optimality. For that to be the case, how-
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· pG at−1 ω̄Gt + (1− pG)ωGt
pT at−1 ω̄Tt + (1− pT)ωTt − 1, (4.17)
where the ‘no-µ’ subscript indicates the optimal wages without migration.
When technical education is subsidized according to this rule, that is when
τ = τ∗, the marginal agent j′ faces the same expected relative returns to accu-
mulating skills, irrespective of the regime of international mobility.
Notice that, since the strength of the distortion increases with the distance
to frontier, the optimal subsidy τ∗ is an increasing function of at−1. Indeed,
recall that the relative wage ωt decreases with the distance to frontier, going
from ω̄∗ to ω∗, as can be clearly seen from Figure 4.4; thus, ωTno-µ/ωGno-µ
increases with at−1. Moreover, the relative domestic wage ωGt/ωTt decreases
with the distance to frontier, as the productivity of G-skills decreases with the
decreasing weight of innovation relative to imitation. Finally, pG > pT. Thus,
also the second ratio at the right-hand side of (4.17) increases with at−1.
As the process of development and convergence to the frontier proceeds,
the rate of the subsidy necessary to restore the optimal trajectory declines over
time to satisfy (4.17) at each instant (and at each level of the distance to frontier
at−1). We can summarize this discussion in the following result:
Proposition 4.7. When technical skills are subsidized according to (4.17), the opti-
mal accumulation of skills is restored. Moreover, the optimal subsidy rate τ∗ declines
over time, as the technological frontier draws nearer.
Proof. In the text.
Thus, subsidizing technical education when the prospects of migration might
distort accumulation incentives on the part of workers corrects the incentives
and restores optimality. We view this implication of our model as an inter-
esting rationalization of the policies performed by the successful East-Asian
economies that we discussed in Section 4.1. There the state invested in specific
types of tertiary education, with an eye (and something more) to the interests
of the local employers. The implications of the model, moreover, seem con-
sistent with the evolution of the attitude of the policymakers responsible for
educational policy mentioned by some observers. The shift from intervention-
ism to laisser-fair is in line with our story: when the structure of the economy
changes to match that of the leading economies, direct interventions in edu-
cation, to regulate the structure of the supply of skills become redundant, and
the market mechanisms regain center stage.
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4.7 Conclusions
The debate on the economic effects of the brain drain has not yet reached uni-
vocal conclusions under many respects. This is particularly true for studies
focusing on developing countries. Recent empirical contributions (e.g. Beine,
Docquier, and Rapoport 2003) have argued that among developing countries
there are both winners and losers, and concluded that more theoretical work
is needed to understand this pattern.
Building on these ideas, we develop a simple theoretical model to investigate
whether the prospects of migration have an influence on growth and conver-
gence. Our contribution extends the framework of Vandenbussche, Aghion,
and Meghir (2006) to incorporate the endogeneity of human capital accumu-
lation in a model where growth is driven by technical progress, and techni-
cal progress is the result of purposive activities of imitation and of bona fide
innovation. The main insight from the model is that, at different levels of
development, different types of human capital, or rather different proportion
thereof, are needed to achieve optimal growth. Thus, the key determinant of
the optimal composition of skills in any given economy is its distance from
the technological frontier.
By blurring the borders between economic systems at different levels of de-
velopment, the possibility of migration distorts price signals, induces change
in the accumulation of human capital, and ultimately proves detrimental for
developing countries. We find that the brain drain reduces the growth rate of a
developing country along the transition to its long-run balanced growth path.
Moreover, we point at the possibility of the emergence of development traps,
as the opportunities of migration might reduce the long-run income level of
lagging countries.
Our theoretical contribution also provides some normative conclusions that
might shed more light on the astonishing performance of the most successful
East Asian economies over the past few decades. From our positive analy-
sis we know that some types of human capital are more important for the
developing countries, but the incentives to acquire them are reduced by the
prospects of migration. Hence, on the normative side, we show that a very
important role can be played by government interventions, e.g. in the form
of subsidies the encourage the acquisition of those particular skills which are
most needed domestically. Moreover, since the distortionary impact of the mi-
gration prospects decline with the proximity to the frontier, the government’s
support in favor of certain skills should taper off as the development process
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proceeds.
We find this story particularly useful, as it can be used to rationalize the
behaviour of the successful East Asian economies over their path to develop-
ment. Countries like Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore all
experienced both high rates of GDP growth and of brain drain at the same
time: a puzzling story, at first sight. However, they are also quoted as exam-
ples of the government’s intervention in the educational field, where policies
were aimed at favouring the acquisition of technical skills over other skills.
According to our story, these policies might have helped the growth perfor-
mance of Japan and of the Asian Tigers by correcting the distortionary impacts
induced by the brain drain. We find more support for the predictive power of
our analysis in the fact that more recently the same countries are advocating
a pervasive change in their educational strategies, to favour the autonomous
display of market forces. This corresponds to the policy a regulator in our
model would find optimal once the technological frontier has been reached.
Our analysis, however, raises a number of questions, the most obvious of
which refers to the empirical relevance of the mechanisms we identify. We
present some stylized facts and anecdotal evidence supporting our theory, yet,
a more thorough empirical analysis is called for by our results. Among our
plans for future work, finding the necessary data and testing the implications
of the model necessarily plays a prominent role.
APPENDIX
D
PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
D.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Firms maximize profits choosing employment in productivity-enhancing ac-







nt + (at−1 − 1) TσmtG1−σmt
]
+
−ωGt (Gmt + Gnt)−ωTt (Tmt + Tnt) , (D.1)
s.t. Tmt ≥ 0, Tnt ≥ 0, Gmt ≥ 0, Gnt ≥ 0.
Where we have normalized the expression for profits using the distance to
frontier At−1, letting at−1 ≡ Āt−1/At−1. From the first-order conditions of
this problem, we know that, for every level of the relative wages, the relative
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An interior solution for this problem obtains when the left-end sides of both
inequalities above equal ωGt. Thus, both activities occur in equilibrium when-
ever











t ≡ ã(ωt). (D.2)
That is, for every value of ωt ≡ ωGt/ωTt, there exists a unique value of at−1,






< ã(ωt) ⇒ innovation only;
= ã(ωt) ⇒ innovation and imitation;
> ã(ωt) ⇒ imitation only.
(D.3)
However, from the discussion of the equilibria in Section 4.3, we know that
at any equilibrium, the wage rate must lay in the interval [ω∗, ω̄∗]. This im-
plies bounds for the range of the values of at−1 for which interior solutions
may occur in the equilibrium. Let the lower bound of the interval be ãl =
ã(ω̄∗) and the upper bound be ãh = ã(ω∗).
Then, from (D.3), we can conclude that when a < ãl only innovation occurs.
While at−1 > ãh, implies that firms only resort to imitation. For the intermedi-
ate range, at−1 ∈ (ãl, ãh), the equilibrium is characterized by firms performing
both imitation and innovation.
To see this, imagine a situation where the distance to frontier is arbitrarily
close to (but smaller than) ãl. Then all firms innovate and the wage ratio equals
ω̄∗. Now imagine that for some reason at−1 increases to a value larger that ãl,
but smaller than ãh. Every firm, given a wage ratio equal to ω̄∗ would prefer
to shift to imitation, since they can increase profits through the shift. But all
firms are symmetric and if all shift the wage rate becomes ω∗, at which level,
firms would prefer to innovate. By iterating this reasoning, we can conclude
that the only level of the wage rate consistent with an equilibrium is the one
we identified by ω̃(a). A symmetric reasoning is possible for the case where
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at−1 is arbitrarily close to ãh and, following a shock, comes to lie in the interval
(ãl, ãh). This concludes our proof.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Recall equation (4.7),




nt + (Āt−1 − At−1)TσmtG1−σmt ;
the growth rate is:




nt + (at−1 − 1)TσmtG1−σmt . (D.4)
The market solution implies that wages equal the marginal products of the
two types of skills in both activities, using Gnt + Gmt = Gt and Tnt + Tmt = Tt,
we write this as:





nt = (at−1 − 1)σ(Tt − Tnt)σ−1(Gt − Gnt)1−σ.






















Let G∗t be the growth maximizing value of Gt:




nt + (at−1 − 1)(Tt − Tnt)σ(Gt − Gnt)1−σ;
since gt is strictly concave and continuous, and Tt is a function of Gt according

















1This is without loss of generality, focusing on innovation yields equivalent results.












Since this expression is identical to (D.5), we conclude that the market out-
come is growth maximizing.
D.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
From Proposition 4.1 we know that the lagging country can be in any of three
situations: it can be performing innovation only (when a ≤ ãl), it can be en-
gaging in both innovation and imitation (when a ∈ (ãl, ãh)), or it can be fully
specialized in imitation (when a ≤ ãh). Under the innovation-only regime, the
lagging country is, by symmetry, identical to the technological leader, and
its growth rate will then be ḡ, a constant. If imitation and innovation co-
exist at the optimum, the growth rate will be given by (D.4). Proposition 4.2
shows that for each level of at−1, this function is maximized by the solution
of our model. Moreover, the function in (D.4) is continuously differentiable in






In the imitation-only case, equation (D.4) reduces to
gt = (at−1 − 1)Tσt G1−σt , (D.7)
and the same reasoning goes through. We can conclude that the growth rate
of the lagging economy increases with the distance to frontier and is higher
than the rate of frontier expansion at each point where a > ãl.
D.4 Proof of Proposition 4.5
First notice that when pG = pT = p the labour supply of the lagging country,
implicitly defined by (4.15), coincides with the one for the leading economy
whenever ω = ω̄. In this case, by symmetry, the two economies are identical
and their growth rates are also equal. Hence when the lagging country, has a
distance to frontier equal to ãl, it specializes in innovation, and will grow at
the same rate as the leading economy: gt = ḡ.
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Whenever at ∈ (ãl, ãh), both innovation and imitation occur at the same
time. The growth rate of the economy is then:
gt(·) = TφntG1−φnt + (at−1 − 1)TσmtG1−σmt .
In the presence of migration, the equilibrium level of G and T, and the split
thereof, will not be the same as without migration, hence the growth rate will
not be maximized.





















At any interior equilibrium it must be the case that φTφ−1nt G
1−φ
nt = (at−1 −
1)σTσ−1mt G
1−σ
mt = ωTGt, and (1− φ)TφntG−φnt = (at−1 − 1)(1− σ)TσmtG−σmt = ωGt.
Moreover, since T = Tmt + Tnt, it follows that ∂Tnt/∂at−1 = ∂Tt/∂at−1 −
∂Tmt/∂at−1; a similar expression holds for Gt, Gmt and Gnt. Using these facts












Recalling the expression linking the supply of T-skills to Gt, from equation



















mt > 0, (D.9)
since both terms are always positive. Indeed, as discussed in section 4.5.1,
the term in square brackets is always negative since the supply curve under
migration, and hence the equilibrium value of the ware rate ω, lies below
the supply curve relative to the no migration case. Recalling footnote 20 this
implies ωt < ωno-µ, or ω < ξ/
√
1− 2Gt < 1/
√
1− 2Gt. Since ∂Gt/∂at−1 < 0
because the equilibrium level of Gt decreases with ωt, while ωt decreases with
the distance to frontier, the first term is always positive. The positivity of the
second term at the right-hand side, on the other hand, is trivial.
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To conclude the proof notice that when only imitation occurs by a similar
reasoning we immediately get (D.9), by setting Tmt = Tt and Gmt = G.
Thus, we have shown that the lagging economy grows faster than the lead-
ing one for each level of the distance to frontier larger than ãl, while it grows
just at the same rate as the frontier when full specialization in innovation (i.e.
convergence) is finally achieved.
D.5 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Notice that the proof in Proposition 4.5 that the growth rate of the lagging
economy increases with the distance to frontier holds irrespective of the val-
ues of pG and pT. Hence, also in this case we can conclude that g increases
monotonically with a. Thus, there is a tendency for the technologically lag-
ging country to converge.
To prove that the process stops prematurely when the probability of migra-
tion is different for workers with different types of skills, recall (4.16). If the
distance to frontier were ãl and firms in the lagging country were to specialize
in innovation, by symmetry, domestic wages would equal foreign ones. Con-
trary to before though, the two economies are not identical, given the wedge
induced by the different probabilities of migration. Thus the accumulation
of human capital is distorted. From Proposition 4.2, the growth rate is max-
imized in the leading country. Since g is strictly concave and continuous, it
follows that the growth rate that can be obtained for ãl by the lagging country
can only be smaller than ḡ.
Since the growth rate increases monotonically with a, it follows immediately
that the lagging country will stop converging towards the frontier at a level of
the distance to frontier atrap > ãl.
Thus, the steady-state distance to frontier is increased by the possibility of
migration and that no specialization in innovation is possible in this case.
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NEDERLANDS SAMENVATTING
De richting kiezen: investeren, het milieu, en economis-
che ontwikkeling
Is technologische verandering goed voor het milieu in een globaliserende we-
reld, of leidt het daarentegen tot meer vervuiling? Is klimaatbeleid een ver-
lichte poging om het milieu te behouden voor toekomstige generaties, of is het
slechts een last voor de economie? Leiden pogingen om het onderwijsniveau
in ontwikkelingslanden te verhogen tot hogere economische groei, of worden
daarmee toch al schaarse middelen weggegooid? Dit zijn slechts enkele van
de thema’s die in deze dissertatie worden onderzocht.
Dit proefschrift concentreert zich op de relaties tussen technologische ver-
andering, milieubeleid en milieukwaliteit enerzijds, en op de relaties tussen
technologische verandering, de accumulatie van menselijk kapitaal en eco-
nomische ontwikkeling anderzijds. Door dit hele boek heen betogen we dat
we, om deze complexe fenomenen te begrijpen, rekening moeten houden met
zowel de algemeen evenwichtseffecten van deze problemen, zoals de weder-
kerige verbanden tussen technologische verandering en het aanbod van pro-
ductiefactoren (zoals natuurlijke hulpbronnen en vaardigheden), als met de
dynamische aspecten, zoals de ontwikkeling over de tijd van het niveau en de
samenstelling van technologie en productiefactoren. In dit proefschrift nemen
we dit als uitgangspunt en bestuderen we uiteenlopende onderwerpen zoals
pollution havens die het gevolg zijn van handel tussen Noord en Zuid, inter-
nationale verschillen in klimaatbeleid en innovatie, en de verbanden tussen
migratie, technologische ontwikkeling en groei in ontwikkelingslanden.
Onze analyse wordt uitgevoerd met behulp van dynamische algemeen even-
wichtsmodellen, met kennisaccumulatie die wordt gedreven door financiële
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prikkels, en is dus stevig geworteld in de traditie van de groeitheorie. De vier
hoofdstukken die samen dit proefschrift vormen hebben echter alle een spe-
ciale focus op de rol van de samenstelling van productiefactoren, in plaats van
op hun niveau, in het bepalen van de uitkomsten.
De eerste drie hoofdstukken van dit boek vallen binnen het raamwerk van
‘Directed Technical Change‘ (gerichte technologische verandering, DTC), één
van de meest recente ontwikkelingen op het terrein van de theorie van eco-
nomische groei. De ontwikkeling van deze benadering is gestart door Daron
Acemoglu, die het belang van de richting en de bias (strekking) van endogene
technologische verandering benadrukt (zie bijvoorbeeld Acemoglu 2002). In
de eerste drie hoofdstukken van deze dissertatie breiden we het DTC kader
uit, en analyseren we verschillende onderwerpen op het terrein van milieu-
economie. Als eerste behandelen we het debat rond de Pollution Haven Hypo-
thesis (hypothese van toevluchtsoorten voor vervuiling).
Het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift richt zich op de rol van endoge-
ne technologische verandering en technologie spillovers bij het verklaren van
verschillen in vervuiling tussen landen, en het Pollution Haven effect van in-
ternationale handel. We presenteren een Noord-Zuid handelsmodel met twee
specifieke eigenschappen. Ten eerste worden nieuwe technologieën ontwik-
keld in het Noorden, om pas daarna naar het Zuiden te verspreiden. Ten
tweede kiezen milieu-autoriteiten in iedere regio lokaal milieubeleid door een
afweging te maken tussen een hoger inkomen en het verlies aan nut door meer
vervuiling.
We tonen aan dat handel er toe kan leiden dat het Noorden technologieën
ontwikkelt die besparen op vervuiling en dat het Zuiden minder vervuilt, het-
geen tegen de traditionele herallocatie-en specialisatie-effecten van handel in
gaat. Dit ’technologie optimisme’ is echter niet de enige mogelijke uitkomst.
Indien het moeilijk is om van vervuiling-intensieve goederen weg te substitu-
eren, leidt een toename in innovatie inspanningen in de schone sectoren in het
Noorden tot een toename in de vraag naar vervuiling-intensieve goederen in
het Zuiden. In dit geval leidt handel tot technologische verandering die juist
vervuiling gebruikt, en dit versterkt de prikkel voor het Zuiden om meer te
vervuilen.
Verspreiding van technologieën van het Noorden naar het Zuiden is dus niet
noodzakelijk goed voor het milieu in het Zuiden. Door DTC in de analyse
op te nemen tonen we aan dat, in tegenstelling tot wat vaak wordt beweerd,
technologische verandering slechts potentieel, en niet noodzakelijk, een zegen
is.
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In het tweede hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie gaan we verder met onze ana-
lyse van DTC in open economieën en richten we onze aandacht op klimaat-
beleid en het Kyoto Protocol. Het hoofdstuk richt zich op het debat over de
effectiviteit van het Protocol indien sprake is van grote landen die het Protocol
niet geratificeerd hebben. De crux is dat landen die buiten een internationaal
klimaatverdrag vallen prikkels kunnen hebben om hun uitstoot van broei-
kasgassen te verhogen, terwijl andere landen juist proberen hun emissies te
verlagen. Dit fenomeen heet carbon leakage (koolstof lekkage).
We betogen dat tot op heden de rol van technologische verandering in het
debat zwaar onderschat is. We ontwikkelen een twee landen model waarin
innovaties endogeen plaatsvinden in beide regio’s, en we vergelijken het ef-
fect van een unilaterale limiet op CO2 uitstoot op de emissiebeslissing van
het andere land. We tonen aan dat het toestaan van endogene verschillen
tussen sectoren in de mate van technologische verandering, dat wil zeggen
indien sprake is van DTC, de perceptie van het probleem drastisch verandert.
We wijzen op het feit dat klimaatbeleid de prikkels voor innovatie verandert,
door veranderingen in de relatieve prijzen (en het relatieve aanbod) van de
productiefactoren. In vergelijking met het geval van niet-gerichte technologi-
sche verandering leidt DTC tot minder toename in de CO2 uitstoot van het
andere land. Daarnaast tonen we aan dat, onder bepaalde omstandigheden,
de richting van carbon leakage omgekeerd kan worden, en de introductie van
het Kyoto Protocol kan leiden tot technologieën die niet-ratificerende landen
ertoe brengen hun emissies te verlagen.
In het derde hoofdstuk richten we onze aandacht op het onderwerp duur-
zaamheid, dat wil zeggen de vraag of economische groei op lange termijn kan
aanhouden indien sprake is van schaarste van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. De
meeste aandacht in de literatuur op dit terrein gaat uit naar de vraag of tech-
nologische vooruitgang een blijvend niveau van consumptie kan garanderen.
De gezamenlijke noemer van de oude en de nieuwe modellen is dat een strikt
positieve groeivoet van hulpbron aanpassende (resource augmenting) techno-
logische vooruitgang noodzakelijk is voor niet-afnemende consumptie op de
lange termijn. In alle endogene groei modellen met niet-hernieuwbare hulp-
bronnen is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor altijd-toenemende consump-
tie dat de groeivoet van hulpbron aanpassende technologische vooruitgang
strikt groter is dan de discontovoet van consumptie. Hetzelfde geldt voor
neo-klassieke modellen waar de mate van hulpbron-besparende technologi-
sche verandering exogeen is. De meeste bijdragen op dit terrein delen dus
de mening dat innovaties direct of indirect de productiviteit van natuurlijke
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hulpbronnen verhogen. Het bestaan van puur hulpbron aanpassende techno-
logische verandering ontbeert tot nu toe echter nog iedere microfundering.
Men kan dus bij bovengenoemde modellen aantekenen dat ze conceptueel
een afwijking hebben ten faveure van duurzaamheid: aangezien technologi-
sche verandering in principe kapitaal- in plaats van hulpbron aanpassend kan
zijn, maken deze auteurs misschien slechts een doelmatige doch sterke aan-
name.
In dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken we of, en onder welke voorwaarde, technolo-
gische verandering endogeen gericht is op hulpbron aanpassende innovaties.
We behandelen dit onderwerp met behulp van een multi-sector DTC raam-
werk waarin niet-hernieuwbare hulpbronnen en accumuleerbaar fysiek kapi-
taal beide essentieel voor productie zijn.
Ons belangrijkste resultaat is dat langs een gebalanceerd groeipad puur hulp-
bron aanpassende technologische verandering plaatsvindt: hoewel de groei-
voet van kapitaal aanpassende (capital augmenting) technologische verande-
ring op korte termijn positief kan zijn, moet ze naar nul dalen wanneer de eco-
nomie het gebalanceerde groeipad bereikt. Zodoende bieden wij een micro-
fundering voor modellen met kapitaal en een natuurlijke hulpbron met hulp-
bron aanpassende technologische verandering, voor zowel de Solow-Ramsey
modellen als de modellen met endogene technologische verandering. Ons re-
sultaat gaat in tegen de gedachte dat zulke modellen te optimistisch zijn met
betrekking tot duurzaamheid.
Het vierde essay van dit proefschrift brengt ons op het terrein van ontwikke-
lingseconomie. In dit laatste hoofdstuk dragen we bij aan het debat rond het
effect van de accumulatie van vaardigheden (skills) op groei: we analyseren
de interactie tussen de samenstelling van vaardigheden, de mogelijkheid tot
emigratie, en de mate waarin een ontwikkelingsland achter ligt.
In dit hoofdstuk breiden we het werk van Vandenbussche, Aghion en Meghir
(2004) uit door endogene accumulatie van menselijk kapitaal toe te staan, en
door ons te concentreren op de verstorende effecten van migratie in een mo-
del dat zich kenmerkt door een stroom naar het buitenland van geschoolde
werkers, de zogenoemde brain drain.
Gemotiveerd door het niet eenduidige empirische werk van Beine, Docqui-
er en Rapoport (2003) dragen we in dit hoofstuk bij aan het debat door ons
te concentreren op de rol die de samenstelling van menselijk kapitaal speelt bij
het voeden van de productiviteitsgroei en, uiteindelijk, de economische ont-
wikkeling. We betogen dat niet alle menselijk kapitaal bruikbaar is voor de
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beschikbare technologie en het huidige niveau van ontwikkeling. We betogen
met name dat de afstand tot de technologische grens de sleutelfactor is voor
het begrip van de effecten van de accumulatie en samenstelling van mense-
lijk kapitaal op economische groei. Hoewel de accumulatie van menselijk ka-
pitaal lijkt te leiden tot snellere technologische vooruitgang en economische
groei wijzen wij op de verschillende soorten menselijk kapitaal die het meest
bruikbaar zijn in verschillende stadia van economische ontwikkeling. Dit per-
spectief geeft de gedachte weer dat technologische veranderingen beschikbaar
komen door hetzij immitatie hetzij innovatie, en dat iedere activiteit (een an-
dere combinatie van) verschillende soorten van vaardigheden verlangt.
Onze resultaten laten zien dat de mogelijkheid van emigratie de prikkels
voor agenten om het voor het land van oorsprong meest bruikbare soort men-
selijk kapitaal (gegeven het niveau van ontwikkeling) te verkrijgen, verstoort.
We tonen aan dat de groeivoet van het land van oorsprong afneemt wanneer
in vroege stadia van ontwikkeling emigratie mogelijk is. Ook bespreken we
de voorwaarden waaronder het mogelijk is dat dit proces leidt tot een armoe-
deval, dat wil zeggen een situatie waarin het proces van convergentie naar de
technologische grens voortijdig stopt.
Tenslotte richten we ons op een normatieve analyse en tonen we aan dat
onderwijsbeleid, in de vorm van subsidies voor bepaalde vaardigheden, de
negatieve effecten van migratie op groei tegen kan gaan. Landen die hun con-
vergentiepotentieel wensen te maximaliseren dienen dus rekening te houden
met dit mechanisme, en dienen de meest bruikbare vaardigheden in toene-
mende mate te subsidiëren naar mate de economie verder van de technologi-
sche grens af ligt en naar mate het gemakkelijker is om te emigreren.

